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The thesis reports research into a phenomenon which it calls the personal working model of an 
individual knowledge worker.  
The principal conjecture addressed in this thesis is that each of us has a personal working model 
which is supported by a personal work system enabled by a personal information management 
system. For some people, these are well defined; for most they are not even explicit. By means of 
structured self-reflection aided by conceptual knowledge modelling within the context of a process of 
action learning they can be improved. That personal working model is predicted by Ashby's law of 
requisite variety and by the good regulator theorem of Conant and Ashby. The latter theorem states 
that the only good regulator of a system is a model of that system. 
The thesis and the work it reports result from a systemic approach to identifying the personal 
information management system and personal work system which together contribute to the 
personal working model. Starting with abductive conjecture, the author has sought to understand 
what models are and to explore ways in which those models can themselves be expressed. The thesis 
shows how a new approach to the conceptual modelling of aspects of the personal knowledge of 
knowledge worker was designed, built and then used. Similarly, the actual data used by a knowledge 
worker had to be stored, and for this purpose a personal information management system was also 
designed. Both these artefacts are evaluated in accordance with principles drawn from the literature 
of design science research. The research methodology adopted in the first phase of the research now 
ending also included a relatively novel approach in which the PhD student attempted to observe 
himself over the last five years of his PhD research – this approach is sometimes called 
autoethnography. This autoethnographic element is one of a number of methods used within an 
overall framework grounded by the philosophical approach called critical realism. 
The work reported in the thesis is initial exploratory research which, it is planned, will continue in 
empirical action research involving mentored action learning undertaken by professional knowledge 
workers. 
[Abstract 348 words; thesis 104566 words without index but with appendices] 
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 INTRODUCTION 
TO A PERSONAL WORKING 
MODEL 
This chapter is firmly in the tradition “tell’em what you’re going to tell’em, tell them, then 
tell’em what you told’em”; it tells a lot of the story in advance and in very condensed form. 
0.1 Thesis themes: what are you about to read? 
In this thesis, I will present my research into the personal work system and personal working 
model of knowledge workers. The research question is: What is the contribution of personal 
information management systems PIMS to the Working Model and personal work system 
PWS of knowledge workers? I shall discuss the thinking and philosophy behind the highlighted 
terms as I establish the existence of a governing model and the need for and nature of the PWS 
and PIMS.  
The thesis and the work which it reports results from a systemic approach. In particular it 
takes as its starting point the work of the cyberneticians W. Ross Ashby and Roger Conant - 
specifically Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety (Ashby 1956) and the Good Regulator Theorem 
of Conant and Ashby (Conant and Ashby 1970). The latter theorem states that the only good 
regulator of a system is a model of that system. Clearly therefore we need to understand 
what models are and we need to explore the ways in which models can be expressed. I will 
introduce and justify a new approach to the conceptual modelling of personal knowledge. This 
has been dubbed concept-process reciprocity modelling, abbreviated to Conceprocity. 
I shall of course discuss the research design: its objectives, motivation, methodology, 
techniques and planned dissemination before reporting the research findings: the extent to 
which I have so far succeeded in identifying a personal working model, a personal work system 
and personal information management system. The thesis concludes in stressing that this 
initial exploratory research is only the first part of a planned research programme. This will 
now move on to mentored action learning - working in conjunction with research volunteers 
who are themselves knowledge workers. 
The thesis title and the principal conjecture 
The title of the thesis is: 
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"What is the contribution of personal information management systems (PIMS) to the working 
model and personal work system of knowledge workers?" 
The principal conjecture is that each of us has a personal working model which is supported 
by a personal work system enabled by a personal information management system. For 
some people, these are well defined; for most they are not even explicit. By means of 
structured self-reflection aided by conceptual knowledge modelling within the context of a 
process of action learning they can be improved.  
The abductive necessity for, and character of, a working model 
The thesis is in part a top-down theory-driven argumentation and justification for the 
necessary existence of a working model that is vital to the regulation of the individual's 
personal and working life. Concretely, the thesis takes as its starting point the theory-derived 
necessity (following Conant and Ashby 1970) for a personal information management system 
PIMS (whether ICT enabled or not) as a part of the regulatory model essential to an 
individual’s efficient and effective personal and working life. Conant and Ashby (1970), in an 
article which they entitled “Every good regulator of a system must be a model of that 
system”, showed that:  
“The design of a complex regulator often includes the making of a model of the system to be 
regulated. The making of such a model has hitherto been regarded as optional, as merely one of 
many possible ways. In this paper a theorem is presented which shows, under very broad 
conditions, that any regulator that is maximally both successful and simple must be isomorphic 
with the system being regulated. (The exact assumptions are given.) Making a model is thus 
necessary. The theorem has the interesting corollary that the living brain, so far as it is to be 
successful and efficient as a regulator for survival, must proceed, in learning, by the formation 
of a model (or models) of its environment.” (Conant and Ashby 1970, p.89).  
The thesis seeks to tease out some of the multiple dimensions and necessarily active nature 
that such an isomorphic model must requisitely possess if it is to be capable of generating 
sufficient variety to overcome the variety that exists in its environment, as is required by the 
same Ross Ashby’s earlier law of requisite variety (Ashby 1956). Thus, the model should have 
both representational and active (actionable) characteristics if the desirable and essential-to-
survival goal of effective regulation of the individual’s life is to be achieved. To the extent that 
we all, for a time, do succeed in a degree of self-regulation and viability, the model must exist in 
some form and the research goal has therefore been to discern and to characterise it initially, 
with the hope of improving it subsequently. 
The thesis is also an investigation of how the affordances and constraints (Maier and Fadel 
2009; Volkoff and Strong 2013) offered by information management technology used by the 
individual  influence and limit what the individual can actually achieve in her working life. This 
aspect of the thesis is informed empirically by multi-methods research (Mingers 2001) which 
has included the unusual methodological lens of auto-ethnography. Autoethnography, 
sometimes referred to as confessional writing, is validly subject to considerable criticism in the 
sociological literature from which it springs. However, it is usually also associated with 
reflexivity and thus with learning (Wall 2006). I understood at an early stage in what I regard 
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as a long-term research programme that I myself needed to learn before I could go on to carry 
out mentored action research into the personal information management of others in planned 
post-PhD research. My principal existing empirical evidence comes from a 390,000-word five-
year auto-ethnographic research journal which I have subjected to textual analysis using 
(‘Leximancer’ 2016) (A. E. Smith and Humphreys 2006). 
By means of bricolage (Ciborra 1992); (Verjans 2005), of design research (Hevner and 
Chatterjee 2010a)): (Baskerville, Kaul, and Storey 2015) and of experiential design 
(Baskerville 2011a) I have also built a personal information management application, based on 
software called InfoQube (InfoQube 2019) and on the reference management software Zotero 
(Zotero 2019). This PIM app is a proof-of-concept prototype which encompasses data such as 
my bibliographic references – and my address book and the repeating elements of my 
shopping lists! Thus, I have sought to investigate personal information management systems in 
a multi-method research framework which has included building and using a PIMS in the 
context of doing a PhD: action learning (Revans 1998) within the context of action design 
research (Sein et al. 2011). The design and implementation of the PIMS is the first of two 
pieces of design research in this study. 
Modelling the model 
My empirical research is buttressed by an innovative and original technique of content 
analysis based on the conceptual modelling of typed kinds of knowledge. The design of this 
knowledge modelling method, which is dubbed Conceprocity - concept <-> process 
reciprocity, is a second piece of design research which is shown in this thesis to be based 
ontologically on an amalgam of the scientific and social ontologies of respectively Mario Bunge 
(Bunge 1977, 1979) and of John Searle (Searle 2006). The complementarity of these two 
ontological approaches in the context of information systems was originally suggested by 
(March and Allen 2014). The use of Conceprocity by a knowledge modeller constitutes in itself 
a work system supported by an information system. 
The thesis also discusses the philosophical justification for the existence and abductive 
(retroductive) identification of generative mechanisms which give rise to morphogenesis, 
terms introduced in the critical realism of the philosopher Roy Bhaskar and of the sociologist 
Margaret Archer (Bhaskar 1975, 1978, 1989; M. S. Archer 1982, 1995). The importance of 
critical realism in the field of information systems was recognised by (Dobson 2002) and has 
been discussed inter alia by (Wynn Jr and Williams 2012); (Mingers, Mutch, and Willcocks 
2013; Mingers and Willcocks 2014). I argue and begin to demonstrate that morphogenesis is 
evidenced semantically and semiotically in accordance with work to be reported in a 
forthcoming paper (Macgilchrist and Gregory 2019). Semantic morphogenesis is evidenced 
by paradigm shifts in language (Macgilchrist 2004) which can be noted empirically across the 
longitudinal autoethnographic research reported in the thesis. Semiotic morphogenesis is 
evidenced by the emergent requirement for, the introduction, evolving design and use of the 
Conceprocity knowledge mapping approach.  
Generative mechanisms identified 
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Two generative mechanisms which I have identified in personal information and work 
management are:  
1. Bricolage1 and experiential design (Baskerville 2011a) are evidenced in the 
necessary and often messy realisation of some kind of personal information 
management system PIMS - (Baskerville 2011b, 2011a) calls it an individual 
information system IIS. A proof-of-concept model of a personal work system is 
represented using Conceprocity. A proof-of-concept PIM application is based on the 
affordances offered by (inter alia) InfoQube (InfoQube 2019) and Zotero (Zotero 
2019). This specific PIM app is currently called UnIQue (pronounced uni-queue - 
unified information querying or, better, unified IQ usage environment). 
2. A second generative mechanism is seen in the philosophically-informed design 
science research employed in the conception, realisation and development of the 
knowledge modelling mechanism called Conceprocity. I have then gone on to use 
Conceprocity both to analyse aspects of my auto-ethnography and to model and 
synthesise the existing research upon which my work is based. Specifically, the proof-
of-concept model of a personal work system is represented using Conceprocity.  The 
current implementation of Conceprocity is based on the affordances offered by web-
based graphical modelling software, specifically Lucidchart (Lucidchart 2016). 
Emergent principles of personal information management  
We see that the auto-ethnographic and knowledge-modelling lenses have together been used to 
explore possible approaches to personal information management as it serves personal work within 
the context provided by an integrative personal working model approach. This combined 
approach augments the warrantability of principles which emerge from the autoethnography and 
from reconsideration of existing theory. Therefore, the thesis claims to have gained insight into 
what it calls morphogenetic stages of learning and has identified candidate generative 
mechanisms as the individual progressively identifies, assembles and uses ICT-informed control and 
regulation affordances. The use of affordances as an analytical construct and as a tool in the 
identification and analysis of generative mechanisms has recently been suggested and exemplified by 
(Bygstad, Munkvold, and Volkoff 2016). A mechanism is a causal structure that explains an empirical 
outcome (cf. Bunge 2004). In open systems, these outcomes are not deterministic, but probabilistic 
and contingent on other mechanisms. In general, mechanisms are abstract and not directly 
observable. By contrast, affordances – which arise from the relationship between a purposeful actor 
and an IT artefact – are more concrete and their identification is much more straightforward. The 
generative mechanisms here identified have included both abductive bricolage and purposeful 
design of an analysis and design language and of a specific PIMS.  
The suggested principles are shown to be grounded in the philosophies both of Peirce's 
pragmaticism (Peirce 1935) but principally of Bhaskar's critical realism. The principles are 
1 Broadly, tinkering or messing about until you achieve a desired result; the French word 
literally translates as do it yourself. 
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illustrated by means of the individual case which suggests demonstrable warrantability despite as-
yet limited empirical justification. 
Warrantability is a measure of the truthfulness or the extent to which we can be certain of a 
proposition. Warrantability is itself a principle suggested by this research as inspired by the 
discussion of validity in critical realist research of (Zachariadis, Scott, and Barrett 2013). It is based 
upon an original idea suggested by (Dewey 1941). See Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Warrantability as viewed by an individual 
Level of  
warrantability 
Notes 
1: Speculation A statement for which at the present time there is no evidence and which may give 
rise to a need for further work. 
2: Conjecture 
/ abduction 
Provisional assertion which, if proven, would help to explain an observed 
situation. There is as yet little or no evidence for the conjecture, which 
nevertheless seems plausible and is not immediately refuted by existing evidence 
or knowledge. Cf. (Popper 1963) on conjectures and refutations and Peirce on 
propositions (section 0). 
3: 
Observation 
Statement I believe to be true on the basis of initial evidence, for which there is 
neither strong supporting evidence nor refutation. 
4: Emergence A strong observation which arises and for which a strong warrant can be given. 
[Less strong observations are simply that: observations.] Statement which I 
strongly believe to be true on the basis of reasonable proof which has arisen in the 
situation or can otherwise be asserted. There is no conclusive refuting evidence. 
5=: Finding A very strong observation which has arisen in the context of my own work and for 
which a proof can be given. [Less strong observations are either emergences or 
observations.] Statement for which I have evidential proof and against which 
there is no conclusive refuting evidence. A safe recommendation to other 
knowledge workers.  
5=: Principle A statement having the same strength and warrantability as finding, but one 
which is not necessarily based on my own work.  
6: Design Applied to a designed artefact – such as software – or model. Warrantability here 
is dependent upon conformance to requirement or to what is modelled. 
7: 
Institutional 
Axiomatic - widely accepted as true - in accordance with social ontology. 
8: Scientific Axiomatic - widely accepted as true - in accordance with scientific realism.  
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An axiom is an established principle, that is, principle which is accepted as having 
been demonstrated and is not therefore in question, at any rate in a given study. 
Axioms can instead be assumed as true for the purposes of experimental design. 
They correspond to Peirce’s assertions (Yu 1994); Peirce contrasts them with 
propositions. 
A theory is an accepted set of axioms having predictive capacity. A theory may be 
espoused or a theory-in-use; the distinction comes from Chris Argyris and Donald 
Schön; see for example (Argyris and Schön 1974). 
Further justification and evaluation of knowledge production follows in general the principles 
established in the paper on genres of enquiry (Baskerville, Kaul, and Storey 2015). 
A principle applied: designing and building a nugget 
A "nugget" is the name I give to an expression of explicit knowledge, often actionable. The 
process of designing and building a nugget in the Conceprocity approach proceeds as follows. A 
Conceprocity model of a nugget may include: 
• A set of Conceprocity maps – these are visual representations of aspects of the model. 
• A set of entries in the Conceprocity dictionary – this helps to clarify the semantics of the 
model by naming notions and deciding their notion type. 
• A set of supporting “resources”, that is, files which, together with the maps and the 
dictionary, constitute this nugget. For example, for a taught class, these might include a 
PowerPoint presentation and supporting articles. 
The steps involved in designing and building a nugget are: 
1. Frame the topic question and its parameters. Archetypically, this might be: what do we need 
to learn as we act? (Active.) Or simply, what do we need to know? (Passive.) 
2. Give the nugget a nugget name. This should normally be a noun phrase if the knowledge to 
be described is passive and a verb-noun compound if the knowledge is active. 
3. Create a resource space in the form of a folder whose name is that of the nugget. 
4. Identify the initial vocabulary surrounding the nugget in a nugget dictionary entry. This is 
typically based both on existing classifications (kinds) and categories (tags) and new ones 
which will be found in and/or stored in the personal working ontology, which is 
represented in the current UnIQue IQBase. 
5. Identify and assemble sources – using tagged classification in the PIMS and original 
information searching. These sources will normally include other nuggets – this is nugget 
reuse; and existing literature references. 
6. Create a putative nugget signature model: this will always include an hierarchical outline2, 
and usually dictionary entry/entries, a knowledge map and tables. The emphasis on 
outlining is justified by the need to level (hierarchicalise) a nugget model. 
2 The emphasis on outlining is justified by the need to level (hierarchicalise) a nugget model. If the 
number of notions in the model is large, it is essential to split the model up into more manageable 
chunks. These chunks may be “obvious”, that is, correspond to structural distinctions which are 
evident. Or they may need to be imposed in a more analytical way, distinguishing sub-nuggets of 
knowledge, possible actionable. There should always be a route map (which is also a root map – 
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7. Identify and carry out original research or initial problem-solving. 
8. Analyse data and refine model and build nugget resources. 
9. Present or otherwise promulgate findings. 
10. Use and refine the nugget, typically in an iterative fashion. 
This process is applicable both to research and, in modified form, to teaching and to other 
practice.  
Nuggets are originated by individuals but can be developed and shared by groups. This 
procedure is an example of an emergent principle arrived at by design. 
  
Incidentally, root and route are pronounced the same in British English) which sets out the main 
chunks and how they are related. We call this the Level 1 map. Each major chunk can then be 
represented on a specific Level 2 map. There are well established principles to be applied when 
hierarchicalising (levelling) Conceprocity maps. In particular, we respect the observation of (Miller 
1956) concerning “The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity for 
processing information”. Thus, there should be no more than nine main notions on the route map (or 
indeed on each level 2 map – this may sometimes require the creation of level 3 maps). The top-level 
chunks might be identifiable as the themes of the topic which is being modelled.  
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Modelling the personal working model 
 
Figure 1 A Conceprocity model of a personal working model 2014 – top level only 
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Figure 2 How the personal working model, work system and information management system 
interrelate 
Contributions made and future research programme  
I summarise the contributions of this research in Table 2: 
Table 2 Contributions made by this research and their warrantability 
Contribution Warrantability 
The identification of the notion of a 
personal working model and its illustration 
by means of a specific example, a case based 
on autoethnographic longitudinal research. 
The necessity for this model is demonstrated by 
reference to the work of Ross Ashby and Roger 
Conant, in particular (Conant and Ashby 1970). 
In the classification suggested by (Baskerville, 
Kaul, and Storey 2015), this is ideographic 
science. 
The identification and exemplification of a 
personal information management system 
PIMS; the proof-of-concept PIM application 
has been dubbed UnIQue. UnIQue 
encourages classification by kind and 
categorisation by tag. Thus UnIQue stores 
both data and metadata. 
The regulation of personal work requires 
appropriate management of personal 
information and effective feedback mechanisms, 
as originally identified by (Ashby 1956). The 
distinction between classification and 
categorisation is discussed by (Jacob 2004). The 
evaluation of the example PIMS follows (Volkoff, 
Strong, and Elmes 2007). In the classification 
suggested by (Baskerville, Kaul, and Storey 
2015), this is primarily ideographic design. 
The Conceprocity visual knowledge 
mapping language and supporting 
dictionary. Conceprocity is presented as a 
series of usage profiles, ranging from the 
highly informal – particularly appropriate 
The design of this language is informed by 
means of cognitive psychology (Paquette 2010), 
typed notions (Church 1940; Booch et al. 2007), 
scientific realist ontology (Bunge 1977, 1979) 
and by the social ontology of John Searle (Searle 
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for student use in original problem 
formulation – through to subsets which are 
sufficiently formal for use in information 
systems requirements definition. However, 
its genesis and focus lie in visual knowledge 
mapping (Paquette 2010) – which I hold to 
be essential to making the working model 
explicit and useful in analysing the 
requirements for PIMS. 
2006). In the classification suggested by 
(Baskerville, Kaul, and Storey 2015), this is in 
large part ideographic design but with elements 
of nomothetic design. 
The entire thesis therefore reports an exploration of an under-researched area, that of 
personal information management systems in the service of personal work. This research has 
employed multiple research methods (Mingers 2001) appropriate to the breadth of the topic 
area. As (Zachariadis, Scott, and Barrett 2013) strongly commend, the research necessarily 
follows a multi-method approach essential to tease out the various generative mechanisms 
which can be discerned in accordance with critical realism principles. It is intended to act as 
prior preparation to a forthcoming, post-PhD, research programme.  
 
A one-sentence summary of the thesis  
Each knowledge worker should learn continuously to improve both their individual enacted, 
open and continuously evolving knowledge model and also the system of data organisation 
which informs and is informed by their daily work.  
Associated website 
http://markrogergregory.net  
0.2 Thesis structure: the classical structure and why I have chosen to 
depart from it 
A common structure for a thesis, as for example discussed by (Crotty 1998), is something like 
this:  
• Problem statement 
• Literature review and identification of research gap 
• Research themes and conceptual framework 
• Research methodology 
• Research design 
• Results 
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• Further work 
I have followed the alternative approach suggested by the meta-framework provided by 
Checkland’s sensemaking FMA: Framework – Methodology - Area of concern (Checkland 
and Holwell 1998b); (Holwell 2004). In its basic form, this is pictured in Figure 3: 
 
Figure 3 Checkland's FMA skeleton in rich picture form. Source: (Checkland and Holwell 
1998b, p.23) 
As emphasised by (Ison 2013), systems thinking and practice is fundamental to doing action 
research. (Ison 2013) notes that (Holwell 2004) proposes three concepts that constitute action 
research as legitimate research: recoverability, iteration and the purposeful articulation of 
research themes. Sue Holwell’s cycle of action research (Holwell 2004) based on (Checkland 
and Holwell 1998a) is reproduced here as Figure 4: 
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Figure 4 The cycle of action research based on a declared framework of ideas F and 
methodology M and area of application A together with articulated research themes Source: 
(Holwell 2004) 
I find Sue Holwell’s diagram more helpful than Checkland’s original in its emphasis on the 
cyclical nature of action research and in the fact that it doesn’t impose a starting point. 
However, she omits “learning about” as a concept. I have chosen to start from the area of 
application. 
Holwell reiterates what Checkland asserts elsewhere as the principle of recoverability: “the set 
of ideas and the process in which they are used methodologically must be stated, because these 
are the means by which researchers and others make sense of the research” (Holwell 2004, 
p.355). The research process must involve the “articulation of an epistemology in terms of 
which what will count as knowledge from the research will be expressed” (Checkland and 
Holwell 1998a, p.9). 
(Checkland and Poulter 2006, p20) describe the Learning for a User by a Methodologically-
informed Approach to a Situation LUMAS model or meta-framework. They describe it as a 
generic model for making sense of any real-world application of any methodology, 
remembering that this word covers a set of principles which need to be embodied in an 
application tailored to meet the unique features of a particular situation. I reviewed the 
applicability of LUMAS in the paper (Gregory and Descubes 2011a). I find it to be elegant and 
the notion that the fundamental output is one of improved learning is attractive. However, I 
rather think that the authors give the game away in their note that every use of SSM can in 
principle be described in the language of this model. It is the gradually diminishing activity, 
over the years, of development occurring along the arrow which links L and M that makes it 
legitimate to describe SSM as mature. This implies that the authors see L as referring to SSM as 
a whole and not to the specific situation in which it is being derived. But it is learning about 
this specific situation that matters to me. 
“Checkland stresses that it is not the methodology which leads to improvement. It is the user 
as (s)he benefits from using the guidelines, as (s)he takes the formally defined methodology M 
to create or tailor A, the actual, user - and situation - specific approach adopted to the Real – 
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world problem R that (s)he perceives a concern for. Thus we suggest the existence of problem - 
focussed or situational learning – using methods in an applied methodology; and higher - level 
learning – which will manifest itself in a deepening appreciation of methodology and a concern 
to develop it further in action. We also suggest the possibility that the outer loop corresponds 
more - or - less directly to the inquiring / learning cycle of Checkland‘s Soft Systems 
Methodology SSM.” (Gregory and Descubes 2011a) 
 
Figure 5 LUMAS Source: (Checkland and Poulter 2006, p20) 
It might therefore be valuable to “try” LUMAS – but I had already applied the simpler-to-apply 
FMA formulation when I was challenged to reconsider LUMAS. 
The basic structure of this thesis is therefore as follows: 
• Area of concern (Chapter 1) 
• The area of concern is that of Personal Information and Knowledge Management 
by a knowledge worker – initially me as a reflective knowledge worker. 
• Studying PIM: literature & knowledge gaps (Chapter 2) 
• Framework (Chapter 3) 
• Notably: 
o Personal data, information, knowledge and actions 
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o Critical realism (Bhaskar 1975, 1978, 1989; Collier 1994) 
o Systems thinking (Mingers 2014) and emergence (Bunge 2003) 
o Knowledge mapping by means of Conceprocity: Concept Process 
Reciprocity 
o Explicit design and serendipitous bricolage 
o The use of appropriate affordances 
• Methodology (Chapter 4) 
• Notably: 
o Autoethnography (Rodriguez and Ryave 2002); (Schultze 2000) 
o Design science research and action design research: (Baskerville and 
Wood-Harper 1998); (Carlsson 2010; Hevner and Chatterjee 2010b); 
(Hevner et al. 2004); (Sein et al. 2011) 
• Findings (Chapter 5) 
• Notably: this chapter presents two proof-of-concept prototypes used as learning 
research vehicles and an analysis of my research journal: 
o Knowledge modelling using Concept  Process Reciprocity, 
Conceprocity 
o UnIQue: a proof-of-concept personal information management system 
o PhD diary; textual analysis by means of Leximancer and categorisation. 
• Learning: Morphogenetic Change in The Working Model (Chapter 6) 
o A discussion of the evidence for semantic and semiotic morphogenesis 
• Contributions and further work (Chapter 7) 
o Results – principles - and future research programme 
0.3 Knowledge work and the management of personal information 
Writing about knowledge worker productivity (Drucker 1999) holds that “The most important 
contribution management needs to make in the 21st century is similarly to increase the 
productivity of knowledge work and knowledge workers”: similarly, that is, to the massive 
increases in productivity associated with manual work which have been achieved in the 
hundred years or so since (Taylor 1911) identified “scientific management”. This present study 
has sought to discover how “better” to manage personal information – both in what William 
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Jones calls KFTF, keeping found things found (W. P. Jones 2007b); and how “better” to get 
things done GTD (D. Allen 2003).  
Sometimes we don’t get things done; at best we procrastinate and at worst we fail. Among the 
myriad reasons for this two may be particularly important.  
One is that we don’t know how to do what we need to. This may simply be a lack of practical 
skills, or it may reflect a greater underlying weakness, particularly in abstract thinking. 
Abstraction skill has been shown to be significant to programming (Kramer 2007) and to 
structuring data (Ledgard and Taylor 1977). To perhaps a lesser extent, abstraction skills are 
essential in all scholarship, in learning in general and especially in the recognition and 
handling of concepts.  
The second is, quite simply, that we don’t want to do them. We are emotionally disinclined to 
get started or to complete certain tasks. Emotional barriers (sometimes mis-labelled 
“psychological” barriers) are perhaps very significant in practice (D. Allen 2003) but are not 
specifically treated in this study. 
When we have a purpose to achieve, we need and decide to take action. In order to act 
reasonably rationally we marshal the data that we need to inform our proposed action. We 
apply our knowledge, values and abilities to the data that we have and we decide a course of 
action which we wish or need to undertake. We catalogue the resources and tools available to 
us to undertake the action. We identify the process by which we will carry out the action. The 
action may be individual or it may require the cooperation of others in an ad hoc team brought 
together to carry out a project including many actions. We then together or alone undertake 
the actions.  As we do so, we update the data we maintain, whether that be in formal 
organisational information systems (such as student records systems or learning management 
systems) or in a less-formal personal information management system.  What we do may be 
informed by or evolve in accordance with the changing data.  
When we have completed the planned action, we evaluate what we have done and decide to 
what extent we have achieved our purpose. Frequently we find that corrective or additional 
action is needed. 
This process, which we can characterise as concerning decision making and problem solving, 
has previously been identified primarily in the organisational context (Simon et al. 1987); 
(Simon [1970] 1996). Herbert Simon wrote extensively concerning purposeful problem-
solving and decision making, and in particular of the necessity for information as a vital 
component in those two processes. 
Sometimes we evaluate what we have attempted and conclude that there is some element of 
failure: some or all of our purpose has not been achieved. We reflect on that failure; it may be 
that our purpose was not achievable with the resources available, or it may be that the purpose 
was in some sense incorrect or inappropriate, or it may be that the knowledge that we applied 
to the situation was inadequate or defective. We learn from our success, but much more from 
our failure; see (Ackoff 1987, 1999, 1997). Ackoff’s stance became that of a systems thinker 
and practitioner, no longer so much concerned to identify algorithms but rather to understand 
heuristics – practical approaches to variably intractable problems – in what he termed 
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systemic “messes” (Ackoff 1997) and Peter Checkland calls “problematical situations”  
(Checkland 2000). 
Thus, it appears that we are each the principal reflective actor in a goal-oriented (teleological) 
system that decides, plans, acts, evaluates and learns. We apply knowledge (both theoretical 
and practical) to carry out informed and decisive action. Our experience causes us to reflect 
and to learn – our knowledge changes. See for example (Schön 1983)’s discussion of what he 
calls the reflective practitioner. 
Our immediate purpose may be apparently simple, for example, to do the shopping. The data 
in this case includes a shopping list. Or our purpose may be larger and longer term in its 
nature, for example, to attempt a PhD in information systems. In both, we apply our existing 
knowledge (and sometimes we seek to extend that knowledge and then apply it) to relevant 
data so as to make informed decisions and to solve problems.  
0.4 PIM: towards a systemic approach 
Approach and limitations 
There is a small community of academic researchers that identifies itself by the label Personal 
Information Management PIM. Some of these researchers meet every 18 months or so to 
exchange and further research in the area of personal information management. Thus, PIM has 
previously been studied by cognitive scientists or from an HCI or user interface perspective – 
but almost never from an information systems perspective. 
PIM systems PIMS have hardly been mentioned in the literature (but we shall highlight as an 
exception (Baskerville 2011b)) and PIM has never to my knowledge been studied from a 
systemic perspective. I shall contend that PIMS only make sense within the overall context of 
personal work systems PWS.  
The research which I have been able to undertake into personal information management 
systems has included a significant element of autoethnography; we might also call it structured 
self-observation (Rodriguez and Ryave 2002). 
This is certainly an unusual research perspective and there are significant dangers associated 
with its use. Learning from a single case is very unlikely to be generalisable and is obviously 
subject to significant observer bias. Thus, in the research design, autoethnography is only one 
of multiple methods of research (Mingers 2001) which together offer insights of varying 
degrees of warrantability (Dewey 1941). (Schultze 2000) in her own autoethnographic 
research suggests that autobiographical details should be minimally divulged but that the first 
person has to be used in expressing the lessons learnt. I concur. I have aimed throughout to 
make my research a piece of engaged scholarship as suggested by (Van de Ven 2007).  
My first degree included cybernetics, the study of control and communications in man, 
machine and animals (Wiener 1973) – with a strong emphasis on “hard” science and 
conditions for stability in engineered systems. I have split my working career between 
information systems practice and teaching. Much more recently, I have begun to research in 
this area. I aim to take a systemic approach in all my work. I take the word systems in the 
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phrase information systems very seriously. My understanding of the word system is an 
evolved emergence arising from my earlier experience but especially from the research and 
learning reported in this thesis.  
0.5 A model of a Personal Working Model 
Figure 6 is a diagrammatic, representational, model of a phenomenon which this thesis calls a 
personal working model. The modelling language used here, called Conceprocity, is itself a 
contribution of this research. The fundamental notions (object types) of the Conceprocity 
language will be described later in this thesis, and on the basis of this understanding a fuller 
description of the model will also be given. 
 
Figure 6 A model of a Personal Working Model (2014) 
A deceptively simple example of personal data: doing the shopping 
We shall first give consideration to what would appear to be a simpler modelling situation and 
draw lessons from it. 
Doing the shopping requires the creation of a list of things to buy. If that list exceeds a few 
items – seven or 10 – we need to write it down. This is because of fundamental limitations in 
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our cognitive capacities first identified by (Miller 1956), who in his article entitled “The 
magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity for processing 
information” demonstrated that the unaided observer is severely limited in terms of the 
amount of information he can receive, process, and remember at a given moment in time 
Implicitly or explicitly we attach additional data to our list. Most items might be obtainable 
from our favourite supermarket, but some might more cost-effectively be obtained from a 
“hard discounter”3, and some might better be obtained online. We end up with a shopping list 
structured as a table consisting of rows and of columns. Its current instantiation is as a table 
produced in Microsoft Word, although it could equally have been built using a spreadsheet 
package or as a table in a relational database – or as a list written on the back of an envelope!  
 
Shopping item Supplier Quantity 
bread hard discount 2 loaves 
pasta hard discount 1 kg 
basic veg hard discount enough for 3 days 
exotic veg supermarket enough for one meal 
chicken farm shop 2.5 kg 
Harry Potter DVD online 2 
Figure 7 An example of personal data: a shopping list 
We should challenge the apparent simplicity of this table. A personal information 
management system is constituted when someone uses information and communications 
technology ICT – here a spreadsheet – to store data which is subsequently used to inform 
decisions or action. The “systemic” element – the knowledge-wielding, learning element of the 
system – is the person who maintains and uses the information. The information is filtered 
data associated with meaning, here represented linguistically by “simple” column headings. 
But in fact there is nothing simple about this process of attributing meaning. How 
“meaningful” would this data be if the content and headings were in a human language 
you didn’t understand? By giving structure to the list, by the introduction of columns each 
with their separate column headings, I have given semantic structure which embodies 
meaning.4 
3 In contemporary French, a “pile-em-high-and-sell-em-cheap” retailer is called “un hard discount”. 
4 Formally, I have here created a set of N-tuples in the sense originally identified by Charles Sanders 
Peirce in a paper published in 1885 and taken up by Edgar Codd when he identified the highly 
influential relational model of data bases (Codd 1970).We shall find in fact that Charles Sanders 
Peirce, who died a century ago, makes no fewer than five major intellectual contributions upon which 
aspects of this present work are deeply dependent. These are (i) the identification of first order logic, 
which underlies relational databases and also provides the potential for automatic inferencing from 
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Now consider the life cycle of the list as it is used. Many items recur over time, each with a 
particular frequency. In effect we can recycle or reuse a list, with the date that an item becomes 
necessary depending upon when it was last purchased and the replenishment period. Thus, 
there can be value in storing the list as – say – a spreadsheet table, and then associating the 
spreadsheet with a calendar app (application program) on the computer or smartphone on 
which the spreadsheet and calendar reside. If we store the data appropriately, we can see what 
we need to buy where and present that information when it is needed: “what must I buy where 
today?” This refined, targeted data informs our repeated action, which is to go to the right 
shops on the right day and to buy what we need; and then subsequently to revise our shopping 
list.  
Thus, I introduce by way of illustration a phenomenon which is called personal information 
management or PIM. An interdisciplinary group of academic researchers and practitioners 
federated by a website called “Tales of PIM” (Tales of PIM 2016) have collaborated to 
introduce personal information management in two books, one intended for a more popular 
audience (W. P. Jones 2007b) and one which consists of a collection of academic papers (W. P. 
Jones and Teevan 2007b).What is Personal Information Management (PIM)? 
(W. P. Jones and Teevan 2007b)  state: “Personal information management (PIM) refers to 
both the practice and the study of the activities people perform in order to acquire, organize, 
maintain, retrieve and use information items such as documents (paper-based and digital), 
web pages and email messages for everyday use to complete tasks (work-related or not) and 
fulfil a person’s various roles (as parent, employee, friend, member of community, etc.).” 
PIM is not inherently computer-based. However, computers and computer-like devices such as 
smartphones are frequently used to assist in more effective personal information management. 
There are two key activities5 which depend upon personal information management. These 
are: 
 Getting Things Done (GTD) 
 See for example (D. Allen 2003). The essential: deciding 
what to do, and when: clearing the decks for action now on 
tasks deferred earlier and which now properly have priority. 
 Keeping Found Things Found 
databases; (ii) what he terms existential graphs, and we shall call conceptual maps, a knowledge 
representation format; (iii) the philosophy known as pragmatism which I will identify as a 
foundational aspect of the epistemological stance of this work; (iv) the study of semiotics and 
semiotic systems; (v) abduction – Peirce sometimes referred to it as retroduction – as a method of 
reasoning. The University of Helsinki is one of a number of universities to have a research centre 
focused on Peirce: http://www.helsinki.fi/peirce/ accessed 30 
5 This is a conjecture based on a broad understanding of the practice of PIM. I offer no proof at this 
stage. 
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 See for example (W. P. Jones 2007b). The essential here is to 
store personal information as it arises in a way which permits 
its easy retrieval and manipulation; which implies searchable 
and organised or classified 
When was PIM invented? 
The small existing PIM research community usually identifies Vannevar Bush (Bush 1945) as 
the first proponent of a device-based approach to personal information management. Bush 
proposed that science be put to use in organizing the vast record of human knowledge. (Caspi, 
Shankar, and Wang 2004) summarise Bush’s life and work. They introduce his most famous 
idea thus: 
“Inspired by his previous work in microfilm mass storage, Bush envisioned an 
information workstation—the memex—capable of storing, navigating, and 
annotating an entire library’s worth of information.  His idea of push-button 
linking between documents is commonly held to be the forefather of modern 
hypertext.” 
Who is involved in PIM? 
 Answer (1): All knowledge workers, since we have all to manage 
personal information.6 
 Answer (2): A relatively small group of researchers, perhaps 30 or 
40 in total, write papers in which the keywords include PIM.  
 Answer (3): I have been able to identify over 150 PIM tools, that is, 
software programs whose main or significant emphasis is on 
personal information management and which are still under active 
development (Gregory and Norbis 2009b). To that there could be 
added perhaps a similar number of programs which are now defunct. 
The earliest such programs appeared nearly 30 years ago. Some 
programs have developed an active following evidenced in the form 
of very active forums. 
0.6 Is personal information management PIM important? 
In terms purely of academic research: there are perhaps 30 or 40 researchers in the world 
active in this area of 138 on a Yahoo! List (Feb 2016) (Tales of PIM 2016) – slight significance. 
They are largely drawn from cognitive science and human computer interface backgrounds; 
almost no researchers identify clearly with the Information Systems community with which I 
most clearly identify.  
6 Or perhaps more generally everyone everywhere who has ever maintained an agenda and a 
shopping list! 
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However, in terms of significance as a business and to businesses and to consumers: the 
management of personal information is of huge significance. Thus, one can argue that the 
businesses of Google, of Microsoft and of Apple are greatly dependent on the use made by 
consumers of devices and services by means of which they store, manipulate and share their 
personal data. 
The phenomenon I am investigating is the personal knowledge management (K. Wright 2005, 
2007) ; (Świgoń 2013) of individual knowledge workers as they carry out their data-informed 
work. I would argue that the emphasis here is on “small data” and personal knowledge 
management as one pole in a dynamic systemic duality – making knowledge work for the 
individual agent or actor; the second pole being the environment within which the agent or 
actor functions, that of business and society. Following (Baskerville 2011b), I suggest that 
there exists a personal work system  in which the primary systemic element is the knowledge 
worker, who works – that is, she acts knowledgeably. Inter alia, she interacts with her 
personal data as it is stored on and made available by means of information and 
communications technology: cf. (Paul 2010)’s definition of an information system as “IT in 
use”.  
(Baskerville 2011b) calls the computer-oriented element of the personal work system an 
individual information system. I had previously identified this as a personal information 
management system PIMS (Gregory and Descubes, 2011b). (Baskerville 2011b) also suggests 
that such an individual information system interfaces both with the employer work system but 
also the personal work system of the individual. The concept of the work system was initially 
introduced by (Alter 1999, 2010). 
Is PIM a ‘problem’? 
(W. P. Jones and Teevan 2007b) quote Benjamin Franklin’s autobiography, in which he 
outlines 13 virtues. The third, order, was the one that gave him the most trouble:  
"Order... with regard to place for things, papers etc., I found extreamly (sic) 
difficult to acquire". 
Blue-collar automation has made enormous strides over the most recent decades. By contrast, 
there is evidence that white-collar productivity has not increased at anything like the same 
pace, despite the huge investment in information and communications technology made across 
the world. Furthermore, the efficiency of individual enterprises and of whole countries in 
benefiting from these investments is extremely variable. See (Strassmann 1997); (Strassmann 
1999). 
Market research companies like the Gartner Group suggest that the average investment in 
information and indications technology (ICT) for a corporate knowledge worker is of the order 
of US$10,000 per annum7. I have found no definitive source which indicates consistent benefits 
of a similar order. Instead, much ICT investment is of the "me-too" variety, justified in order to 
7 Gartner Worldwide IT Spending Forecast, http://www.gartner.com/technology/research/it-
spending-forecast/, accessed 20/12/2016. Worldwide IT spend is around $3.4 trillion in 2016 and 
the figure for 2017 will be the same or a little lower. 
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retain a competitive comparability and to avoid competitive disadvantage. The same market 
researchers are now reporting that consumer expenditure on ICT-related products and 
services (including computers and telecommunications) exceeds that made by businesses. 
PIM in work and business 
Individuals, teams and organisations need to carry out business & personal processes; they 
have to act, to Get Things Done: GTD, as identified by popular authors such as (D. Allen 2003). 
To do this, they need to Keep Found Things Found: KFTF. KFTF, as defined by (W. P. Jones 
2007b), means that they must store data, manage information, and act to enhance their 
knowledge.  
They must also share their information with the people with whom they work and play. 
We agree with Baskerville’s suggested terminology, that of personal work systems. While 
approving of Alter’s very helpful notion of work systems, we suggest a slight revision of his 
definition. (Alter 2002b) defines a Work System as “a system in which people and/or machines 
perform a business process using resources (e.g., information, technology, raw materials) to 
create products/services for internal or external customers”.  
What is the business significance of effective personal information and knowledge 
management? The brief answer is that we cannot know until we are clearer concerning what 
the phenomena are and where they occur. Nevertheless authors such as (Strassmann 1997, 
1999) have identified substantial issues concerning the value-for-money of much ICT 
investment by companies. There may well be an equivalent productivity paradox concerned 
with investment in individual systems. One of the few discussions of the economics of PKM 
(and of PIM – the article is much wider in its scope than the title, “Cost-Benefit Analysis for the 
Design of Personal Knowledge Management Systems”, suggests) is provided by (Völkel and 
Abecker 2008). They provide a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) model, but they have yet to apply it 
widely. 
0.7 Why and how are PIM systems an appropriate focus for doctoral 
research? 
Initial motivation: a focus on tools 
Knowledge and information workers work as individuals within virtual team structures. As 
individuals and as team members, they acquire information, which they store in several 
complex ways: some paper-based, but increasingly computer-based. There are a number of 
computer-based tools, sometimes referred to as Personal Information Managers or PIMs (D. 
Kelly 2006); (Teevan, Jones, and Capra 2008) which can assist in the storage and management 
of such information. However, it remains the case that little is understood about how people 
use these tools, how they learn new ones, the ways in which the tools constrain how people 
work and think, and how best to educate people to make the right choice of the right tools. The 
original underlying themes of my research work were that  
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 Individuals - working alone or in groups - should be encouraged and 
educated to make better use of the available tools; 
 And that the tools themselves should evolve into better ways of 
representing information and knowledge. 
Is research into personal or individual information systems justified? The story of 
Jane Doe 
“Individual IS may well be an extremely large, undiscovered, arena for future IS research.” 
(Baskerville 2011b) 
In the March 2011 edition of the European Journal of Information Systems, the editor in chief 
Richard Baskerville identifies the phenomenon that he calls individual information systems 
(Baskerville 2011b). He uses a pseudonymous case, that of Jane Doe, whose information 
system architecture he illustrates thus: 
 
Figure 8 Jane Doe's individual information system architecture 
I quote Baskerville at length, because he introduces very well the phenomenon of what he calls 
individual information systems (and I call personal information management systems). The 
emphases in this extended quote are mine: 
“ 
Figure 8 delineates the information system architecture of Jane Doe. Such 
individual IS architectures are unique at this time; many other examples would 
be more complex, and others simpler. This is a single example. There are two 
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elements in the architecture that might require slight elaboration. We note with 
vertical arrow[s] two ‘work systems’ within this IS architecture. One is Doe’s 
‘profession[al]’ work system as an employee. The other is the work system that 
serves Doe as a person. While Doe and her family might not regard their 
involvement with entertainment and personal communications systems as 
work, it is nevertheless work for the information system that Doe is operating. 
The other element is the representation of information services consumed and 
produced as arising from, and sinking into, clouds. The term cloud is used here 
in its loose, IS perspective because the ‘network’ is evolving to the ‘cloud’. This 
evolution is because of the increasing availability of not just low-level data 
services, but cloud-based business processes (Fingar 2009). 
” (Baskerville 2011b, 252–53) 
Baskerville reminds us that the field of information systems is about much more than just 
technologies, information and human factors. He calls in evidence that information systems 
have been regarded as social-technical phenomena from the earliest years (Bostrom and 
Heinen 1977); (Mumford and Weir 1979). But our understanding of the systems has grown. 
Baskerville recalls that (Alter 2008) details more than 20 different authoritative definitions of 
IS before himself suggesting that we should ‘define [information system] IS as a type of ‘work 
system’, ‘in which human participants and/or machines perform work (processes and 
activities) using information, technology, and other resources to produce informational 
products and/or services for internal or external customers’ (p.451). But even Alter’s 
definition implies the exclusion of individuals with its reference to internal and external 
‘customers’: information systems is often seen as a sub-discipline of business and 
management. Baskerville instead suggests that we should study the essential human progress 
enabled by the ICT now available to individuals. A business-centric point of view overlooks 
the way in which individual IS have evolved into rather a complete and legitimate form of 
IS.  Therefore, IS researchers should concern themselves with individual information systems: 
 
“ 
As technological evolution has enabled more-and-more complex individual IS, 
it seems that these could easily become the most prevalent of all kinds of 
such systems. Ignoring individual IS within our discipline is an evolutionary 
oversight that may simply reflect our own assumptions that personal, 
individual IS are uninteresting: simple; or mostly recreational systems used 
‘after hours’ or outside of real organizational IS (Crowston et al. 2010). 
Why should IS researchers have any concern for individual IS? Perhaps we 
might begin with the recognition that we are fairly benighted about the 
phenomena. We might also recognize that these systems represent the most 
recent frontier for the design of computer based IS. These are complicated and 
unique systems that cross the boundaries between work and home. As such, 
individual systems still engage social aspects and organizational aspects. 
Certainly, these systems are socially constructed. It is not sufficient to regard 
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individual IS as merely retail consumers of information, entertainment, and 
technologies. Very few individual systems are purely information sinks. People 
are not merely customers and game-players, but are actively collecting data 
and processing it into information for their various purposes, and feeding it 
outward.  
Thus far, we have yet to seriously introduce our knowledge about complex IS 
into these individual versions. How has Doe designed her system above? Why 
has she made the choices, initiatives, and investments apparent in her 
individual information system? How does she plan and control this complicated 
architecture? How can our extant body of knowledge improve Doe’s individual 
information system? What are the important relationships between Doe’s 
system and other IS (e.g., individual or otherwise)?   
” (Baskerville 2011b, 252–53) 
There is, as we shall see, a personal information management PIM literature, and a (smaller) 
personal knowledge management PKM literature. The PIM literature is mainly influenced by 
cognitive science and human computer interface considerations. There are no contributions 
from recognised IS researchers in either the PIM or PKM literatures. Thus, there is almost no 
discussion of PIM systems in the PIM literature, and as Baskerville suggests, IS research has 
been almost entirely blind to the phenomenon of what he calls individual information systems. 
Personal knowledge management 
(Apshvalka and Wendorff 2005) draw together definitions of knowledge from the 
organisational knowledge management literature, notably from (Davenport and Prusak 1998) 
and (T. D. Wilson 2002); thus knowledge is at least “a combination of facts, experiences and 
perceptions that are being used to make a decision or to select an action by which a situation is 
changed into a more valuable situation.… knowledge … is in the mind and only in the mind”. 
They agree with Wilson that it is everybody’s personal decision, will and responsibility to 
manage his/her knowledge.  
So, as (Drucker 1994) states: 
“In the knowledge society... individuals are central. Knowledge is not 
impersonal.... does not reside in a book, a databank, a software program; they 
contain only information. Knowledge is always embodied in a person; carried 
by a person; created, augmented, or improved by a person; applied by a person; 
taught and passed on by a person; used or misused by a person. The shift to the 
knowledge society... puts the person in the centre.” 
Obtaining a PhD: an illustration of personal knowledge management 
Arguably, obtaining a PhD is an exercise in personal knowledge management PKM as 
identified by (Frand and Hixon 1999; Apshvalka and Wendorff 2005), but one which involves 
much data collection and information management.  
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A distinctive research approach: using PIMS to study PIMS 
Taking up the challenge made by (Baskerville 2011, p.253): “Individual IS may well be an 
extremely large, undiscovered, arena for future IS research”, we have established the need 
for an information systems perspective on personal information management in the papers 
(Gregory and Descubes 2011b) and (Gregory, Kehal, and Descubes 2012b). This perspective is 
based critically on necessarily unusual lenses and research approaches because we are here 
exploring a new area of academic research: therefore, I have chosen to use individual IS to 
study individual IS. 
0.8 What has my recent research been demonstrating? 
We have previously presented a model of a Personal Working Model (Gregory and Macgilchrist 
2014). Initially in that paper, and now in this thesis I show why such a working model perforce 
exists. I discuss ways in which to identify and to begin to model the Working Model and its 
components. 
My most recent work has consisted in continuing to improve the ways in which to model a 
working model in Conceprocity. I have also built a proof of concept personal information 
management system which I have used in the final months of my research and specifically in 
the planning of this thesis and in the maintenance of the information necessary to its 
completion. 
It would be a mistake to regard these two prototypes as merely garlands, as pretty 
interpretations. They reify two warrantable principles: 
1. Knowledge work requires the construction of representational knowledge models. 
These might often only be mental models. But there is benefit to be had in making them 
explicit as knowledge maps (a semiotic representation) and as a knowledge dictionary 
(a semantic representation). 
2. Personal data needs frequently to be made explicit, given semantic structure and 
tabulated as part of a PIMS. 
The Ph.D. research has been largely exploratory in character. However, the research to be 
described forms part of what I hope will be an ongoing programme which I expect to occupy 
me for a significant part of the remainder of my career. Thus, subsequent to the PhD, I will 
undertake more exploration and continue and deepen the explanatory research which I have 
of necessity only started during the PhD itself. 
0.9 My specific perspectives and how they differ from earlier work on 
personal information management PIM 
(Wood and Wood-Harper 1993) distinguish between hard and soft systems viewpoints. I add a 
design science viewpoint (fairly “hard”) to the study of PIMS and a learning or enquiring 
systems point of view (fairly “soft”) to the study of PWS. The thesis will explain and exemplify 
the language used in this paragraph. 
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I follow (Conant and Ashby 1970) as I insist on modelling in order to understand and in order 
to regulate. To support my insistence on modelling to understand, I have also introduced a 
somewhat novel conceptual modelling approach which I call Conceprocity. This is one of the 
contributions made by this research. 
I have also sought to establish a sound philosophical basis for my work on PIMS and for the 
new conceptual modelling approach. This philosophical basis draws on critical realism 
(Bhaskar 1975, 1978, 1989; Collier 1994) and on systemic thought (Herrscher 2006). 
The Ph.D. research has largely been exploratory in nature. However, one of the claims made by 
and for critical realism is that the identification of what it calls generative mechanisms can 
have explanatory power. It is in the nature of design science research that some at least of 
these generative mechanisms are explicit and reasonably straightforward to characterise and 
therefore to apply in an explanatory way. 
0.10 Conventions followed in this document  
I consider it to be wholly appropriate in a thesis concerning personal work that I should use 
the personal pronoun much more frequently than is conventional in scientific writing. I hope 
that you will agree on its utility. 
I have included almost no autoethnographic data in the thesis itself. If you wish to examine the 
contents of my PhD research journal, you will find all entries that I have not tagged as personal 
via the URL http://markrogergregory.net/2016/03/31/thesis-resources/. 
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 AREA OF CONCERN 
The area of concern is the means by which an individual knowledge worker regulates her life. 
The terms working model, personal work system and personal information management 
system are introduced. The role of information is stressed. 
1.1 Engaged scholarship  
In this chapter, I set out to identify the area of concern. Russell Ackoff suggests that the only 
way in which we learn is by failure (Ackoff 1999). The causes of failure are usually multiple 
and compound. As a consequence, and also by deep conviction, the research reported is an 
example of what Andrew van der Ven calls engaged scholarship (Van de Ven 2007). For the 
starting point for this research was a dissatisfaction with the results which I was achieving by 
means of the application of PIM tools, hardware and software aids to the management of 
personal information.  
My early career was as a computer programmer and technical support consultant and my later 
career has been as a teacher of information systems. My university-level education – the 
French very usefully use the word formation – consisted of a systems approach to the social 
sciences in my first degree in the early 70s and a master’s degree in information systems 
design in the early 80s. Therefore the lenses which I expected to apply to doctoral research 
included PIM tools or applications, a systems approach to enquiry (Churchman 1971) and 
designerly conduct (B. Archer 1979).  
At the beginning of the 1990s I moved from industry into academia and started to teach at 
what quickly became the University of Huddersfield. I was employed because of my extensive 
practical knowledge of databases, database design and conceptual modelling gained in 
industry. I worked very hard to serve my students. I emphasised practical over theoretical 
knowledge because that was where my expertise lay. I developed my teaching in the areas of 
conceptual modelling of information systems, business process modelling and systems 
integration. 
Shortly into the new millennium, I accepted the challenge of moving to France to teach in a 
business school. Here, I continued to try to teach business students the importance of 
modelling and of a systems approach. Teaching business students threw up the additional 
challenge of confronting students - who were often averse to conceptual thinking and 
unconvinced of the value of theory - with material which they sometimes found frankly 
difficult and of whose value they needed to be convinced. 
I was thus too busy (or too afraid) to take on the challenge of really confronting theory for 
myself. It was only in 2007 that I agreed to take on the challenge of doctoral research. I 
registered for this current PhD in the summer of 2008.  
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(Klein and Rowe 2008) discuss the challenges and the opportunities presented by what they 
call professionally qualified doctoral students: later-life PhD students who bring applicative 
knowledge into both research and boundary-spanning engagement with practice. One of the 
significant ways in which I have remained engaged in practice has been to make very 
considerable use of information and communications technology in the way that I work – 
building small information systems to support my own work and in particular to permit 
effective formative assessment of students working both as individuals and in groups by 
teachers teaching in teams. Thus, I have had a considerable interest in personal information 
management and in the development of what are sometimes called situational applications. 
This chapter introduces the area of concern which I wished to address in my doctoral studies. 
1.2 Work systems and information systems 
(Alter 1999, 8) holds that a work system is ‘a system in which human participants and/or 
machines perform a business process using information, technology, and other resources to 
produce products and/or services for internal or external customers. Organizations typically 
contain multiple work systems and operate through them.’ 
Example work systems include building aircraft and co-authoring textbooks. 
(Alter 2008, p.451) defines an information system IS as a type of ‘work system’, ‘in which 
human participants and/or machines perform work (processes and activities) using 
information, technology, and other resources to produce informational products and/or 
services for internal or external customers’. 
Example information systems include the enterprise resource planning system which often 
forms a dominant part of the applications portfolio of medium and large enterprises. Whether 
as part of an enterprise resource planning system or as a stand-alone element, every business 
possesses some form of accounting information system. 
(Alter 2008) summarises and discusses 20 overlapping but distinct definitions of the phrase 
‘information system’. Amongst which, (Checkland and Holwell 1998b, 451) posit: ‘'Any and 
every information system can always be thought of as entailing a pair of systems, one a system 
which is served (the people taking the action), the other a system that does the serving [i.e., the 
processing of selected data (capta) relevant to people undertaking purposeful action].'’ 
Elsewhere, Checkland calls these a human activity system and an information system. 
We prefer the language of Steven Alter and therefore refer to work system and information 
system in this thesis. There are many ways in which an information system and a work system 
can overlap; see Figure 9. 
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Figure 9 Work systems and information systems. Source: (Alter 2002a) 
1.3 Personal work systems and personal information management 
systems 
(Baskerville 2011b) suggests that what he identifies as the individual information system – we 
had previously called this a personal information management system PIMS (Gregory and 
Descubes 2011b) – has an interface with both the personal work system of an individual and 
one or more work systems corresponding to her employer. He attributes to an everywoman 
knowledge worker that he names Jane Doe an individual information system whose 
architecture and principal interfaces are shown in Figure 8. Baskerville’s posited IIS 
Information system is a small, dedicated 
component of a single work system 
Information system is 
roughly equivalent to work 
system 
Information system designed 
to support one work system is 
also used in another work 
 
Large information system 
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architecture incorporates two kinds of system. One is the individual information system itself, 
largely an artefact made up of computer-based services. Second is two ‘work systems’ denoted 
by arrows within this IS architecture diagram. One is Doe’s ‘profession[al]’ work system as an 
employee. The other is the work system that serves Doe as a person. We note also the 
representation of information services consumed and produced as arising from, and sinking 
into, clouds. The term cloud is used here in its loose, IS perspective because the ‘network’ is 
evolving to the ‘cloud’. 
Baskerville reminds us that: 
“IS have been understood as social-technical phenomena from the earliest 
years (Bostrom and Heinen 1977); (Mumford and Weir 1979). Steven Alter 
(Alter 2008) defines IS as a type of ‘work system’, ‘in which human 
participants and/or machines perform work (processes and activities) 
using information, technology, and other resources to produce 
informational products and/or services for internal or external customers’” 
(p 451).  
Alter’s definition can be read as excluding individual work systems with its reference to 
internal and external ‘customers’. Baskerville notes by contrast that individual information 
systems are evolving into a legitimate and sometimes complicated form of information system 
supporting the personal work system. Just as expenditure on information and communication 
technology by individuals has become more quantitatively significant than that by businesses, 
so the individual information systems which arise when individuals use ICT to collect data, to 
process it and then feed it outwards to inform others are perhaps beginning to rival in their 
significance the corporate information systems which until now have been the focus of IS 
teaching and research. 
Creating the personal work system may at least in part be an act of creative design (Cross 
2007). Schön in (Schön 1987) points out the significance of design and of synthesis, going 
beyond analysis:  
“Designing in its broader sense involves complexity and synthesis. In contrast 
to analysts or critics, designers put things together and bring new things into 
being, dealing in the process with many variables and constraints, some 
initially known and some discovered through designing. Almost always, 
designers’ moves have consequences other than those intended for them. 
Designers juggle variables, reconcile conflicting values, and manoeuvre around 
constraints – a process in which, although some design products may be 
superior to others, there are no unique right answers.” 
1.4 A personal working model and why it has got to exist 
My conjecture is based generally upon abductive insight and well-established cybernetic 
theory and specifically upon the Good Regulator theorem t.he argument for this appears in 
section 0. I conjecture that the effectiveness of the individual knowledge worker depends to a 
significant degree upon at least these factors: 
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1. Each of us has a more or less explicit personal working model which 
encapsulates our understanding of how we should organise our personal 
work and life. Thus, each of us as we work participates in and constructs a 
personal working model which informs and regulates the personal work 
system which we as knowledge workers constitute as we work. In most cases, 
that model is inexplicit.  We would expect the extent to which our personal 
working model is an effective regulator of our personal work system to be 
determined (inter alia) by the faithfulness, the degree of isomorphism, of that 
working model with the “reality” with which we have to deal. My ongoing 
research aims to make empirical evidence available concerning that 
conjecture. Among the risks are that the “inter alia” – unidentified – will 
interfere with and perhaps dominate the expected result; or indeed that 
evidence will contradict the theoretically-based prediction, putting the theory 
itself in question. 
2. My further conjectures are that the effectiveness of personal work can be 
increased for and by individuals who more explicitly model – and thus 
understand – their personal work system before seeking to design 
improvements to aspects of that system (particularly the PIMS element); and 
that in many cases, individuals will benefit from mentoring as they audit, 
model and redesign their work system (Gregory, Kehal, and Descubes 2012a). 
3. Since a model is an abstraction and simplification, no one model can fully or 
adequately represent the situation modelled. In this paper, I present and in 
part justify a modelling (semi-)formalism based on typed concept mapping 
which I call Conceprocity. Conceprocity has as a characteristic that it 
supports, enables and encourages multiple models of different kinds of a 
situation. The different models and kinds of model may together permit 
richer understanding, all within a reasonably unified representational 
framework. 
Conant and Ashby (1970), in an article which they entitled “Every good regulator of a system 
must be a model of that system”, showed that:  
“Restated somewhat less rigorously, the theorem says that the best regulator of 
a system is one which is a model of that system in the sense that the regulator’s 
actions are merely the system’s actions as seen through a mapping h. ” (Conant 
and Ashby 1970, p.95). 
The thesis seeks to tease out some of the multiple dimensions and necessarily active nature 
that such an isomorphic model must requisitely possess if it is to be capable of generating 
sufficient variety to overcome the variety that exists in its environment, as is required by the 
same Ross Ashby’s earlier law of requisite variety (Ashby 1956). Thus, the model has to have 
both representational and active (actionable) characteristics if the desirable and essential-to-
survival goal of effective regulation of the individual’s life is to be achieved. To the extent that 
we all, for a time, do succeed in a degree of self-regulation and viability, the model must exist in 
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some form and the research goal has therefore been to discern and to characterise it initially, 
with the hope of improving it subsequently. 
1.5 Regulation: an « age of steam » analogy 
Both Figure 10 and Figure 11 are representations and therefore conceptual models of a 
controlled system. In such a control system, feedback is used to ensure that the output of the 
principal component – in this case a steam engine – is in accordance with the controller’s 
intentions. The regulator or governor is used to generate a control signal which modifies the 
input (pressurised steam) to the system as a whole and in this case ensures that the engine will 
neither overspeed nor underspeed. This is an example of negative feedback. Thus, the 
principles of control engineering, a concrete instantiation of what later became known as 
cybernetics, were understood at least in part in earlier centuries. 
 
Figure 10 Regulatory active model: the governor Source: Course notes on Otomatik Kontrol 
Kavramı ve Örnek Devreler. Yrd. / Automatic Control Concept and Sample Circuits, Dr. Aytaç 
Gören, http://docplayer.biz.tr/156411-H1-otomatik-kontrol-kavrami-ve-ornek-devreler-yrd-doc-dr-
aytac-goren.html 
It is important to notice that we are dealing here with two models. The first, iconic or 
conceptual, model is the representation of the situation. This is what appears in this 
document. The second, analogical, model is in this case the governor. The governor,   part of 
the machine “in the world”, is a regulatory active model. 
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Figure 11 Watt’s steam engine governor 
1.6 Feedback control theory 
  
Figure 12 Single-loop feedback system.  Source - (Doyle, Francis and Tannenbaum, 1992, figure 
1.3, p.8) 
Figure 12 is drawn from a standard text on control theory; it shows a single-loop feedback 
system. (Doyle, Francis, and Tannenbaum 1992) 
The system under consideration is shown in their Figure 1.3, where P and C are the plant and 
controller transfer functions. 
The signals are as follows: 
Representation of a regulatory active 
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r   reference or command input 
e   tracking error 
u   control signal, controller output 
d   plant disturbance 
y   plant output 
n   sensor noise 
This is not a theory which is directly applicable to PIMS. 
1.7 A general control system 
 
Figure 13 A general control system. Source - (Doyle, Francis and Tannenbaum, 1992, p.6) 
 
Figure 13 which is drawn from the same text shows: 
1. The "plant" (factory) is the set of production facilities, actuators that generate inputs, 
signal sensors, etc. 
2. The controller must be designed so that the plant creates the desired outputs z from 
the input w. 
This simplified control system is a better analogy for the way in which an individual controls 
her work. 
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1.8 Personal Information Management Systems PIMS and Personal 
Work Systems PWS 
The author holds that a very significant component of each such personal work system is an 
individual and personal information management system (PIMS). That PIMS may from time 
to time be the consequence of an explicit design act on the part of the individual who 
constructs and uses it. Perhaps more often it will arise from a process of more-or-less 
serendipitous bricolage (Ciborra and Jelassi, 1994), (Verjans, 2005) – tinkering until by some 
happy chance we have a temporarily stable but useful personal information management 
approach. Thus, we suggest the emergence and (sometimes) design of a personal information 
management system PIMS, which is an information system specific and personal to an 
individual knowledge worker. 
What a PIMS is 
What is the nature of such a personal information management system? One difficulty to be 
overcome is choosing (and sticking to) the right definition of terms; in this connection see 
(Holwell 1997, pp. 191-196). According to Holwell, Checkland sees an information system as 
more-or-less equivalent to a human activity system; he separately identities a data 
manipulation system (which Checkland points out, as does his Lancaster colleague Brian 
Wilson (B. Wilson 1984), is only a component of an information system).  
(Checkland and Holwell 2005) state that: 
“The act of creating information is a human act, not one which a machine can accomplish. It is 
the human being who can attribute meaning to the selected data which have been highlighted 
for attention, this being done in a context which may well be shared by many people but may 
also be unique to an individual. Of course the designer of a system which processes focussed-
on data (i.e. capta) into a more useful form will have the aim of making the processed capta 
correspond to some obvious categories of information which will be meaningful to many 
different people. But attributing meaning to the processed data is a human ability and a 
particular attribution may be unique to one individual. No designer can guarantee that his or 
her intended attributions of meaning will be universally accepted.” (Checkland & Holwell 
2005, p. 54). 
The PIMS as part of a personal work system PWS 
A personal information management system PIMS is posited as an information system in 
which an individual structures and stores data so as subsequently to yield information which 
she requires (inter alia) in order to be able to control her own activities. Her aim is to get 
work done more efficiently or effectively by more closely achieving desirable goals or 
outcomes. The achievement of this aim is embodied in a personal work system (where work 
is to be understood very generally so as to embrace play rather than to contrast with it). 
Thus: 
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❑ An engineer designs and constructs a “better future”, that is she looks at an 
existing messy situation and identifies problems and problem owners - the 
latter may be or become the clients for possible solutions – realisable 
improvements to the messy situation (Ackoff 1997). In such a way an engineer 
might construct improved personal information management tools. 
❑ A do-it-yourselfer, what the French call un bricoleur, makes something that is 
useful but typically in a less systematic manner than the engineer.  
❑ The motivations for bricolage, a French word meaning do-it-yourself or 
“muddling through” (Lévi-Strauss 1966), include inadequate access to expertise 
or cost saving. As (DesAutels 2011) suggests, individuals have frequently to 
mash together various components so as to address their personal information 
management needs by means of what he calls user generated information 
systems UGIS.  When the scope of the required system extends beyond the 
individual to groups, we suggest that a UGIS becomes a situational application 
(Gregory and Norbis 2009b). Situational applications are used primarily by 
groups and as such fall outside the immediate scope of this present paper. 
❑ A worker progressively assembles together, more or less consciously, a 
“mashup” of components – often in the form of apps and/or office software – 
which are together useful as her personal information management system. 
Knowledge workers work within (a) work system(s) (Alter 2008, 2002b, 2006). 
❑ A player is similar to a worker, since we here treat play as work much as some 
people treat work as play. For both worker and player the emphasis is on 
creatively finding a solution to an immediate problem while always seeking to 
learn how to solve that problem or others like it better next time. 
What do the engineer, the bricoleur and the knowledge worker / player have in common?  
❑ They are all involved in everyday task identification and management, and in 
problem-solving. 
❑ They are all part of a work system and have some limited or constrained ability 
to improve the system of which they are a part. 
❑ They all understand something of the systemic nature of the situation, which is 
that any improvement will change the problem situation but will rarely 
completely “solve” it, since unanticipated systemic effects – sometimes 
positive, often negative – will emerge and then in their turn need to be 
addressed. 
❑ They work best, that is, they get more done more quickly, if they have:  
o a good problem-solving framework 
o competences, perhaps including modelling and design skills 
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o they learn by doing and from doing (the latter being the fruit of 
reflection). 
❑ They sometimes see the need for, and either acquire or make, a new tool in 
order to amplify their competences. 
What the PIMS consists of 
Information systems researchers have not as yet contributed much to the study and practice 
of personal information management. Thus, Baskerville (Baskerville 2011b) as editor of a 
leading information systems journal has recently identified what he calls “individual 
information systems IIS” as a new subject of enquiry. PIM is not a new field of enquiry. 
Studying PIM systems or individual information systems as information systems is arguably 
novel. 
What are the essential characteristics of the PIMS that supports the PWM? Here are just 
sketches of an answer: 
1. Conceptual data structures which are adapted to the data to be stored and the 
information to be derived. These structure the specks and nuggets which are the data. 
Nuggets will take concrete form as for example data tables, data views and 
multimedia documents; specks are either specific items (e.g. rows) in tables, or 
standalone information items such as contact details or bibliographic references. It is 
convenient to distinguish between so-called structured and unstructured data, 
although these may not be as distinct as some seem to think. In any given PIMS, 
multiple conceptual data structures will almost invariably be required. In many cases, 
multiple software packages will be needed to manage those structures. 
2. Some individuals will wish to go right back to the philosophical roots of personal 
knowledge as they seek to understand their work. We cite here (Polanyi 1958) and 
(Polanyi 1962), but also (Popper 1972). Thus, ontological issues may also need to be 
addressed. We suggest that it is necessary to support a personal ontology (Katifori et 
al. 2008) -- specific, that is, to each personal information management system. This 
may sound very grand; in practice, it might take the form of a hierarchical 
classification scheme – a taxonomy – and a parallel categorisation or tagging scheme.  
The difference between categorisation and classification is made by (Jacob 2004) and 
further discussed by (J. Sinclair 2008; J. R. Sinclair 2007). They see categorisation as 
“the process of dividing the world into groups of entities whose members are in some 
way similar to each other”. Classification, by contrast, is the process of dividing a set 
of entities into mutually exclusive classes related according to formally defined rules. 
“A classification scheme is a set of mutually exclusive and non-overlapping classes 
arranged within a hierarchical structure and reflecting a predetermined ordering of 
reality.” (Jacob 2004) 
3. In so far as the Working Model is a model of a way of working, it is as much a set of 
activities, sometimes repeated in accordance with a template and thus 
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distinguishable as processes; as it is a set of concepts, data tables and data views. 
However, those processes are likely to be extremely specific to the individual and 
very difficult to discern, let alone to model. Probably the best that can be hoped for is 
to explicate certain of the lower-level data-oriented processes surrounding the use of 
a PIMS while at the same time recognising the necessity for higher-level “processes” 
such as planning and delivering a new course, writing a paper or book. 
4. It then becomes desirable or necessary to model a PIMS. We have devised 
Conceprocity for this purpose and for others. Conceprocity permits the construction 
of visual concept-process knowledge models – the significance of the visual 
component being that it resonates with a large part of the brain’s variety-absorbing 
and learning capacity.  
5. We suggest the use of a dictionary / lexicon to store the metadata / semantics 
associated with named things; that dictionary should be an active component (Zahran 
1981) which can also support the taxonomic classification and / or tagging of target 
information items in an integrated lexicon. 
6. An implication is that the model of a personal information management system, the 
meta information about that system, may itself be a part of the personal information 
management system. Here we can draw a parallel to those data management systems 
which incorporate a data dictionary as an active component of the database 
management system itself. Just as an active data dictionary is a vital component of a 
really effective data management system (Zahran 1981), so an active working model 
dictionary is a vital component of a well-defined personal information management 
system. By active, we mean that the model not only describes the system but is a vital 
(living and growing) component of the system.  
1.9 An initial model of how a knowledge worker uses information to 
regulate her work 
Figure 14 is a Conceprocity model of a conjectured use by a knowledge worker of information 
which she stores in some personal information management system PIMS. It is also intended 
for use by the reader as a Conceprocity tutorial example. 
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Figure 14 How a knowledge worker uses information to regulate her work 




In Conceprocity, concepts are normally represented as light blue rectangles and 
procedures – actions, repeated activities or formalised processes – as light green rounded 
rectangles. Principles are shown as light yellow trapezoids and logical decisions or logical 
connectors are represented by light orange trapezoids. Actors are represented by a 
stylised person icon in mauve. Conceprocity users are recommended to follow certain 
grammar rules, only some of which are enforced by the software currently used to 
construct a Conceprocity diagram. Further information concerning Conceprocity is 
provided in chapter 3 and in appendices. 
In Figure 14 the numbered callouts have the following significance: 
 At 1, the knowledge worker sets objectives. 
 At 2, she identifies and obtains necessary resources. 
 At 3, she updates the information in her personal information 
management system. This information is then used at 7 to 
influence her actions. 
 The black arrows indicate the forward path; the red arrows 
represent the feedback path. The AND connector between the 
knowledge worker and the first three procedures indicates that 
she does all the procedures in some indeterminate order. It has 
one arrow coming in and three coming out – it is a splitting 
connector; it splits a process into three parts carried out in 
parallel or at any rate in an indeterminate order.  
 Once she has the necessary resources and has set her personal 
objectives, she goes on to enact her plans and achieves some part 
of them. Notice that the 2nd AND logical connector has two 
arrows going into it and one coming out – this connector joins 
together previous paths. The AND connector indicates that all 
previous paths must have terminated before the procedure which 
follows the connector can be enacted. She needs both resources 
and objectives before she can carry out meaningful action. 
 She now has some actual achievements. A procedure (which she 
carries out) compares the actual achievements with the 
objectives which are assumed to be stored in the personal 
information management system labelled as 7. This comparison 
may indicate a gap between the plan and the actual achievement. 
It will therefore be necessary to carry out one or more corrective 




actions, introduced by the inclusive OR at the right-hand end of 
the diagram. 
 At 4, she obtains more resources. 
 At 5, she changes her objectives. 
 At 6, she changes herself – she learns. The output of this process 
is shown going into a principle, labelled personal knowledge and 
model, which is shown to regulate or influence the knowledge 
worker – whereas flows that prompt an action are shown as solid 
arrows, control or influence is shown as a dotted arrow. 
Thus, the conjecture which is being modelled here is that in a way analogous to the way in 
which a controller or governor is used in a physical system such as a steam engine, so 
personal information is used by the knowledge worker in what we stress to be an open, 
self-organising system demonstrating continuous evolution and learning. This 
premise is basic to the entire thesis. 
There are two senses here in which a model is an active regulator. The first is that data 
stored in the personal information management system may influence or even direct the 
actions of the knowledge worker. Thus, for example a diary entry might “make” a person 
take action – for example, to send a birthday card. This is because the data in the 
information system, perhaps stored in a relational table, models the real-world situation in 
which someone was born on a particular date, that that date was recorded in a birth 
certificate, reproduced in the personal information management system and presented by 
software in the personal information management system as an alert. The second way in 
which a model may be an active regulator is that a knowledgeable person may produce or 
have presented to her a conceptual model such as the one in Figure 14. Taking cognizance 
of the situation represented in the model, the knowledgeable person may decide to 
examine her existing personal information management system and find ways in which to 
improve it. The modelling process has enabled her to achieve improved understanding on 
the basis of which she changes her action. She has both learned and changed. 
1.10 Summarising the area of concern  
In this chapter, I have set out to illustrate the area of concern which is that of the 
regulation by the individual knowledge worker of her personal work. I have suggested, but 
not as yet justified, a conjecture which is that in some way she maintains a personal 
information management system in which, in this example, she holds details of her 
objectives. 
Among the questions which therefore arise are these: 




o Do the conjectured mechanisms exist in reality? 
o What is the scope and nature of the “reality” to which we can apply this kind of 
modelling approach? 
o How should we best model or represent a situation into which we wish to 
enquire or which we seek to control? 
It is hardly likely that I am the first person to ask questions of this nature. They have 
perhaps already been answered adequately in the past. In the next chapter, I review 
literature relevant to this area of concern. 




 STUDYING PIM: 
LITERATURE & KNOWLEDGE 
GAPS 
This chapter reviews the literature of PIM. Philosophical considerations are introduced. It 
discusses data, information, knowledge and the distinctions and co-dependencies between 
these concepts. Design science research is discussed. The chapter concludes with notes on 
the diverse evaluations required for the different approaches introduced. 
(Boyne 2009) examines the PhD literature review and makes recommendations 
concerning how to produce a literature review which assists in the generation of original, 
and defensible, research questions which correspond to gaps in existing research. 
Literature review is both a process and a product. However, (Alvesson and Sandberg 
2011) object that such “research gap spotting” makes it less likely that academic work will 
challenge our assumptions in some significant way. They prefer what they call 
problematisation. An alternative approach based on abductive logic and reflexivity 
suggested by (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009) is discussed later in this review. It is this last 
view which has most informed my approach.  
The literature review reported in this chapter contains a much higher proportion of 
material that can be labelled philosophy than would be normal in a PhD thesis in 
information systems. I believe this both to be justified and essential given that: 
1. One of the contributions of the doctoral work is a demonstration by case study of 
a critical realist approach to principled and experiential design. 
2. A second major contribution is the modelling approach which I call Conceprocity. 
This is strongly based in scientific realist and social ontology, both of which I have 
therefore to have understood before applying them to the design of that 
modelling approach. 
3. The personal working model of a researcher must to some degree embody her 
belief system, her Weltanshauuang (Checkland and Davies 1986). 




(Checkland and Holwell 1998b) review the nature and validity of action research, arguing 
that “its claim to validity requires a recoverable research process based upon a prior 
declaration of the epistemology in terms of which findings which count as knowledge 
will be expressed.” This thesis reports on the first part of a planned long-term research 
programme. The principal research methods reported in this thesis include design science 
research and autoethnography. It is only in the second part of the programme that 
significant use of mentored action research will be made. Nevertheless, I have chosen to 
apply the injunction to the entire programme. 
2.1 Personal information management PIM 
PIM systems and techniques 
 PIM 
(a) Origins 
Vannevar Bush identified the Memex as a theoretical concept 70 years ago: (Bush 1945); 
see also (Caspi, Shankar, and Wang 2004); (S. Davies, Velez-Morales, and King 2005). 
The first modern reference to personal information management (which was also the last 
for many years) was by the psychologist (Lansdale 1988). 
Deborah Barreau, a library scientist, was probably the first author to discuss personal 
information management systems: (Barreau 1995). She also identified the vital need to 
preserve the context in which personal information is first encountered. The only other 
author of whom I am aware who seeks to tackle personal information management 
systems qua systems is Ofer Bergman; see for example (Bergman et al. 2008). 
Popular authors such as Dave Allen have written about various aspects of what is 
commonly known as “time management”: and what he dubs “getting things done GTD” (D. 
Allen 2003). 
(b) PIM community of practice 
The current, fairly active if small, PIM research community dates its origins to work by 
(Barreau and Nardi 1995), (Bergman, Beyth-Marom, and Nachmias 2003) and (Bergman et 
al. 2004). Richard Boardman completed Ph.D. research in PIM, largely from a tool-usage, 
HCI point of view: (Boardman and Sasse 2004); (Boardman 2004). Perhaps the most 
prolific current author on PIM is William Jones, of the University of Washington. Dr. Jones 
received an NSF award to kick-start serious PIM research, (W. P. Jones and Bruce 2006). 
Jones’ three most recent books on personal information management are (W. P. Jones 2013, 
2012, 2015).  




A general blog, but a closed-entry community of practice, centres on (Tales of PIM 2016), 
http://talesofpim.org/. Jones instigated a small group of PIM researchers which first met 
as a special interest group in the summer of 2006, and this has become the primary cross-
disciplinary PIM-focussed research group. Subsequent meetings have occurred in 2008, 
2012, 2014 and 2016. 
(c) PIM: Core references 
Following the 2006 symposium, William Jones wrote a popularising, but scholarly, text in 
2007 - (W. P. Jones 2007b). The title, “Keeping found things found: The study and practice of 
personal information management “, suggests the bias – which is to the study of human 
activities that require personal information to be managed. Dr. Jones’ own background is in 
cognitive psychology. 
(d) Review articles 
(Teevan, Jones, and Bederson 2006) introduced PIM in a special edition of the 
Communications of the ACM devoted to PIM. This was updated in (Teevan and Jones 2008) 
and again for (Teevan, Jones, and Capra 2008). 
Conference papers that I wrote with Dr. Mario Norbis are a good general introduction, 
although they place too heavy an emphasis on PIM tools: (Gregory and Norbis 2008a), 
(Gregory and Norbis 2008b).  
(e) Initial definitions of PIM 
Dr. Jones also collaborated, notably with Jaime Teevan, now a Microsoft researcher, on a 
book which is a collection of scholarly articles: (W. P. Jones and Teevan 2007b). Many of 
the authors are associated with the PIM community of practice instantiated in the Tales of 
PIM website and in the various special interest group meetings. 
What the PIM community defines PIM to be can be seen from the brief analysis of the 
articles that appear in Jones and Teevan’s 2007 book which follows in Table 3. The 
analytical technique is very simple; it is to classify the book chapters by main disciplinary 
influence: 
Table 3 An analysis of (W. P. Jones and Teevan 2007b) 
Authors 
Title Main disciplinary influence 
(W. P. Jones and 
Teevan 2007a) 
Personal Information Management: 
Introduction 
Cognitive psychology 
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Authors 




How people find personal information Cognitive psychology 
(W. P. Jones 
2007a) 
How people keep and organize personal 
information 
Cognitive psychology 





Naturalistic approaches for understanding 
PIM 
Philosophy 
(Tan et al. 
2007) 
Save everything: Supporting human 
memory with a personal digital lifetime 
store 
Human activity systems 
(Catarci et al. 
2007) 
Structure everything Computer science 
(Karger 2007) Unify everything: It's all the same to me Human activity systems 
(Russell and 
Lawrence 2007) 













PIM: Individual differences Human activity systems 








Management of Personal Information 
Disclosure: The Interdependence of Privacy, 
Security and Trust 
Information security 
(Shamos 2007) Privacy and public records Records management 
(W. P. Jones and 
Teevan 2007c) 
Personal Information Management: 
Conclusion 
Cognitive psychology 
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This rather superficial analysis is however sufficient to indicate that some disciplines are 
over represented and that some (notably information systems) are hardly represented at 
all. 
Also notable by its absence is sufficient discussion of “psychological” (or emotional) 
barriers to action. However, (E. Jones et al. 2009) does contribute a discussion on why 
people give up on PIM efforts. 
There are remarkably few references in the established literature to PIM systems PIMS. 
Some that appear to refer to PIMS are simply making the common error of considering a 
tool or a collection of components to be a system: typical of this kind of error is the paper 
(Al Nasar, Mohd, and Ali 2011). 
(Hwang, Kettinger, and Yi 2015) is the first quantitatively informed study that I have so far 
encountered in the field of PIM. The article focuses on the construct “personal information 
management effectiveness” of knowledge workers and its antecedents. 
(f) Specific issues: organising personal information 
(W. P. Jones et al. 2005) discusses the crucial significance of folders (directories) as a 
mechanism for organising personal information. This requirement is complemented by 
(Catarci et al. 2007) in their more general discussion of the need to structure personal 
information.  
Otherwise, the relatively clear distinctions made in library science between classification 
and categorisation – as for example in (Jacob 2004) – are not sufficiently emphasised in the 
PIM literature (nor in the practical sphere). This is at least in part the result of differences 
of vocabulary. Here and elsewhere in the literature of PIM, authors prefer to talk about 
folders rather than classifications and tags rather than categories. 
(g) Specific issues: organising personal information 
 
(Whittaker and Bergman 2016) continue the development of what (Bergman, Beyth-
Marom, and Nachmias 2003) originally termed the user-subjective approach. Bergman and 
Whittaker argue that both information theories and technologies that work well in other 
areas of information management do not do so in the sphere of personal information 
management. They propose a three-stage model for curation, keeping, management and 
exploitation. They note that PIM differs from other information management approaches 
in that the hierarchical folder method which dominates practical PIM usage is preferred by 
PIM users over the search-everything and tag-everything information management 
approaches which are otherwise becoming ubiquitous. Their suggestion is that what they 
term PIM systems should exploit the fact that in PIM the person who organises the 
information is the same person who later retrieves it. They suggest a user-subjective 
approach and related design principles consistent with their three-stage model for 
curation. 
(h) Specific issues: supporting cognitive processes 
The strong influence of cognitive psychology on PIM research is emphasised by, for 
example, (W. P. Jones and Ross 2006). Part of the value of this synergy appears in the use 
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of evaluative techniques inspired by measurement approaches borrowed from cognitive 
psychology. This approach is exemplified by (Elsweiler and Ruthven 2007) and by 
(Elsweiler 2008) – the latter extending the memex metaphor of in a discussion of 
supporting human memory in personal information management.  
(i) Specific issues: learning how to improve personal 
information management 
The PIM research community has commented favourably on my suggested “how to learn 
PIM more effectively” research emphasis. Thus Sauermann, in a forum communication, 
commented that he thought the approach was novel and likely to prove valuable. One of 
my proposals – that of individual self-auditing of PIM effectiveness – is discussed in the 
conference paper (Gregory and Norbis 2009a). 
(j) Specific issues: end user PIM system development 
This has been discussed in (Gregory 2010), concerning collaboration and end-user 
information management tools.  
(k) Evaluating PIM 
This is discussed in (D. Kelly 2006). 
 Personal knowledge management PKM 
The literature on personal knowledge management seems to be closer to that on 
organisational knowledge management than to PIM. See (Apshvalka and Wendorff 2005), 
(Frand and Hixon 1999), (Grundspenkis 2007), (Snowden and Pauleen 2008),  (Pauleen 
2009), (Pollard 2008), (Sauermann 2005b), (Schwarz 2006), (Smedley 2009), (Snowden 
and Pauleen 2008) 
Kirby Wright takes an interesting perspective. Convinced of the value of organisational 
knowledge management, he nevertheless contends that that knowledge is situated in 
individuals. Thus he makes a very clear link between organisational and personal 
knowledge management in (K. Wright 2005) and (K. Wright 2007). Similar synergistic 
thinking informs (Zhang 2009). 
 PIM and personal knowledge management PKM 
We accept as axiomatic for this study that knowledge is personal (Polanyi 1958) and that 
even to share knowledge requires that that knowledge first be made explicit as 
communicable data structured to permit meaningful information to be extracted from it.  
PIM can be done using computers; PKM can (at this stage) only be assisted by ICT, e.g. by 
so-called “E-learning” and by the creative use of social networks.  
True knowledge representation (KR) using computers is perhaps a near-reality, but as yet 
of little practical significance in most personal information management systems. I would 
identify John Sowa’s work (John F. Sowa 1992b; Shapiro 2001; John F. Sowa 2000a) as an 
accessible and influential summary of the insights of computer science and artificial 
intelligence concerning knowledge representation. (Schubert 2005) is an example in the 
literature of artificial intelligence AI of the definition of a notion of explicit self-awareness. 
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This also needs an explicit internal representation which the author claims might enable 
general inference methods and overt communication about the self. To achieve this 
requires particular forms of knowledge representation and reasoning including natural 
language expressiveness, autoepistemic inference grounded in a computable notion of 
knowing and / or believing, meta-syntactic devices and an ability to abstract and 
summarised stories. This technology is not as yet widely available to, and readily 
applicable by, the ordinary PIM user who is addressed by this thesis. (Schwarz 2006) 
discusses a context-sensitive support system which aids the user with her knowledge 
work, defined as searching, reading, creating and archiving of documents. The context 
model it incorporates necessarily restricts the information items with which it concerns 
itself to things already known to the user – links to home documents, folders et cetera. It 
depends upon shared ontologies and the use of knowledge representation mechanisms 
such as RDF. In a prototype, data is retrieved from the user’s own computer via XML and 
remote procedure call technologies. This present thesis refers to such technologies but 
holds that they are not yet in a form which is mature enough to be usable by the ordinary 
computer user. Indeed, a rash of research was reported in this general area – sometimes 
referred to as the semantic desktop – about 10 years ago, but has largely fallen into 
abeyance since. The most prolific author who attempted to bridge the gap between PIM 
and what he identifies as the semantic desktop is the Austrian researcher and 
entrepreneur Leo Sauermann: see (Sauermann and Schwarz 2004), (Sauermann 2005b), 
(Sauermann 2005a), (Sauermann, Bernardi, and Dengel 2005), (Sauermann, Cyganiak, and 
Völkel 2008). 
 An evaluation of the PIM / PKM literature and an initial 
identification of knowledge gaps 
Currently, the published literature on PIM only rarely refers to the PKM literature. The 
converse is also true. A rare exception is provided by (Świgoń 2013). Her work is notable 
for her clear enunciation of the necessity of personal information management to effective 
personal knowledge management. Although guilty in my mind of insufficient precision in 
distinguishing information and knowledge, she has an excellent literature review on 
personal information management and personal knowledge management. (Agnihotri and 
Troutt 2009) usefully considers the more technological aspects of personal knowledge 
management. 
One initially-promising area of research which I nevertheless largely ignore in my current 
research is in the cross-over between personal information management and the semantic 
web. The semantic web, should it appear, will depend upon formal knowledge 
representation mechanisms: see (Sauermann and Schwarz 2004), (Sauermann 2005b), 
(Sauermann 2005a), (Sauermann, Bernardi, and Dengel 2005), (Sauermann, Cyganiak, and 
Völkel 2008). 
This leaves very significant knowledge gaps. I would highlight the following disciplines and 
fields whose literature ought greatly to influence PIM practice, but where the current 
influence is restricted to one or two articles or to none: 
 Computer science (but note the work of Leo Sauermann 
and his collaborators) 
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 Information systems 
 Logic, artificial intelligence and knowledge 
representation 
 Knowledge management (in the organisational sense) 




 Educational psychology 
 Learning 
 Organisational learning 
Only in the areas below is there much cross-pollination: 
 Information and library science 
 Sociology 
 Cognitive psychology 
 Human computer interfaces, HCI 
 Knowledge gaps 
Elaborating, I now go on to suggest the existence of specific knowledge gaps. 
The literature of PIM makes very little reference to philosophy. And yet: if for a moment 
we exclude the work of the artificial intelligence community, we live in a world in which all 
knowledge is personal to human beings. A somewhat more profound consideration of 
epistemological issues is essential. Ontological issues surface very practically in 
considerations of information item classification and of categorisation (“tagging” by 
multiple criteria). See section 2.2 for further discussion of this gap. 
The productivity impact of poor PIM is not known – for example, how much time is lost 
every day because people search again for information that they ought already to have 
readily-available to them under a managed form? We know neither how many people 
habitually manage personal information, nor to what extent in their working days. A very 
recent article is the first in a major journal to tackle this issue: (Hwang, Kettinger, and Yi 
2015). However, I think it is too early to assert the existence of clearly-identified and 
quantifiable PIM constructs in the way that they seek to do. 
How much productivity is lost, and how many opportunities are never realised, because 
one person files information under a category or a classification which is not the same as 
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that used by another member of the same team or community of practice? Again, the 
literature is largely silent on this issue; however, see (Catarci et al. 2007). 
The academic literature seems to emphasise tool usability and not to study the structure 
and usefulness of PIM tools (and very little, the huge investment in so-called “office” 
productivity software used to permit PIM). For example, (Boardman 2004); (Boardman 
and Sasse 2004) view tools from the perspective of an HCI researcher. HCI (human 
computer interaction) is a cross-disciplinary area of study usually regarded as being at the 
intersection of computer science, behavioural sciences (particularly cognitive science) and 
design. Thus, Boardman is chiefly concerned to identify ways in which to improve the user 
experience of PIM tool users.  
The literature on personal information management generally takes an uncritical view of 
what data, information and knowledge are. Further, there is no systematic consideration of 
the contexts within which personal information is used and managed.  
As yet, there is little in the way of well-founded “how to” guides to people who wish to 
improve their PIM practice. 
Group aspects remain underdiscussed. Mechanisms for sharing information exist. For 
synchronising and rationalising data, some tool support is available. For synchronising and 
rationalising ontologies, there is little support available. Nor is much written on teaching, 
learning and mentoring to improve PIM. There is nothing yet on explicitly reflective 
approaches to improving PIM / PKM. 
The PIM literature makes almost no mention of systems and apparently knows nothing of 
the systems approach and of systems thinking. 
In summary, among the questions insufficiently addressed in the literature of PIM are 
these: 
1. Can people be helped to improve their PIM? How? 
2. Are existing methods, tools and techniques appropriate? How could they be 
improved? 
3. What are the barriers to effective PIM? 
4. When should people simply use existing tools, when should they integrate them, 
and when should they resort to creating or sponsoring new tools? 
5. What can PIM practice learn from epistemology and from ontology? 
6. What can PIM learn from systems thinking? 
PIM conceptual data structures 
Much practical personal information management is carried out using the facilities of so-
called office-productivity software, such as for example Microsoft Office. The effective use 
of such software depends upon practical skills possessed by the user, particularly the key 
issue of choosing the appropriate data structure for the problem at hand.  
  66 / 343 
 
Data is more or less organised. It can take many forms, including texts, lists, graphs, tables, 
related tables and objects. Dictionaries – metadata which ascribes meaning to data - are 
essential to organising data and information. The better the organisation the easier it is to 
exploit the underlying data. 
There are many ways of organising the same data. We often need to change the 
organisation of data according to the needs. Reorganisation or conversion is a common 
need of institutions such as business organisations.  
Information is derived from data by means of processes summarised in Figure 15: 
 
Figure 15 How information is obtained from data Source: Renaud Macgilchrist, personal 
communication. 
Table 4 suggests types of data. The table is ordered by increasing degree of structure. This 
initial classification is partially corroborated by (Völkel and Haller 2009). 
Table 4 Types of data ordered by degree of structure 
Some forms of data 
Text: Natural language that follows the rules of grammar 
Bullet points with text 
Structured Lists (e.g. <Names and telephone numbers>) 
Sequences: (like structured lists but richer) 
Outlines 
Tables 
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Tables include 2-dimensional structures that have columns and rows 
In MS Office terms: 
Word tables (also PowerPoint) 
Excel worksheets 
Access tables (collection of rows) 
      Spreadsheets and functional spreadsheets 
Graphs (can be represented as partially filled in tables) 
Concepts linked by relations (e.g. mind map, concept map) 
Clarifying some of the items in Table 4: 
 Text 
Natural language and text is in fact characterised by a very high degree of structure, that of 
natural language. Much software engineering expertise has been applied to text 
processing, giving rise to practically useful software such as voice recognition. However, it 
is not yet the case that office productivity software can accurately classify, categorise or 
otherwise “make sense” of textual data. It has to treat text as being without structure. 
 Hierarchic outlines and multiple hierarchy 
An outline is a hierarchical way to display related items of text to graphically depict their 
relationships. Outlining is a technique which may be implemented in general office 
programs or in specific computer programs known as “outliners”. An outliner is a program 
which stores and depicts outlines: a special text editor that allows text to be structured as 
an outline. Outliners are typically used for computer programming, collecting or 
organizing ideas, tasks or even project management. Outlining is the technique widely 
used in programs such as Microsoft Office PowerPoint, in which the main headings of a 
presentation appear as separate slides and on each slide appear points and sub-points. The 
same technique is available in a more powerful but perhaps less widely-used form in word 
processing packages such as Microsoft Office Word, which supports a very useful and 
underused Outline mode. 
In an outline, a data item is given meaning by being shown in its owning hierarchy. Thus, a 
person’s surname may be presented as a component of a composite contact object. The 
relative positioning of an item conveys meaning in that the label of the owner classifies or 
otherwise gives contextual information concerning the owned item; and the depth in the 
hierarchy gives some idea of the relative importance or significance of the item. 
Some programs allow a data item to participate in more than one hierarchy. Thus, for 
example an appointment for a meeting can appear in an overall agenda or calendar, but 
also be linked to the name of each participant in the meeting. Effectively, the same datum is 
classified in more than one way. To the extent that knowledge is a product of the 
recognition by intelligent agents of connections between information otherwise not 
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explicitly linked, tools that permit the representation of multiple hierarchy can be used as 
a mechanism for storing and representing relatively unsophisticated knowledge. 
 Relational databases 
The most widely accepted, implemented and used type of database is the so-called 
“relational” database (Date 2003).  In a relational database all data is stored as relations or 
sets, as originally suggested by (Codd 1970). Date suggests as an informal initial definition 
that  
“A relational system is one in which the data is perceived by the user as 
tables (and nothing but tables); and the operators at the user’s disposal 
(e.g. for data retrieval) are operators that generate new tables from old. For 
example, there will be one operator to extract a subset of the rows of a 
table, and another to extract a subset of the columns – and of course a row 
subset and a column subset of a table can both be regarded as tables 
themselves. The reason such systems are called ‘relational’ is that the term 
‘relation’ is essentially just a mathematical term for a table.” 
 Semantic web and web science 
(Shadbolt, Hall, and Berners-Lee 2006) introduces the notion of the semantic web and of 
what has become known as web science. Most practical work in this area emphasises XML 
documents, RDF and OWL. See (J. Davies, Studier, and Warren 2006).  
Two possibilities exist when applying semantic web approaches to personal information: 
either (1) specialist PIM software or services which incorporate semantic web techniques; 
or (2) systems which apply semantic web techniques to pre-existing data stored on a 
specific computer. The latter approach is referred to as the semantic desktop (Sauermann 
2005b; Sauermann, Bernardi, and Dengel 2005).  
 PIM processes 
I suggest the following initial classification of processes which commonly involve PIM 
techniques: 
 Decision making and control in the presence of 
constraints and with incomplete information 
 Problem solving 
(a) Algorithms 
(b) Heuristics 
PIM packages and tools 
 Basic data management tools exist in proliferation: such as 
spreadsheets and databases 
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Spreadsheets are a very powerful combination of the nearest approach to widely available 
end-user computer programming so far invented; and ways of storing (more or less) 
structured data in which the relationship between items of data is imposed using formulae 
and by physical organisation. 
Databases generally have a more limited remit which they fulfil with greater semantic 
precision than do spreadsheets. The most widely accepted, implemented and used type of 
database is the so-called “relational” database (Date 2003).  
It is possible and common to use spreadsheets and database management systems as the 
means by which personal data is stored, in other words, as the means by which a given 
individual carries out personal information management. 
 PIM tools and packages 
However, effectively using spreadsheets (or even more so, databases) involves a level of 
planning and organisation which not every professional can do well together with 
technical skills which not every such worker possesses. Consequently, over the years, a 
plethora of application programs (frequently based on an underlying relational database) 
have been devised to ease the task of storing and retrieving personal information such as 
contacts (addresses), appointments, tasks and the like. The most widely used such tool has 
been Microsoft Outlook, which additionally provides access to the facilities of an email 
system by means notably of the user’s email inbox.  
Many more focussed commercial PIM packages have been proposed over the years, but 
none has achieved ubiquity. 
In the open-source world, the Thunderbird and Lightning developments have provided an 
effective email capability (but little more in the way of PIM functionality at this stage). 
LibreOffice is widely used but has not threatened to replace Microsoft Office thus far. 
 PIM tools: specific personal information managers 
Various so-called “PIM” (Personal Information Manager) tools have been developed and 
marketed with varying degrees of success. 
A personal information manager (PIM) is a type of application software that functions as a 
personal organizer. As an information management tool, a PIM's purpose is to facilitate the 
recording, tracking, and management of certain types of "personal information".  
Personal information can include any of the following: 
 Personal notes/journal 
 Address books  
 Lists (including task lists)  
 Significant calendar dates  
 Birthdays  
 Anniversaries  
 Appointments and meetings 
 Archives of email and instant messages 
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 Fax communications, voicemail  
 Project management features  
 Recorded music, films and similar media 
 RSS/Atom feeds 
 In some domains, specialised information management tools 
have become established 
 E.g. bibliographic citation and referencing tools such as 
EndNote and Zotero 
User-generated information systems (UGIS) 
Baskerville (op. cit.) identifies “individual information systems”. I suggest that this is the 
same phenomenon that I have chosen previously to name “personal information 
management system”, abbreviated to “PIM system” or even PIMS. Further, I believe that 
this is much the same phenomenon recently identified as a “user-generated information 
system” UGIS by (DesAutels 2011).  
Philip DesAutels suggests as a formal definition: 
“A user-generated information system is defined as a set of component 
services, integrated by the user into a novel configuration such that the 
resulting information service is (1) qualitatively different from its 
components and (2) offers unique value to the user over and above the 
value of its inputs” (DesAutels 2011, 187). 
More generally, the individual may find herself in a situation where a gap exists between 
capability or individual competence on the one hand and need on the other. Bridging that 
gap requires both tools and general knowledge specifically applied. It is the fundamental 
contention of this present research that no general mechanism exists to build these 
bridges and that therefore “all” that can be done is to help people to learn “enough” to be 
able to construct the necessary bridges at appropriate cost. The components of such 
bridges may be general in their form and application even if each specific bridge has to be 
crafted for the particular circumstances of its use. 
 PIM system acquisition 
I suggest the following initial categorisation: 
 The Make or Buy? Decision (Coase 1937) – that is, do I 
buy PIM software or do I craft my own PIM approach? 
To what extent do I combine the approaches? 
 Procurement / Acquisition 
 Systems development of tools of specific or general 
applicability 
(a) End user development 
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(b) Conventional software engineering 
(c) Object-oriented approach 
(d) Logic databases 
(e) Functional programming 
2.2 Philosophical considerations 
 Introduction: determining the epistemological and 
ontological influences on this research 
In principle, every piece of research needs to demonstrate its epistemology: how we claim 
to know what we know. In this research, it has additionally been necessary to think about 
and develop (an) ontology: a classification of what we know. Ontology is “that branch of 
philosophy which deals with the order and structure of reality in the broadest sense 
possible” – quoted by (Wand, Storey, and Weber 1999, 496). 
Epistemology 
Epistemology addresses the questions: 
• What is knowledge? 
• How is knowledge acquired? 
• How do we know what we know? 
• What warrant exists for our knowledge claims? 
Ontology in philosophy and ontology in computer and information science 
Ontology in the philosophical sense is the philosophical study of the nature of being, 
existence or reality as such, as well as the basic categories of being and their relations. 
Ontology deals with questions concerning what entities exist or can be said to exist, and 
how such entities can be grouped, related within a hierarchy, and subdivided according to 
similarities and differences.  
In both computer science and information science, an ontology is a data model that 
represents a set of concepts within a domain and the relationships between those 
concepts. It is used to reason about the objects within that domain. 
Ontologies are used in artificial intelligence, the semantic web, software engineering and 
information architecture as a form of knowledge representation about the world or some 
part of it.  
 Ontologies, formal and personal 
A formal ontology (or upper-level ontology) is defined by axioms in a formal language and 
aims to provide a domain- and application-independent view of reality. The notion of a 
personal ontology is not well-developed but we demonstrate by example that it is 
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fundamental to more exact personal information management and more explicit personal 
knowledge management.  
(Chandrasekaran, Josephson, and Benjamins 1999) introduce ontology thus: 
“In philosophy, ontology is the study of the kinds of things that exist… [An] 
ontology is a representation vocabulary, often specialized to some domain 
or subject matter. More precisely, it is not the vocabulary as such that 
qualifies as an ontology, but the conceptualizations that the terms in the 
vocabulary are intended to capture… The representation vocabulary 
provides a set of terms with which to describe the facts in some domain, 
while the body of knowledge using that vocabulary is a collection of facts 
about a domain.”   
(Gruber 1993) suggests that an ontology is a specification of a conceptualization. “A 
specification of a representational vocabulary for a shared domain of discourse — 
definitions of classes, relations, functions, and other objects — is called an ontology.” 
(Gruber 1993, p.11) 
A filing system (paper or on a computer) can be viewed as an embodiment of such a 
personal ontology or at least taxonomy. The expression of the personal ontology may be 
less rich than the ontological stance of its owner; thus a student’s filing system may 
distinguish only Home and School folders, but her mental categorisations and 
classifications (Jacob 2004) are very much richer. Further discussion of the distinction 
between classification – as exemplified by physical or computer-based folders; and 
categorisation – as exemplified by tagging; is held over until section 0. 
Pragmatism 
Pragmatism – its founder Peirce preferred to call it pragmaticism – is one of a small 
number of philosophical approaches which have overtly influenced the present study. 
(Hartshorne, Weiss, and Burks 1931) – just one volume of several which together make up 
the collected papers of Charles Peirce – epitomises the vast intellectual outpourings of the 
American philosopher and polymath Charles Sanders Peirce.  
Abduction and the abductive logic of enquiry 
My initial approach has been abductive and it is pragmatic: I have followed Charles Sanders 
Peirce as interpreted by (Yu 1994, p.1): 
“In [the] Peirceian logical system, the logic of abduction and deduction 
contribute to our conceptual understanding of a phenomenon, while the 
logic of induction adds quantitative details to our conceptual knowledge. 
Although Peirce justified the validity of induction as a self-corrective 
process, he asserted that neither induction nor deduction can help us to 
unveil the internal structure of meaning. As exploratory data analysis 
performs the function as a model builder for confirmatory data analysis, 
abduction plays a role of explorer of viable paths to further inquiry. 
Thus, the logic of abduction fits well into exploratory data analysis. At the 
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stage of abduction, the goal is to explore the data, find a pattern, and 
suggest a plausible hypothesis; deduction is to refine the hypothesis based 
upon other plausible premises; and induction is the empirical 
substantiation.”  
Thus, before any possibility of hypothesis testing in the Popperian sense, hypotheses (or at 
least, initial questions) should be generated by means of critical thinking applied to pattern 
recognition. Yu continues: 
“Exploratory data analysis, as an application of abduction, is not a permit 
for the analyst to be naive to other research related to the investigated 
phenomena. Peirce strongly criticized his contemporaries' confusion of 
propositions and assertions. Propositions can be affirmed or denied while 
assertions are final judgments. The objective of abduction is to determine 
which hypothesis or proposition to test, not which one to adopt or assert… 
“Peirce stated that classification plays a major role in making hypotheses; 
that is the characters of phenomenon are placed into certain categories. In 
short, abduction by intuition can be interpreted as observing the world 
with appropriate categories which arise from the internal structure of 
meanings. The implication of abduction for researchers is that the use of 
exploratory data analysis is neither exhausting all possibilities nor making 
hasty decisions. Researchers must be well-equipped with proper categories 
in order to sort out the invariant features and patterns of phenomena.” 
In parallel, we also draw a very strong analogy to the method of inference called abduction, 
initially by Charles Sanders Peirce. We do this both for what we believe to be sound 
philosophical reasons but also because abduction has been suggested as a mechanism of 
situated cognition (Clancey 1997). We are therefore not alone in our speculation that 
abduction is not only a mode of inference, but also fundamental to human cognition. This 
stance is notably associated with the work of Lorenzo Magnani. Specifically, see: (Magnani 
2009, ch.8), where he discusses what he calls morphodynamical abduction. He makes 
specific reference to catastrophe theory (Thom [1980] 1993, [1972] 1989):  
“A cognitive process (and thus abduction) is described [by some] by the 
manipulation of internal semiotic representations of the external world. 
This view assumes a discrete set of representations fixed in discrete time 
jumps and, because of its functionalist character, cannot render the 
embodied dimension of cognition and the issue of anticipation and 
causation of a new hypothesis adequately. An integration of the traditional 
computational view with some ideas developed within the so-called 
dynamical approach and catastrophe theory can lead to important 
insights.” 
Critical realism (CR) 
 Origins of CR 
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The seminal publications quoted in almost all work on CR are (Bhaskar 1975); (Bhaskar 
1978); (Bhaskar [1986] 2009); (Bhaskar 1989); (Collier 1994). 
 Reality exists independently of our observation of it: (Dobson 
2002) 
This section is informed by the work of the information systems scholar Philip Dobson, 
specifically (Dobson 2002). Dobson poses the question: Why bother with philosophy? 
Dobson sees the emancipatory power of a researcher’s understanding of different 
philosophical positions as a powerful argument for “bothering with philosophy”.  
Thus, Dobson agrees with the critical realist Roy Bhaskar as they argue for a recognition of 
the intimate relationship between philosophy and methodology; the continued success of a 
philosophy is considered by (Bhaskar 1975) to be dependent on its effectiveness as 
“underlabourer and occasional midwife” to the research process: (Dobson 2002, 199). 
Dobson suggests that “the adoption of the ‘critical’ foreword [in the name ‘critical realism’] 
is unfortunate in that it misleadingly suggests that the philosophy is aligned with 
“Habermas’ ‘critical theory’, with its close links to phenomenology”. 
Dobson follows a classification of different conceptions of social structure that he ascribes 
to (M. S. Archer 1995) and concentrates his discussion on Giddens’ Structuration Theory 
(Giddens 1986). This Dobson restates by positing a ‘system’ between structure and agency, 
creating an interdependent duality. Further he emphasises a realist interpretation which 
sees structures as referring to actual forms of social organizations, following Archer’s “real 
entities with their own powers, tendencies and potentials” (M. S. Archer 1995, 106).  
Thus for Dobson “Giddens’ structuration theory and Bhaskar’s critical realism provide an 
opportunity for the recognition of both structure and agency although both 
representations provide little real practical guidance”. 
From a more systems theoretical perspective, (Mingers 2004) also shows appreciation of 
Bhaskar’s re-appropriation of the real. 
 Reality exists independently of our observation of it – following 
(Mingers, Mutch, and Willcocks 2013) 
Reality exists independently of human knowledge of that reality. 
Our imperfect – corrigible and provisional – knowledge of that reality can only come 
through our fallible conceptual apparatus. 
CR defends a strong realist ontology. There is an existing, causally-efficacious world which 
is independent of our knowledge of that world. This realism contrasts with positivism 
(which reduces the world to that which can be empirically observed and measured) and 
constructivism which seeks to ignore that part of the world of which we are ignorant. 
CR can be characterised as holding to an objective ontology, even while accepting 
epistemic relativity. This corresponds to Kantian critical thinking. 
CR accepts the existence of different kinds of objects of knowledge, physical, social and 
conceptual. Because these have different ontological and epistemological characteristics it 
is appropriate to use a range of different research methods to enquire into them. Thus, CR 
supports and arguably encourages multi-method research. 
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 Object of scientific investigation: real internal mechanisms – 
following (Mingers, Mutch, and Willcocks 2013) as based on 
(Bhaskar 1975) 
Causality cannot be reduced to empirical constant conjunction as argued by David Hume – 
such conjunction is neither sufficient nor even necessary to establish a causal relationship. 
Science is understood as an ongoing process in which scientists improve the concepts they 
use to understand the mechanisms that they are studying. It is not about the identification 
of a coincidence between a postulated independent variable and dependent variable; nor is 
causality located in events but rather it depends on mechanisms. 
Popper's falsification is not adequate to reject a hypothesis because a mechanism may 
exist but either (i) not be activated or (ii) not be perceived or (iii) be activated but 
counteracted by other mechanisms which result in unpredictable effects. 
The fact that a posited mechanism is not realised does not necessarily signify its 
nonexistence. 
 Object of investigation: human world; critical naturalism: special 
philosophy of the human sciences – following (Mingers, Mutch, 
and Willcocks 2013) as based on (Bhaskar 1978) 
CR is fundamentally realist in its outlook and, if one follows the later thinking of its 
founder Roy Bhaskar, takes a dialectical perspective. CR opposes the view of David Hume 
and his successors that science concerns itself with recording constant conjunctions of 
observable events so as to posit laws that correspond to those regularities. Instead, it seeks 
to concentrate on the objects, entities and structures that exist – whether observable or 
not. Philosophically, CR stands against the Humean and positivist idea that empirical 
regularities are genuinely explanatory. Instead, there must be some intransitive domain of 
objects and events which exists independently of our perceptions of them. Thus, CR stands 
against the epistemic fallacy, that of reducing the ontological domain of existence simply to 
the epistemological domain of what we know.  
CR is based on an abduction, the necessary explanation of surprising facts. There must 
exist enduring entities – physical, social or conceptual – that have powers or tendencies to 
act in particular ways. "It is the continual operation and interaction of these mechanisms 
that generates the flux of events.… The heart of this argument is that of a causal criterion 
for existence rather than a perceptual one" (Mingers 2006, p.21). Further, the cause may 
not in a specific circumstance be perceived – but may nonetheless be real. Margaret 
Archer, following Roy Bhaskar, emphasises that reality is both intransitive and stratified. 
Thus, CR distinguishes, then stratifies: mechanisms, the events they give rise to, and the 
subset of events that are actually experienced. These are identified as the domains of 
respectively the real, the actual and the empirical. 
 Stratification and emergences – following (Mingers, Mutch, and 
Willcocks 2013) 
The existence of strata or of levels gives rise to emergences at higher level from the lower 
level – Bhaskar calls this "emergent powers materialism". Thus, these "generative 
mechanisms", each of which has certain causal powers, tendencies or ways of acting, then 
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interact to generate the observable, the actual. Since some of these mechanisms work in 
opposition to others, specific events may or may not occur. 
The basic methodology of science as conducted in a critical realist framework is also 
abductive or retroductive. (Peirce tended to use the word retroductive when arguing after 
the historical fact for which an explanation is sought, but methodologically abduction and 
retroduction are largely indistinguishable.) In logical terms, a surprising fact, a 
phenomenon for which we seek an explanation, causes us to seek hypothetical 
mechanisms which – were they to exist – would explain the surprising phenomenon. The 
latter part of the process is sometimes called inference to the best explanation. So the 
essential methodological step is to move from descriptions of empirical events or 
regularities to potential causal mechanisms, the interaction of which could potentially have 
generated the events. This abductive process gives no proof that the mechanisms which 
are posited actually exist. We need to move on from the abductive phase to deductive and 
inductive reasoning. Even then, CR accepts that knowledge is always fallible and that the 
hypothesised mechanisms, even where there are strong indications that they really do 
exist, may not in fact explain the observed reality. In summary, we describe events of 
interest, retroduce explanatory mechanisms, eliminate false hypotheses, aim to identify 
correct mechanisms. CR tends to be eclectic in its research methods because different 
kinds of mechanism require different kinds of investigation. Thus, what we might call 
quantitative and qualitative approaches may be indicated in a study of a single 
phenomenon. There is no prescription of the right way to advance scientific knowledge. 
Instead, strong principles can be put forward and have already been so in areas such as 
case study research (Wynn Jr and Williams 2012). 
Bhaskar argues strongly against methodological individualists and what he sees as the 
conceit of constructivism. So much of what we know and of what we experience comes to 
us quite independently of how we think about reality. Thus, for example, we use language 
which is essentially social in its character. 
Archer in sociology and Tony Lawson in economics (M. S. Archer et al. 1998) have 
exploited critical realism in its role as a philosophical "under-labourer" to give strength to 
their respective critical engagements. (D. K. Allen et al. 2013) use critical realism both to 
require and to facilitate engagement with other traditions, in their case that of the 
application of activity theory (Nardi 1996) in information systems case studies. 
 Generative mechanisms - (Wynn Jr et al. 2013) 
There is currently more literature concerning what critical realism is than there is about 
using or applying it. Usefully, Wynn and Williams set forth methodological principles for 
evaluating CR-based explanatory case study research in information systems. They then 
apply them to existing case studies. 
 Morphogenesis - (M. S. Archer 1995); (M. S. Archer et al. 
1998); (M. S. Archer 2007); (M. S. Archer 2010) 
Margaret Archer does not follow the specific model of transformative social action which 
Bhaskar put forward. Instead, in seeking to address the fundamental issue in sociology of 
the respective roles of structure and agency, Archer has developed a distinctive 
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morphogenetic approach as she insists on the necessity for studying both agency and 
structure – avoiding all temptations to conflate the two. Specifically, Archer accuses 
Anthony Giddens of such conflation in his notion of structuration.8 
 Analytical dualism and the morphogenetic approach - (M. S. 
Archer 2014) 
This extract from her recent presentation of ideas which she originally 
introduced in (M. S. Archer 1982) and developed in (M.S. Archer 1995) usefully 
summarises what Archer means by morphogenesis and specifically the 
mechanisms that give rise to it.  
 
“ 
Analytical Dualism & the Morphogenetic Approach 
Through analytical dualism we can separate ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ and examine 
their interplay to account for the structuring and re-structuring of the social 
order. 
Possible because ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ are different kinds of emergent entities, 
with different properties and powers, despite the fact that they are crucial for 
each other’s formation, continuation and development. 
Secondly, ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ operate diachronically over different time 
periods because:- 
(i) structure necessarily pre-dates the action(s) that transform it and,  
(ii) structural elaboration necessarily post-dates those actions. [See Figure 16.] 
  
8 In a parallel way, (Mingers and Willcocks 2014) argue against the conflation implicit in 
Orlikowski’s notion of "sociomateriality" (Orlikowski and Scott 2008). 



























Figure 16 The basic morphogenetic sequence according to Margaret Archer (source: (M. S. 
Archer 2014)) 
… 
Interaction T2 – T3 
Motives for interaction shaped by prior context (where groups are ‘beneficiaries’ 
OR ‘obstructed’ OR ‘indifferent’) 
… 
At T4: 
Morphogenesis/stasis at T4 is not just the eradication/modification of previous 
structural/cultural properties and powers 
But also the elaboration of:-. 
- a new ‘relational organization’ with powers of downward causation  
- of new constraints and enablements for different groups/ new 
opportunity costs 
- new ‘generative mechanisms’ governing how things work 
” 
All of this is consistent with what Archer said in her early article: (M. S. Archer 1982) and 
in her book (M. S. Archer 1995, chap. 5). 
More recently, Archer has extended the scope of her work to give considerable 
consideration to reflexivity. (M. S. Archer 2010) holds that all human beings are reflexive 
in the sense that they monitor their central concerns in an ongoing way. However, we are 
not all reflexive in the same way and the mode of reflexivity is significantly influenced by 
the combination of structural and cultural moments that we experience in life.  
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(Mingers, Mutch, and Willcocks 2013), while agreeing on the importance of reflexivity, 
contend that Archer's emphasis on reflexivity may tend to downplay both routine action 
and tacit forms of knowing.  
 Morphogenesis and technology (Mutch 2010) 
Mutch suggests certain dimensions of a morphogenetic approach to technology. Structure 
always forms an objective context for the exercise of agency. Technology renders some of 
those structures more durable in both time and space. 
Why philosophy matters in this study 
 The importance of a strong epistemological and ontological 
stance in researching individual information systems: an 
introduction 
How we know what we know is the subject of epistemology. What we know and how it is 
classified is the subject of ontology. When a researcher seeks to enhance their personal 
knowledge by undertaking research, they are carrying out a learning process – they are an 
actor. The data they collect and its analysis are carried out using information management 
tools. Together, these elements constitute a personal knowledge management system.  
I have therefore needed to reflect a great deal on the concepts of data, information, 
knowledge and how they are used: on enacted knowledge. For me, these are not just 
abstract philosophical conceptions – they drive the process of research and they are its 
substance. In a very real sense, the process of doing this PhD is a use of (and a participation 
in) a personal knowledge expression or representation system based on a concrete 
personal information management system made up of multiple more-or-less integrated 
components. 
2.3 Systems thinking and models 
Systems thinking, systems theory and PIMS 
(a) Systems Thinking: General 
There exist tools of thought and enquiry that take a systemic and systematic approach to 
problem identification, analysis and solution. Among these is the so-called Systems 
Approach (Georgiou 2007), the underlying science of which is called cybernetics. Norbert 
Wiener and Arturo Rosenblueth are generally regarded as the fathers of what Wiener 
named cybernetics, which he defined as the science of control and communication in man, 
machine and animals (Wiener 1973). Cybernetics deals with complexity by seeking to 
control it, where control is to be understood as steering a course towards a better solution 
– from kybernetes, κυβερνετες, the steersman or helmsman. The helmsman applies her 
intelligence and experience, as amplified by the machine, the ship, which she controls, to 
create sufficient and appropriate variety to deal with and overcome the variety and 
complexity she is encountering in her turbulent environment. Wiener and the other early 
cyberneticians identified as fundamental to control the notion of feedback. Feedback exists 
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when the effect of a process (or the things that come out of it) has a connection to its cause 
(or things that go in to it). Feedback can be negative, which tends in general to increase the 
stability of a system but may reduce its responsiveness; or positive, which amplifies the 
possibility of change but may also result in system instability. The effects of feedback can 
be positive in terms of greater controllability or negative in terms of a loss of effective 
control. 
Walonick (Walonick 1993) provides a useful introduction to the general systems theory of 
the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy. GST is a complementary approach to the issues of 
control and complexity which initially developed independently of the engineering-
focussed cybernetic tradition. Walonick observes that: 
“A closed system is one where interactions occur only among the system 
components and not with the environment. An open system is one that 
receives input from the environment and/or releases output to the 
environment. The basic characteristic of an open system is the dynamic 
interaction of its components, while the basis of a cybernetic model is the 
feedback cycle. Open systems can tend toward higher levels of organization 
(negative entropy), while closed systems can only maintain or decrease in 
organization.” (Walonick 1993) 
This observation suggests the necessity that a system be open if it is not over time to 
decay. Specifically, a tool alone cannot improve the controllability of a system; only its use 
as part of an open system holds this potential. 
The British cybernetician W. Ross Ashby first enunciated his Law of Requisite Variety in 
1956 (Ashby 1956): “Variety absorbs variety, defines the minimum number of states 
necessary for a controller to control a system of a given number of states” (albeit in a 
discrete state controller).  
The contributions of the original cyberneticians include (Rapaport 1970), (Rosenblueth, 
Wiener, and Bigelow 1943), (Wiener 1965), (Buckley 1968); and those of of the originators 
of the systems approach, (Churchman 1968), (Churchman 1971), (Churchman 1979). The 
great apostate of Operations Research is (Ackoff 1971); he moved instead to embrace 
more general systems thinking, a System of Systems Concepts. He works this out further in, 
for example,  (Ackoff 1994). 
The originator of General Systems Theory is (Von Bertalanffy 1968); (Von Bertalanffy 
1972). Also present at the original Macy conferences in which the early cyberneticians 
discussed their new insights was (Von Foerster 2003) who was subsequently linked to the 
development of second-order cybernetics.  
(Ison 2013) presents a concept map which models the various different influences that 
have shaped historical and contemporary systems approaches. He suggests that many 
well-known systems thinkers had particular experiences which led them to devote their 
lives to their particular forms of systems practice. He distinguishes between soft systems 
and hard systems approaches and between the words systemic and systematic. He does 
not do this in the somewhat polemical way in which some authors seek to force binary 
choices between these terms. Instead, he argues for duality against unhelpful dualism. An 
epistemological awareness can be made apparent in what he calls the ‘as if’ attitude, “e.g. 
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the choice can be made to act ‘as if’ it were possible to be ‘objective’ or to see ‘systems’ as 
real”. He suggests also that systemicity is associated particularly with interconnectedness 
and process-awareness. (Salner 1986) has found that many people are not able fully to 
grasp relatively simple systemic concepts such as self-reflective structures. As a 
consequence they will not be able to rethink organisational dynamics in terms of managing 
complexity without substantial alteration in their applied epistemology, their worldview. 
This involves the deliberate breaking down and restructuring of mental models that 
support worldviews. (Prigogine and Stengers 1985) discuss dissipative structures, a 
theory of the dynamics of epistemic learning. Ray Ison suggests that their theory provides 
a model of the dynamics of epistemic learning. Each learner goes through a period of 
chaos, confusion and being overwhelmed by complexity before new conceptual 
information brings about a spontaneous restructuring of mental models at a higher level of 
complexity, thereby allowing a learner to understand concepts that were formerly opaque. 
He notes our need to “live in” language as we reflect on what is happening as we create an 
object of what is happening and name it experience.  
A simplistic definition of a system would be a set of interacting or interdependent 
components which together form an integrated whole. However, some argue that what 
makes a system viable is its capacity to adapt, that is, to develop increased order 
(negentropy). Thus, Francis Heylighen (Heylighen 1992) identifies a number of cybernetic 
principles. One among these is what he calls blind-variation-and-selective-retention 
(BVSR). Accepting as another principle that a stable system is to be preferred to one that 
decays towards higher entropy (disorder), Heylighen goes on to suggest: 
“BVSR processes recursively construct stable systems by the 
recombination of stable building blocks. The stable configurations resulting 
from BVSR processes can be seen as primitive elements: their stability 
distinguishes them from their variable background, and this distinction, 
defining a “boundary”, is itself stable. The relations between these 
elements, extending outside the boundaries, will initially still undergo 
variation. A change of these relations can be interpreted as a recombination 
of the elements. Of all the different combinations of elements, some will be 
more stable, and hence will be selectively retained. 
Such a higher-order configuration might now be called a system. The 
lower-level elements in this process play the role of building blocks: their 
stability provides the firmness needed to support the construction, while 
their variable connections allow several configurations to be tried out. The 
principle of “the whole is more than the sum of its parts” is implied by this 
systemic construction principle, since the system in the present conception 
is more than a mere configuration of parts, it is a stable configuration, and 
this entails a number of emergent constraints and properties. A stable 
system can now again function as a building block, and combine with other 
building blocks to a form an assembly of an even higher order, in a 
recursive way.” (Heylighen 1992, p.3) 
In living systems the selection process is evolutionary. In a work system, the selection 
mechanism is no longer blind but can itself be purposeful, what Bruce Archer quoted in 
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(Hevner and Chatterjee 2010c) identifies as “designerly enquiry”: ‘there exists a designerly 
way of thinking and communicating that is … as powerful as scientific and scholarly 
methods of enquiry’. Similarly (Schwaninger 2004) identifies evolutionary design or 
evolution by design.  In the context of PIM I would identify categorisation, classification, 
ontology and “programming” (broadly understood so as to include spreadsheet formulae, 
as well as “traditional” computer programming) as among the intelligent behaviours which 
cause the order of a system to increase. 
(b) Critical Systems Thinking and Total Systems 
Intervention  
This is represented by (Flood 1996), (Flood and Romm 1996), (Flood and Ulrich 1990) 
based on origins identified by (Jackson 1991). The literature of critical systems thinking 
has not greatly influenced this thesis. 
Problem solving and heuristics and decision science 
Herbert Simon - (Simon [1970] 1996); compare (Simon et al. 1987) - saw the work of 
managers, of scientists, of engineers, of lawyers – the people whom he saw as steering the 
course of society and of its economic and governmental organisations - as largely the work 
of making decisions and solving problems. 
Problems can be solved using algorithms or by using heuristics. Problems that can be 
solved algorithmically are now usually the province of computers. But the descriptive 
theory of problem solving and decision making is centrally concerned with how people cut 
problems down to size: how they apply approximate, heuristic techniques to handle 
complexity that cannot be handled exactly. Thus, heuristics are ways of solving (or at any 
rate of addressing) problems where there is not just one possible desirable outcome. 
Problem solving enters the domain of many disciplines, but is particularly associated with 
what Herbert Simon has described as the sciences of the artificial and are today more 
commonly called the decision sciences. The decision sciences include management science, 
operations management and management information systems.  
Models, mental and conceptual 
Models are necessary; the IS community with which I identify has a duty to help people 
understand that. The alternative to models is not no models, but bad models because they 
remain inexplicit mental models. 
(Leonard 2009) discusses the viable system model VSM originated by her partner Stafford 
Beer.  
“Models flow from distinctions; selections of characteristics important to the question at 
hand. Stafford said models are not ‘true’ or false; they are more or less useful, depending 
on the purpose of the person using it… A good model, for the purpose, has requisite variety 
and captures the salient relationships. An inadequate one lacks requisite variety and 
misses important aspects of the situation, leading to unintended consequences.” (Leonard 
2009, p.225) 
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“Cybernetic models differ from others in that they focus on relationships that are dynamic. 
Ross Ashby showed that only a few simple decision rules in a model could lead to  complex  
interactions.  Often  they  centered  [on] the  maintenance  of  equilibria  called homeostasis 
with the ‘mechanisms’ referred to as homeostats. A complex organism, like the human 
body sustains itself through the operation of a great many homeostats. Body temperature, 
electrolyte balance, blood sugar and many others operate for the most part out of our 
conscious awareness although if they fail, they do intrude on consciousness and the 
consequences can be serious. Stafford was especially interested in the operation of 
homeostasis in human organizations. He postulated that the first consideration of an 
organism or an organization, such as a business or a city, was to survive. To do so required 
that the variables on which its survival depended be maintained within acceptable limits. 
Often he was able to point to a single homeostat as a bellwether measure—if this aspect 
was in equilibrium, the rest of the situation would remain stable. He defined viability as 
able to maintain an independent existence.” (Leonard 2009, p.226) 
Modelling an organisation in order better to control it involves discovering what the 
organization’s critical variables are and finding or installing the homeostats that will show 
that they are maintaining equilibrium. Within that context, the model will help you 
ascertain that the principle functions and communications channels are in place and can 
function effectively. Leonard explicitly links Ross Ashby’s law of requisite variety to the 
later Conant-Ashby Theorem as she states that the good regulator of a system needs to 
have as much variety at its disposal as does the system being regulated. 
According to Leonard, Stafford Beer also used modelling in the representational or 
analogical manner. She refers to his yo-yo model (Beer 1966) as she describes how he 
would draw a metaphor between an organisational situation and a scientific one. If it was 
sufficiently logically consistent, it could then be regarded as a simile. If the simile were to 
be effective, the next step is homomorphic and perhaps isomorphic mapping and 
sometimes mathematical description. 
Although (Conant and Ashby 1970) themselves do not explicitly suggest that their “good 
regulator” is to be equated with the notion of a mental model, (Rouse and Morris 1985) 
start their discussion and review of mental models by equating the regulator as suggested 
by Conant and Ashby with a mental model. Rouse and Morris then go on to discuss the 
notion of mental models at length, demonstrating the pervasiveness of the concept 
particularly in the fields of manual / supervisory control and of cognitive science. They 
state: 
“The notion that humans have "mental models" of the systems with which 
they interact is a ubiquitous construct in many domains of study. This 
paper reviews the ways in which different domains define mental models, 
characterize the purposes of such models and attempt to identify the forms, 
structures, and parameters of models. The resulting distinctions among 
domains are described in terms of two dimensions: 1) nature of model 
manipulation, and 2) level of behavioural discretion. A variety of salient 
issues emerge, including accessibility of mental models, forms and content 
of representation, nature of expertise, cue utilization, and, of most 
importance, instructional issues. Prospects for dealing with these issues are 
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considered, as well as fundamental limits to identifying or capturing 
humans' "true" mental models.” (Rouse and Morris 1985, abstract)  
They note also the necessity and difficulty of distinguishing the notion of mental model 
from knowledge. 
(Moray 1990) also refers back to the work of Ashby and of Conant as he proposes lattice 
theory to provide a formalism for the knowledge base used as a mental model by the 
operator of a complex system. The ordering relation '<latex>$\geq $</latex>' is 
interpreted as `is caused by', and the lattice becomes a representation of the operator's 
causal hypotheses about the system. A given system can be thought of causally in different 
ways (purposes, mechanics, physical form, etc.). Each gives rise to a separate lattice. These 
are related to each other and to an objective description of the structure and function of 
the physical system by homomorphic mappings. Errors arise when nodes on the mental 
lattices are not connected in the same way as the physical system lattice; when the latter 
changes so that the mental lattice no longer provides an accurate map, even as a 
homomorphism; or when inverse one-to-many mapping gives rise to ambiguities. Moray 
makes suggestions about ways of reducing error. 
(Nersessian 2002) discusses the cognitive basis of what she calls model-based reasoning. 
She puts forward a mental modelling framework and discusses the various kinds of 
representation that it might encompass. She sees mental modelling and in particular 
thought experiments as the basis of creative reasoning. 
(Scholten 2010b) in his discussion of the good regulator theorem of (Conant and Ashby 
1970) suggests but does not prove that “Of course, the preceding sort of analysis does not 
constitute a proof that ‘every good solution must be a model of the problem it solves.’ It is a 
plausibility argument only.” But he does provide a long list of everyday problem-solving 
situations where we create models as the genesis of solutions. “What must we always do? 
Make a model of the problem. How do we know we have to do that? Because we know that 
every good solution must be a model of the problem it solves. Whatever else we do, we 
must do at least that. Of course, most of the time this approach will fail, at least on the first 
attempt, but only because there are many, many ways to model any given problem, and 
only a relatively few will make the solution transparent. But if after modelling the problem 
the solution is not transparent, then we also know that we have to come up with a different 
model. How do we know this? Again, because every good solution must be a model of the 
problem it solves. If the model we currently have doesn’t solve the problem, then we must 
find some other way to model the problem… the C&A theorem shows us that the process of 
problem solving is equivalent to the process of problem modelling, and especially, the 
process of problem re-modelling.” 
In a later publication (Moray 1997), Neville Moray distinguishes between several distinct 
usages of the notion of “mental model” and goes on to suggest a single unifying formalism. 
He first distinguishes between the tradition of mental models associated with the 
psychological community, most notably (Johnson-Laird 1983); and that associated with 
the control engineering and cybernetics community. Moray notes the occasionally loose 
usage of the term mental model – which then becomes indistinguishable from the basic 
knowledge of the person to whom a mental model is being ascribed. But he then goes on to 
demonstrate that there is a particular and quite precise reason for using the term mental 
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model because that captures an important aspect of human functioning. This can only 
properly be applied to long-term representation of system knowledge. There is 
commonality between researchers in identifying as the significant concepts those of 
human, task and environment. Moray goes on to suggest that there is a single canonical 
form of a mental model which is a homomorphic mapping from one domain to another, 
resulting in an imperfect representation of the thing modelled. The person building a 
model has to have had a prolonged period of experience of the task and the environment. 
“That experience results in a mapping of features and properties (relations, dynamics, 
entities) from the task and environment into the long-term memory of the person. It is a 
reducing, many to 1 mapping, which results in memory containing a simplified version of 
reality (the properties of the task and its environment).” (Moray 1997) 
Moray suggests that as the complexity of the situation to be controlled increases, a skills-
based pattern recognition approach has necessarily to give way to rule-based and 
ultimately the knowledge-based paradigm of the “logical reasoning tasks” suggested by 
Johnson-Laird – where there is nothing but knowledge of and no overt action on, the 
world. 
In the paper (Moray 1997), Neville Moray surveys the literature concerning the notion of 
“mental model”. His context is largely that of the operation of complex machines or 
systems. He surveys the literature then existing and seeks to create a single unifying 
formalism. He identifies as the pioneering notion of a mental model the work of the 
philosopher and physiological psychologist Kenneth Craik (Craik 1967). Moray notes that 
Craik suggested that knowledge consists of a model of the world formed by humans in 
their nervous systems. Thus for Craik, to talk of a mental model is to talk of the way in 
which our knowledge of the world is represented in the head. That mental model is 
necessarily a part of long-term memory. Craik was also interested in human-machine 
systems and closed-loop skills, so his notions come not only from psychology but are 
consistent with those of the control engineering community and more broadly of 
cybernetics in general. This control engineering view of the mental model as regulator 
contrasts strongly with the more general notion of mental model put forward by, for 
example, (Johnson-Laird 1983). Moray restricts his discussion of mental model to what he 
terms “the more or less imperfect knowledge that a person has of his or her functional 
environment – the environment, in a broad sense of that word, with which moment-to-
moment interaction is occurring, from which information is being received, with respect to 
which decisions are being made, and upon which the person is acting.” (Moray 1997). 
Moray agrees with Craik that the more typical use of the term mental model refers to 
certain contents of long-term memory, and that the contents of working memory are 
constructed from moment to moment from the interaction of the contents of long-term 
memory, including mental models among other such contents, together with information 
obtained anew from the environment. This view is consistent with the notions of 
cybernetic levels, traverses and of practopoiesis introduced by (Nikolić 2015) discussed in 
section 0 below. Moray identifies five main uses in the literature of mental model which 
can be characterised by the nature of the task and the form of interaction with the 
environment. The one which superficially comes closest to our notion of model-based 
regulation is probably that termed “logical reasoning” introduced by (Johnson-Laird 1983).  
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However, Moray bases his own canonical mental model on a series of homomorphic 
mappings from one domain to another, resulting in an “imperfect” representation of the 
thing modelled. By means of these homomorphic mappings, both models of knowledge 
(hypotheses, facts and expectancies about the task in the world), and also plans for action – 
models for what to do - emerge. Long-term models wait to be activated in accordance with 
specific task demands – Moray calls them schemata. They give rise to frames or to scripts 
in short-term memory. Moray insists that these models are usually only homomorphic and 
only rarely isomorphic. Moray identifies as the appropriate formalisms for discussing both 
models and relations those of lattice theory and of mapping theory. These mappings can 
account for the fact that two pieces of knowledge that are quite disparate can interact. 
Thus, a single semantic network can cover both knowledge and action and is a lattice 
which orders the relations between things that a person knows. The models in use are 
highly dynamic and can be modified in real time in accordance with incoming information. 
However, because the model is not isomorphic in the sense required by (Conant and Ashby 
1970) and because it depends on internal remappings which may further distort the 
representation, people make errors. Moray concludes that it is engineering models – in 
particular of the performance of human operators – which are central to understanding 
the nature of mental models. Thus, he holds that a synthetic view deriving from control 
engineering and from psychology is appropriate to conceptualisation of mental models. 
(Greca and Moreira 2000) discuss mental models, conceptual models and modelling. The 
context within which they write is that of educational theory and specifically the study of 
mental representations constructed by students in their interactions with the world, its 
phenomena and artefacts. Starting from the representational nature of knowledge, they 
ask whether processes and representations can be understood as either innate or 
acquired? Is it in fact possible to change the mental representations held by students? The 
notion of representational models is particularly attractive in the context of the teaching of 
science, where it is common to present conceptual models to students in order that they 
can “learn” them. This is to neglect the facts that: 
Firstly, students hold mental models which are imperfect copies of 
conceptual models; 
Secondly, the process of modelling is far from being evident to the students 
concerned.  
(Greca and Moreira 2000) go on to note that mental models exist to allow their builder to 
explain and make predictions about a physical system represented by that model – the 
model must be functional to the person who constructs it. The models are not 
computational in nature although they may include production rules of the If… Then type. 
The models are also active in the sense that they may be used to simulate or to “run” 
aspects of the real world in order to improve the qualities of prediction made. Thus, a child 
may initially know that it is impossible to ride a bicycle, then conceive of the possibility by 
observation, then learn how to do it in practice. They say that (Johnson-Laird 1983) 
characterised mental models as analogical representations of reality. In the face of a given 
situation, the individual chooses models to interpret the situation together with perceived 
or imagined relations between them. The resulting substitute model is internally 
manipulated in order to make possible a “reading” by the individual of the situation which 
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she is facing. The models might rarely be propositional or symbolic; they are more likely to 
be mental models – structural analogues of the world, or they might be images. Mental 
models are dynamically reconstructed as new information is incorporated or taken into 
account in a recursive process. 
(Greca and Moreira 2000) consider (Nersessian 1992)’s conception of mental models as 
intermediate levels of analysis between the phenomenon and the resulting final 
mathematical or conceptual model. Generally, a conceptual model is an external 
representation created by researchers, teachers, engineers et cetera that facilitates the 
comprehension or the teaching of systems or states of affairs in the world. Conceptual 
models are or should be precise and complete representations that are coherent with 
scientifically accepted knowledge. Thus, whereas mental models are internal, idiosyncratic 
and essentially exist for functional reasons, conceptual models are external 
representations shared by a given community which are coherent with the scientific 
knowledge of that community. (Greca and Moreira 2000) suggest that teachers commonly 
assume that students have acquired or constructed mental models that are copies of the 
conceptual models that have been presented to them. However, this does not happen. 
There is no simple and direct relation between a conceptual model and a mental model. 
Indeed, students frequently do not have the necessary knowledge to interpret any 
representation as a conceptual model. This is true also of trained scientists – who also 
neglect to seek to share the mental model by which they achieved a conceptual model. This 
is significant because it may well be the mental model which governs their actual actions 
as scientists. 
 
(Greca and Moreira 2000) see the challenge of seeking to align the internal 
representations held by students (and practitioners) with knowledge that is scientifically 
accepted as best being addressed by means of modelling. Just as scientists have already 
learned to play the modelling game, so must students. They need to learn an integrated 
reasoning process which  
“uses an analogical and visual modelling as well as thought experiments in 
the creation and transformation of the internal representation of a 
problem” (Nersessian 1995, p.204) 
This modelling process is a semantic one, so that they produce models which are:  
“interpretations that should satisfy the restrictions derived from the text, 
equations, diagrams, and other salient information sources in the external 
medium and in the mental representations of those who solve the 
problems” (Nersessian 1995, p.204).  
Thus, the learning process of modelling should be explicit; the students should be explicitly 
taught the procedures by means of which they can construct mental models that in turn 
will enable them to understand the taught conceptual models. It is not an easy task to teach 
the modelling process, even more so when the intention is to help to build useful mental 
models behind that modelling process. Meaningful learning could be improved if students 
were taught the construction process – modelling – of the internal representation rather 
than simply being presented with the complete scientific model. 
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Learning, enquiry and cognition 
 Learning 
Learning can be viewed as adaptation - see (Ackoff 1999). Learning can also be regarded 
as conversion of explicit information to personal tacit knowledge - see (Nonaka and Konno 
1999). 
In order to improve learning - individual, team, wider – we need to see that: 
o The human agent, working with his or her information and knowledge base, is 
but one agent in a complex network of interacting intelligent agents 
o She has her own memory, augmented by her personal information management 
system 
o She works in a local network: her team, her community of practice 
o The global network of semantic agents (human, and nascent artificial 
intelligence) also has access to a memory system: this is the social web (now – 
Web 2.0) and will be the augmented or extended semantic Web (soon – Web 3.0) 
o Learning itself can occur via planning: (De Geus 1988) 
o Teaching / mentoring can be viewed as agency (Giddens 1986) in effective 
learning 
One source of external information and indeed knowledge is mentoring. Mentoring is more 
than information or even knowledge exchange. (Bozeman and Feeney 2007, 732) give as 
their definition:  
“Mentoring: a process for the informal transmission of knowledge, social capital, and 
psychosocial support perceived by the recipient as relevant to work, career, or 
professional development; mentoring entails informal communication, usually face-to-face 
and during a sustained period of time, between a person who is perceived to have greater 
relevant knowledge, wisdom, or experience (the mentor) and a person who is perceived to 
have less (the protégé).” 
 Barriers to effective personal information management:  
capacity for abstraction 
(Kramer 2007, p.37) has suggested that  
“All these courses require that students are able to perform problem 
solving, conceptualization, modelling, and analysis. My experience is that 
the better students are clearly able to handle complexity and to produce 
elegant models and designs… What is it that makes the good students so 
able? What is lacking in the weaker ones? Is it some aspect of intelligence? I 
believe the key lies in abstraction: The ability to perform abstract thinking 
and to exhibit abstraction skills.” 
Kramer goes on to discuss the findings of Jean Piaget (Piaget [1955] 1999); see also, 
(Inhelder and Piaget 1955) on the foundations of an understanding of the cognitive 
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development of children from infants to adulthood. Only in the fourth and final operational 
stage of that development does a strong capacity for abstraction emerge:   
“The fourth is the formal operational stage, from around 12 to adulthood, 
where individuals indicate an ability to think abstractly, systematically, and 
hypothetically, and to use symbols related to abstract concepts. This is the 
crucial stage at which individuals are capable of thinking abstractly and 
scientifically…. Tests conducted on adolescent and adult populations 
indicate that only 30% to 35% of adolescents achieve the formal operations 
stage; some adults never do.”  (Kramer 2007, p.40) 
Kramer reports his own experience that teaching model building and analysis gives very 
encouraging results, particularly when students are given existing models with which to 
work. However, some students still find it extremely difficult to create their own models ab 
initio. Although such students are capable of abstract thinking and reasoning, these 
students seem to lack the skills to apply abstraction… therefore “efforts must be made to 
measure student’s abstraction abilities annually while at college”.  
However, universal to all effective personal information management is a capacity to 
categorise and classify data and information. (Ledgard and Taylor 1977) considered an 
abstraction capacity in the context of the structuring and organisation of data. They 
suggested the need for the design of data and abstractions analogous to the design of 
algorithms as operational abstractions. I suggest as axiomatic for this study a clear 
distinction between data and process. Almost happily, as we shall see, most personal 
information management tools concentrate very much on the structuring of data and offer 
limited or no support for process as such. Pragmatically, it is sensible to teach processes 
and data initially as separate if orthogonal concerns. 
Further, there is some evidence that Kramer is too pessimistic in his contentions. 
(Bennedsen and Caspersen 2008) reported on a three-year longitudinal study to confirm 
the hypothesis that general abstraction ability has a positive impact on performance in 
computing science. Abstraction ability was operationalized as stages of cognitive 
development for which validated tests exist. Performance in computing science was 
operationalized as grade in the final assessment of ten courses of a bachelor’s degree 
programme in computing science. To their surprise, they showed that there is hardly any 
correlation between stage of cognitive development (abstraction ability) and final grades 
in standard computer science courses, neither for the various groupings, nor for the 
individual courses. 
Reflection, reflexivity and autoethnography 
 Reflection and reflexivity as an essential part of the 
research process 
(Schön 1983) powerfully argued for reflection in and on practice a generation ago. A 
similar but distinct concept is that of reflexivity (Van de Ven 2007). In using the word 
reflexivity I am consciously referring to a concept which is well understood in the 
sociological literature (Denzin and Lincoln 2000), (Denzin and Lincoln 2005) and which is 
closely related to autoethnography. The associated community of practice (Wenger 1998) 
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ranges in its expression from the frankly autobiographical (Ellis 2002) - as self-justified in 
(Ellis 1997) in (Tierney and Lincoln 1997) - through the merely personal (Boje and Tyler 
2009), (Holbrook 2005) to the more objectively reflective (Humphreys 2005). (McIlveen 
2008) explicitly links autoethnography and reflexivity in arguing for their admissibility in 
the context of vocational psychology research. Reflection on reflection is discussed by 
(Wall 2006).   
There has been a recent backlash against the validity and verifiability of scientific 
conclusions drawn from autoethnography alone and a consequent attempt to reposition it: 
e.g. (Tsekeris and Katrivesis 2009). 
2.4 My discipline: Information Systems 
Information Systems as an academic field 
The academic field with which I identify myself is known in the American speaking world 
as Management Information Systems (MIS) and in Europe as business information 
systems. In both North America and Europe it is frequently more simply referred to just as 
information systems IS.  
The United Kingdom Academy for Information Systems (UKAIS), of which I am a member, 
defines information systems thus: 
Definition: Information systems are the means by which people and organisations, 
utilising technologies, gather, process, store, use and disseminate information. 
Domain of Study: The domain involves the study of theories and practices related to the 
social and technological phenomena, which determine the development, use and effects of 
information systems in organisations and society. 
Disciplines 
(Biehl, Kim, and Wade 2006) is an empirical study based on the extent of referencing 
between business journals. They build a spatial representation of these links which shows 
the centrality of IS and management science MS journals to business research. However, 
they also show that it is IS and MS journals that quote extensively from other business 
disciplines rather than the converse. 
2.5 What are data, information, and knowledge? 
As knowledge workers (Drucker 1999), we engage daily in meta-cognitive processes 
through which we build our own personal knowledge concerning our own cognitive 
processes and learning-relevant properties of knowledge, information or data. As a former 
practitioner and current academic teacher and researcher engaged in doctoral studies, I 
consider myself to be a knowledge worker who analyses existing knowledge and seeks to 
create new. As I do so, I also engage in metacognitive processes, i.e. I build personal 
knowledge concerning my own cognitive processes and learning-relevant properties of 
knowledge, information or data.  
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Knowledge defined 
Philosophical debates in general start with Plato's formulation of knowledge as "justified 
true belief". There is however no agreed definition of knowledge, nor any prospect of one, 
and there remain numerous competing theories. 
Knowledge acquisition involves complex cognitive processes: perception, learning, 
communication, association, and reasoning. The term knowledge is also used to mean the 
confident understanding of a subject, potentially with the ability to use it for a specific 
purpose. 
We are concerned both with etymology (which deals with the history and development of 
language and linguistic meaning) and also epistemology (which refers to the philosophy of 
knowledge). 
Knowledge creation 
We firstly introduce a working definition of knowledge. This definition is operational, 
based on how we create knowledge. 
Tsuchiya (Tsuchiya 1993) suggests an approach built around knowledge creation ability. 
He states that “Although terms ‘datum’, ‘information’, and ‘knowledge’ are often used 
interchangeably, there exists a clear distinction among them. When datum is sense-given 
through (an) interpretative framework, it becomes information, and when information is 
sense-read through an interpretative framework, it becomes knowledge” (p.88; italics 
mine). He emphases how organizational knowledge is created through dialogue, and 
highlights how “commensurability” of the interpretative frameworks of the organization’s 
members is indispensable for an organization to create organizational knowledge for 
decision and action. Here, commensurability must be understood as the common space of 
the interpretative frameworks (e.g. cognitive models or mental models) of each member. 
Tsuchiya states that “It is important to clearly distinguish between sharing information 
and sharing knowledge. Information becomes knowledge only when it is sense-read 
through the interpretative framework of the receiver. Any information inconsistent with 
his interpretative framework is not perceived in most cases. Therefore, commensurability 
of interpretative frameworks of members is indispensable for individual knowledge to be 
shared.” 
Epistemology 
Epistemology or the theory of knowledge is the branch of philosophy that studies the 
nature and scope of knowledge and belief. The term "epistemology" is based on the Greek 
words "ἐπιστήμη or episteme" (knowledge or science) and "λόγος or logos" 
(account/explanation); it was introduced into English by the Scottish philosopher James 
Frederick Ferrier (1808-1864). 
Much of the debate in this field has focused on analyzing the nature of knowledge and how 
it relates to similar notions such as truth, belief, and justification. It also deals with the 
means of production of knowledge, as well as scepticism about different knowledge claims. 
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In other words, epistemology primarily addresses the following questions: "What is 
knowledge?", "How is knowledge acquired?", and "What do people know?". 
There are many different topics, stances, and arguments in the field of epistemology. 
Recent studies have dramatically challenged centuries-old assumptions, and the discipline 
therefore continues to be vibrant and dynamic. 
A more populist rendition of epistemology (Mark Gregory, after Roger White, University of 
Leeds; personal conversation) is “how we know what we know”. 
Language and Classification 
Simplistically, language concerns specific instances of general classes of things: 
occurrences of entity types; or proper and collective nouns. The codification and the 
management of knowledge start with these insights: we need to group specific instances 
into entity types (or classes) and to recognise rules (which generalise the relationships 
between things). 
Classification and categorisation 
The work of Barsalou, notably (Barsalou 1989), on categories and categorisation, is 
discussed by (Jacob 2004). Jacob notes that because different features or properties are 
used to represent the same category at different times and in different contexts, the 
information associated with a particular category varies across individuals and across 
contexts. Thus, the set of features associated with a category on any given occasion is 
composed of both context-dependent and context-independent information. Context-
dependent information is relevant only within a particular context. The apparent 
instability of categories is therefore a reflection of the flexibility and the plasticity that are 
the power of the cognitive process of categorisation and of the individual’s ability to create 
and modify the informational content of a category as a function of immediate context, 
personal goals, or past experience. 
Barsalou also demonstrated that subjects could rank a robin, a pigeon, an ostrich, a 
butterfly, and a chair on a single continuum of representativeness for the category “bird”—
a continuum extending from the most typical member of the category (robin) to the most 
atypical member (chair). The evidence for graded structure of categories points to the lack 
of fixed and determinate boundaries separating members of a category from non-
members. 
Thus, concepts are frequently, and sometime of necessity, fuzzy. However, there are many 
contexts in which strict classification is necessary. (Jacob 2004) discusses and 
distinguishes classification and categorisation. 
Data, information and knowledge 
It is a long established common understanding that data is transformed into information, 
and information then feeds or becomes knowledge or even translates into further levels, 
these being understood and praised as wisdom (Ackoff 1999). Russell Ackoff focuses on 
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learning from experience in an organizational context. He suggests an extended KID 
hierarchy: 
• Data 
• Information – data processed for some purpose 
• Knowledge – cognitively processed information 
• Understanding 
• Wisdom 
He sees adaptation as a special situational case of learning. 
For a diagrammatic summary of Ackoff’s formulation, we suggest Figure 17 below. 
In the paper (Gregory, Descubes, and Makovsky 2010) we argued that that sequence – data 
-> information -> knowledge – is limited and does not encompass the reality of systematic 
and pragmatic approaches to personal information management (PIM) and personal 
knowledge management (PKM) systems. We also pointed to an insufficient level of 
understanding of how to make the best use of personal information management systems 
to extend the power of knowledge workers to think and to create. In a subsequent paper 
(Gregory and Descubes 2011d) we firstly summarised and then extended the discussion of 
the 2010 paper.  
The relationship between data and information was initially established in the seminal 
work of Shannon and Weaver reported in the 1940s (Shannon 1948), (Shannon and 
Weaver 1949). (Floridi 2005) largely confirms what he identifies as the Dretske-Grice 
approach, that meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information, even as 
he adds as a qualification that they be contingently truthful. This is despite Claude 
Shannon’s own later observation that “It is hardly to be expected that a single concept of 
information would satisfactorily account for the numerous possible applications of this 
general field” (originally written in 1953; see (Shannon 1953)). See also (Capurro and 
Hjørland 2003). 
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Figure 17 Simple hierarchical data, 
information and knowledge sequence & 
“pyramid” Source: Renaud Macgilchrist, 
personal communication 
 
Figure 17 illustrates the commonly-posited data, information, knowledge hierarchy. The 
diagram is ours, and is illustrative only, being obviously incomplete – for example in its 
failure fully to elaborate what it means by “process data”.  
Knowledge, information and data revisited 
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(K. Wright 2005) views knowledge as an organisational resource or asset, but one 
that is always vested in the individual. Early organisational knowledge management 
(KM) initiatives adopted a knowledge-leverage model, based on a view that 
computers could capture and disseminate information and knowledge throughout 
the organization leading to increased productivity, cost savings and innovative 
capacity (Davenport and Prusak 1998). We follow Wright in suggesting that, at least 
at this stage in the development of artificial intelligence (AI), all knowledge is 
intrinsically personal.  
The very idea that knowledge can be managed is cogently criticised by (T. D. Wilson 
2002), who reports that he cannot distinguish much KM from re-engineered 
information management. Both Wright and Wilson agree that what is manageable 
by computer is information; for them, knowledge is intrinsically human. 
(Tuomi 1999) suggests that it is necessary to reverse the pyramid and create a 
seemingly illogical sequence “Knowledge -> Information -> Data”. Tuomi 
emphasises the dependence on knowledge for the interpretation of information, and 
of information to situate the processing of data. The contrasting points-of-view are 
well summarised by (Alavi and Leidner 2001). We have conceptualised these two 
views in Figure 17, which shows the forward DIK and reverse KID pyramids in a 
concept map. 
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This reversed hierarchy has itself been criticised in an approach developed by 
(Kettinger and Li 2010). Kettinger and Li have extended (Langefors 1980)’ 
infological equation, suggesting that information is the joint function of data and 
knowledge. They name their approach the KBI theory, the knowledge-based 
information theory. They put forward the following initial definitions: 
• Data are the measure or description of states of objects or events, usually 
referred to as a set of interrelated data items that measure the attributes of 
the objects or events. 
Key : 
  DIK   
KID 
[Type a quote from the document or the summary of an interesting point. You can position the text box 
anywhere in the document. Use the Drawing Tools tab to change the formatting of the pull quote text box.] Figure 18 “Data -> Information -> Knowledge” Pyramid revisited: an initial interpretation of the 
concepts and processes involved 
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• Knowledge is justified true belief of the relationship between concepts 
underlying these states. 
• Information is the meaning produced from data based on a knowledge 
framework that is associated with the selection of the state of conditional 
readiness for goal-directed activities. 
Information, representing a status of conditional readiness for an action, is 
generated from the interaction between the states measured in data and their 
relationship with future states predicted in knowledge. They view data, information, 
and knowledge as being core to the Information System (IS) field. In response to 
limitations in existing models, they propose a knowledge-based theory of 
information. This is extended from (Langefors 1980)’ infological equation, 
suggesting that information is the joint function of data and knowledge. Different 
forms of IS are conceptualized as the embodiments of knowledge domains capable 
of transforming specific categories of data into information for business operations 
and decision-making. 
They conclude that the production of information from data needs knowledge, and 
when knowledge varies, so does information.  
Similar concerns had been raised earlier by (Alavi and Leidner 2001), who see 
knowledge as information possessed in the mind of individuals: it is personalized 
information (which may or may not be new, unique, useful, or accurate) related to 
facts, procedures, concepts, interpretations, ideas, observations, and judgments. 
They posit that information is converted to knowledge once it is processed in the 
mind of individuals and knowledge becomes information once it is articulated and 
presented in the form of text, graphics, words, or other symbolic forms. A significant 
implication of this view of knowledge is that for individuals to arrive at the same 
understanding of data or information, they must share a certain knowledge base. 
  









Figure 19 General depiction of the relationship between data, knowledge and 
information - (Kettinger & Li, 2010) 
 
We would comment that (Kettinger and Li 2010): 
1. Emphasise meaning as an integral element of information; they do this by 
reference to (Mingers 1995). [Mingers views information not as processed 
data but rather as ‘data plus meaning’. Mingers distinguishes four levels of 
information: symbolic empirics, syntactics, semantics and pragmatics. 
Meaning is generated from the information carried by signs. Information is 
objective, but inaccessible to humans, who exist exclusively in a world of 
meaning. Meaning is inter-subjective — that is, based on shared agreement 
and understanding — rather than purely subjective. Information and 
information processing systems exist within the wider context of meaning or 
sense-making (cf. Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005).] 
2. Implicitly reintroduce a crucial element inevitably omitted in any view of 
data, information and knowledge as static concepts. The missing element is 
that of process.  
Extending their discussion, we suggest that a more or less knowledgeable agent 
transforms data to create meaningful information. The transformation may be 
represented as a function, or more generally it may be a process carried out by a 
more or less intelligent agent within a socio-technical information system.  
(Johnson 2007) in his review of John Mingers’ book (Mingers, 2006) on critical 
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“The fundamental question that Mingers poses is to what extent can 
a ‘critical agent’… stand outside the thing they intervene in, and what 
is the driving force for them to intervene in the first place?” 
For Mingers, motivation for intervention can only come from the individual, who 
must act either to remove constraints or fulfil absences. A praxis-based conception 
of knowledge does not separate mind and body: the difference between knowing 
and doing is dissolved. 
Because management information systems MIS is (with management science) one of 
Herbert Simon’s “sciences of the artificial” (Simon [1970] 1996), we would similarly 
hold that knowing and doing are almost inextricably interlinked and that they meet 
in individual knowledge and action. (Ågerfalk et al. 2006) argue the generality of 
this proposition. 
2.6 Knowledge 
Popper’s characterisation of subjective and objective knowledge 
(Popper 1978) distinguishes three worlds as he seeks what he terms objective 
knowledge (Popper 1972).World 1 is the physical universe. It consists of the actual 
truth and reality that we try to represent, as in energy, physics, and chemistry. We 
exist in this world. However, we do not always perceive it or then represent it 
correctly.  
World 2 is the world of our subjective personal perceptions, experiences, and 
cognition. The theory of personal knowledge of (Polanyi 1958) is based entirely 
within this world.  
World 3 is the totality of the abstract products of the human mind – such as 
booksand similar artefacts. While knowledge may be created and produced by 
World 2 activities, its artefacts are stored in this world. There are various 
relationships between these three worlds: 
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Figure 20 Popper's Three Worlds 
(Source: http://www.knowledgejump.com/knowledge/popper.html accessed 20/12/2016) 
We can summarise Popper’s thinking here (text adapted from 
http://www.knowledgejump.com/knowledge/popper.html accessed 20/12/2016) 
as a framework yielding two different senses of knowledge or thought: 
“Knowledge in the subjective sense, consisting of a state of mind with a disposition 
to behave or to react or to act. 
Knowledge in an objective sense, consisting of the expression of problems, theories, 
and arguments.  
While the first is personal, the second is totally independent of anybody’s claim to 
know — it is knowledge without a knowing subject.” 
See also Table 6 below. 
Data, information, knowledge and the economic agent 
(Boisot and Canals 2004) consider the issue primarily from an economic point of 
view. In doing so, they introduce two useful perspectives.  
One is to make a clear distinction between data and information by discussing 
cryptography. Without a key to an encrypted message, we have only a flow of data. 
With a key, we have information in the sense discussed by Claude Shannon and his 
collaborators (Shannon 1948), (Shannon 2001), (Shannon and Weaver 1949): “Thus 
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while the data itself can be made “public” and hence freely available, only those in 
possession of the “key” are in a position to extract information from it”.9 
A second useful perspective which is implicit in the work of many other writers but 
is made explicit by (Boisot and Canals 2004)  is that knowledge exists in the head of 
an agent. They criticise the notion of information and knowledge as “things”. They 
define information as “an extraction from data that, by modifying the relevant 
probability distributions, has a capacity to perform useful work on an agent’s 
knowledge base.” 
They posit Figure 21: 
 
Figure 21  The agent-in-the-world (Boisot & Canals 2004) 
(Boisot and Canals 2004) state: 
“Building on the concept of entropy that information theory shares 
with thermodynamics, we would like to suggest that information-
bearing data may be likened to free energy in a physical system. That 
is to say, data that carries information retains a capacity to do work – 
i.e., it can act on an agent’s prior state of expectations and modify 
it”… 
“The act of extracting information from data constitutes an 
interpretation of the data. It involves an assignment of the data to 
existing categories according to some set of pre-established schemas 
or models that shape expectations. For this to be possible, such 
schema or models must already exist in some form or other. But how 
do such schemas and models come into existence in the first place? 
“They do so primarily through explicit or tacit rules of inference. 
Explicit rules will for the most part be applied to codes; implicit rules 
will be applied primarily to context. Expectations and categories co-
9 See below in section 0 for a discussion of the basis for this result in the original work of 
(Shannon 1948), (Shannon 2001), (Shannon and Weaver 1949) 






















  102 / 343 
 
evolve, with expectations shaping the categories that we create, and 
these, once created, in turn shape the evolution of subsequent 
expectations. Our categories condition the dispositions that we adopt 
towards the world – i.e., our knowledge, taken here in the Popperian 
sense of a disposition towards action (Popper 1972). Thus, data can 
only constitute information for an agent who is already 
knowledgeable.” 
Knowledge, information and process 
A single synthetic view of data, information and knowledge is elusive and likely to 
remain so. However, an emergent theme is that of action through agent, activity and 
process. Information and knowledge have value only insofar as they are actually 
used (because usable and useful), that is, use is enacted. 
Organisational knowledge 
 Views of knowledge: (K. Wright 2005) - organisational 
resource, asset 
Kirby Wright (K. Wright 2005) summarises this approach as “Early KM initiatives 
adopted a knowledge-leverage model, based on a view that computers could capture 
and disseminate information and knowledge throughout the organization leading to 
increased productivity, cost savings and innovative capacity e.g. (Davenport and 
Prusak 1998)”. 
Kirby Wright argues here and elsewhere (see also, Wright 2007) that, at least at this 
stage in the history of AI (artificial intelligence), all knowledge is intrinsically 
personal.  
2.7 Knowledge representation 
Back to basics: Organising data 
Data and information is more or less organised. It can take the form of texts, lists, 
graphs, tables, related tables, objects, etc. 
Dictionaries are essential to organising data and information; they are an example 
of metadata, that is, data about data. 
The better the organisation the easier it is to exploit the underlying data. 
There are many ways of organising the same data. We often need to change the 
organisation of data according to the needs. 
Reorganisation or conversion is a common need of individuals and organisations. 
(For example we convert an Excel table to an Access table). 
Knowledge and data representation 
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Existing KR techniques vary in their: 
 Expressiveness 
 Precision 
 Ease of comprehension 
 Degree of abstraction (Hoare 1972) 
The more abstract, the more precise we can be in expression and manipulation 
(potentially even by machine); but less generally applicable, and more difficult to 
learn. 
 Knowledge workers cannot really survive only 
with one data and knowledge representation 
approach 
Especially if that is “just” natural language (which is in fact extremely rich 
semantically), but is “only” the expression of a single individual in a specific context. 
A justification for visual modelling: graphical analysis (GA) and 
representation (GR) 
This section borrows heavily from (Shiu and Sin 2006). 
 Why are both GA and GR useful?  
Both qualitative and quantitative analyses play important roles in information and 
knowledge management. 
Unfortunately, people who prefer qualitative analysis may consider quantitative 
analysis “tedious mathematics”, while people who prefer quantitative analysis may 
consider qualitative analysis “imprecise, if not empty.” 
They argue that GR and GA can bridge the gap between qualitative and quantitative 
analyses by quantifying the concepts and conceptualizing the quantities. 
 Top-down, Middle-out, and Bottom-up Processes 
In cognitive psychology and cognitive science, top-down and bottom-up processes 
refer to processes that flow from either the top or the bottom of the information 
processing hierarchy, respectively (Lindsay and Norman 1977). 
The top of the hierarchy is assumed to contain high-level, abstract, and 
encompassing knowledge representations such as concepts, mental models, and 
schemata. 
The bottom of the hierarchy is assumed to contain low-level, concrete, and specific 
knowledge representations such as visual features, lexicons, and propositions (e.g., 
(Bruning, Schraw, and Ronning 1999); (Kintsch 1998)). 
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Bottom-up processing draws from some particular examples, instances, cases, or 
events to a generalization, rule, or law to capture the commonality between the 
examples, instances, cases or events - e.g., (Brown, Collins, and Duguid 1989). 
Top-down processing infers from a generalization, rule or law to conclude 
something about a particular example, instance, case, or event. 
Induction is an example of bottom-up processing and deduction is an example of 
top-down processing. 
 Graphical approaches to Top-down, Middle-out, 
and Bottom-up Processes 
(Shiu and Sin 2006) suggest that graphical representations and analyses could be 
very useful devices that bridge the gap between top-down and bottom-up processes; 
bridging theories and facts: 
• GR are not as abstract as theories or concepts - 
they may portray the important features of 
abstract theoretical concepts in a concrete form 
• GR are not as concrete as empirical facts or 
events - they may delineate theoretical 
explanations in a sequence of discrete steps 
Using concept maps to make knowledge representation more visual 
In the processes of teaching and of research, we frequently resort to creating simple 
diagrams or sketch maps of the topics we are seeking to illustrate. One largely-
informal representation mechanism which has seen widespread use is that of mind 
mapping (T. Buzan & B. Buzan 1996). Mind maps can be criticised for giving primacy 
to a single central concept or question.  
A related technique, also widely used, is that of concept maps. Concept maps may 
give primacy to a single question but do not make one single concept central to the 
whole diagram.  
Concept maps were identified by Joseph Novak (Cañas and Novak 2006); (Novak 
and Cañas 2008). Their use in information systems teaching and assessment 
contexts is discussed by (Croasdell, Freeman, and Urbaczewski 2003). They are a 
very useful way of summarising the model-maker’s understanding of knowledge 
and, as such, highly complementary to the use of natural language, specifically as 
represented textually. I have been making use of a particular kind of concept map as 
described by Gilbert Paquette and his co-workers at the LICEF research centre of the 
Télé Université de Québec de Montréal (Paquette 2010). Paquette and his co-workers 
distinguish processes, concepts and principles – see Figure 22. Their approach, la 
modélisation par objets typés - typed object modelling - is implemented by means of 
software called Mot+ (subsequently, G-MOT).  
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Figure 22 Objects (and links) have type (Paquette 2010) 
Paquette notes that process and procedure are near-synonyms in this context. 
The approach also cclassifies the links (relationships) between objects: 
C  Composition 
S  Specialisation 
R  Regulation 
P  Precedence 
I  Instantiation 
IP  Intrant-Product 
A  Application 
C*  multiple Composition  
NT Non-typed (untyped) 
Table 5 Link types in Mot+ 
Mot+ modelling can be seen to be heavily influenced by object-oriented analysis and 
design, as described by (Deacon 2005), (Bennett, Farmer, and McRobb 2010). The 
Mot+ approach thus introduces greater semantic precision by means of typed 
concepts and relationships. 
Criticism of the LICEF approach 
Distinguishing process, concept and principle is useful. It might even make it 
possible to carry out more-or-less formal quantitative analyses of the contents of 
concept maps, which is potentially valuable as the basis of metrics for assessment. 
However, Mot+ does not allow a relationship to be labelled in the same simple way 
that does, for example, Novak’s Cmap software. Instead, in Mot+, each relationship 
has a type. Theoretically useful because it increases the expressive power and 
semantic precision of the concept map, it necessitates the use of an additional 
concept to express even a simple proposition. Thus, John loves Mary is modelled 
using two concepts-as-facts John and Mary and one process, loves. This makes the 
diagram more complex and somewhat more difficult to read. Deciding how to type 
(classify) the relationships between John and loves and between loves and Mary is 
not straightforward and requires a good understanding of the Mot+ modelling 
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complexity and an increased possibility that the modeller, the reader or both will 
make mistakes. 
An application of the LICEF approach 
In Figure 23 we present an example of a concept map with forward and feedback 
loops highlighted; the application is to research on personal knowledge 
management PKM. The diagram is of historical interest in the current research. It 
represents an early stage in a process elsewhere identified in this thesis as semiotic 
morphogenesis. A consideration of knowledge creation by researchers and 
knowledge synthesis by teachers suggests the need for an inner-loop and an outer-
loop. The inner loop depends on the practice of structured self-observation SSO to 
generate concepts and the subsequent outer loop concentrates on engaged research, 
e.g. action research, to refine them. Hence, we consider that we individually observe 
our own practice of PKM (SSO) as also we observe and work with others as they 
practise PKM (action research). So the SSO method is a crucial part of a reflective 
study of PKM. That reflection is greatly informed by the discovery of paradox and by 
learning from mistakes (ours and others). We are working with our information and 
knowledge base, partially explicit in the form of tables of data and documents 
relating to teaching and research, but partially also tacit in the sense discussed by 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). We interact in a complex network with other 
intelligent agents.  The importance of reflection on practice is described in (Argyris 
2000), as is the notion and utility of a double loop; see also (M. K. Smith 2001) for a 
recent summary of Argyris’ work and an assessment of its ongoing significance. 
Figure 23 is in fact a small extract of the overall concept map which describes and 
guided my doctoral research. It is at the same time a developing part, but also a 
product, of systematic self-observation and of reflection on the learning process.  
Later in the process of undertaking this doctorate, I created the Conceprocity 
concept process reciprocity knowledge modelling language. However, I have left 
several of the earlier Mot+ / GMOT maps in this thesis since they demonstrate a 
phenomenon which I will subsequently identify as semiotic morphogenesis – see 
section 6.2. An evidence for such semiotic morphogenesis is the evolution in the 






















Figure 23 Part of a concept map with forward (high- and low-level) and feedback 
loops emphasised: a model of undertaking a Ph.D. concerning and using PKM 
 
Example concept map (extract) with meta-annotation 
I distinguish between what I do, how I act; and the knowledge, information and data 
which I use as I do or act. When I do something, I act: I carry out specific actions, I 
carry out an activity. In his work systems framework, (Alter 2003) identifies 
processes as repeatable prototypes for specific actions. Early systems analysis 
methodologies, such as (Yourdon & Constantine 1976), make a clear distinction 
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between process and data. In a parallel manner, (Paquette 2010) distinguishes 
processes from concepts. The specific form that this takes in his Mot+ 
representation is exemplified in Figure 24. Note the distinction also made between 
the general class, e.g. of process, and a specific instance. 
 
 
Figure 24 Examples of process, concept and instances in Mot+ 
It is possible to criticise a clear distinction between process and data, not least 
because it represents an abstraction which this author has found difficult in practice 
to teach. Thus, in computer programming, the original clear distinction between 
algorithm and data that we find for example in (Wirth 1985) gave way to the object-
oriented paradigm which sought to encapsulate data and process within so-called 
objects. Similarly, structured design, with its clear distinction between business 
process and business data, gave way to object-oriented analysis and design but also 
to business process modelling. 
I argue the pragmatic necessity to make a clear distinction between these concepts: 
• what we do: our actions (D. Allen 2003), activities, processes and work 
systems (Alter 2002), (Alter 2003) 
• what we act upon: our stored data and kept information 
• how we act: our knowledge and our theories-in-use (Argyris 1982), (Smith 
2001) 
• how we act: the personal data, information and knowledge-representation 
tools that we use 
• how we act: the techniques and methodology that we apply as we act and 
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• how we learn: both at the low-level "how-to", but also at the higher 
reflective level  
Whence comes this pragmatic necessity? From what I regard as my professional 
obligation as a teacher of information systems to take a systematic and systems-
thinking-led approach which learns from well-established principles. In the 
immediate methodological context, we note as applicable principles those of 
orthogonality and of separation of concerns.  
Hbguhjgj  
Towards a working model of PKM 
Just as (Argyris 2000) demonstrated the need for what he called “double loop 
learning” in the context of organisational learning, so too my working model of PKM 
requires an inner-loop and an outer-loop.  (For an excellent summary of Chris 
Argyris’ work, I have used (M. K. Smith 2001).) 
In an inner loop, I engage in day-to-day doing – I as a researcher do work towards a Ph.D.  
I observe myself (autoethnography and action research)  
To do this, I observe myself as I PRACTISE PKM. 
In an outer loop, I observe others (ethnography) and I work with others (action research) 
as they PRACTISE PKM. 
My observation forms a crucial part of a reflective STUDY of PKM.  
That reflection is principally informed by the discovery of paradox and by learning 
from mistakes (mine and others); more generally, by reflection as introduced by 
(Argyris and Schön 1974); see also (M. K. Smith 2009).  (Smith 1999) considers the 
origins of the concept of reflection in the work of the American pragmatist John 
Dewey – see also (Dewey 1933), and (Dewey 1960), going on to consider the 
development of that thinking in (Schön 1983), (Schön 1987) and the significance of 
emotions in reflection, quoting (Boud, Keogh, and Walker 1985). 
2.8 Information as data associated with meaning 
Semiotics 
In the current document, which you may be accessing by reading it as a printed 
document, or which you may read online in some form or another: a string of 
characters appears, and forms the word which you have just read as ‘semiotics’. This 
character string is a signifier, of something (object, concept...) which semiotics 
refers to as the signified. Semiotics was first identified by the European writer de 
Saussure a century ago, and independently by the American Charles Peirce. 
(Chandler 2007) emphasises: 
“semantics: the relationship of signs to what they stand for;  
syntactics (or syntax): the formal or structural relations between signs;  
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pragmatics: the relation of signs to interpreters. ” 
Roland Barthes, writing in French, established many useful terms in the field of 
semiotics. According to (R. Wright and Flores 1998), Barthes defined semiotics thus:  
“The noun form of the study of signs and signification, the process of attaching 
signifieds to signifiers, the study of signs and signifying systems…”  
Semiotics began to become a major approach to cultural, communications and 
media studies in the late 1960s, partly as a result of the work of Roland Barthes. 
However, its significance for personal knowledge management derives more from 
the pragmatic American stance of Peirce interpreted by (Morris 1938). Where 
semantics concerns itself primarily with spoken and written “natural” language, 
semiotics extends syntax, semantics and pragmatics to all forms of communication.  
A semiotic approach has therefore become well established and widely used 
particularly in the field of communication and media studies because, pragmatically, 
it has been found to be useful in understanding cultural phenomena. Nevertheless, 
strong proponents such as (Chandler 2014) recognise that semiotics is neither a 
discipline nor a science in itself. There are competing theoretical assumptions, and 
even rival camps.  
KR knowledge representation: conceptual graphs 
The distinction between a conceptual data structure and a more fully-formed 
knowledge representation is not straightforward, being largely one of degree. (John 
F. Sowa 2000b) summarises his work on conceptual graphs – based on Peirce’s 
existence graphs. He demonstrates that this graphical model has the expressive 
power of first order logic and is therefore a candidate knowledge representation 
(KR) approach in instances when it is valuable to draw automatic inferences from 
data. 
Natural language and linguistics 
de Saussure argued that 'nothing is more appropriate than the study of languages to 
bring out the nature of the semiological problem'.  He saw linguistics as a branch of 
'semiology'. 
However, language is about more than linguistics, as de Saussure recognised in 
distinguishing between langue (language) and parole (speech).  Langue refers to the 
system of rules and conventions which is independent of, and pre-exists, the 
individual use and usage to which parole refers. 
Information Theory 
Claude Shannon (Shannon 1948); recently republished as (Shannon 2001) wrote a 
theoretical paper on the mathematical theory of communication in the Bell 
[Telephone] System Technical Journal which had an immediate impact when first 
published in 1948, enhanced the following year when a mathematician colleague 
Warren Weaver suggested republication in a more widely-read forum.  
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Shannon and Weaver’s papers do not name the subject ‘information theory’. Instead, 
they stated four key concepts which (Aftab et al. 2001) identify as: 
Every communication channel has a speed limit, measured in binary digits per 
second and given by the formula ; this so-called Shannon Limit, 
beyond which it is 
 
“mathematically impossible to get error free communication above the limit. No 
matter how sophisticated an error correction scheme you use, no matter how much 
you can compress the data, you can not make the channel go faster than the limit 
without losing some information… below the Shannon Limit, it is possible to 
transmit information with zero error. Shannon mathematically proved that there 
were ways of encoding information that would allow one to get up to the limit 
without any errors: regardless of the amount of noise or static, or how faint the 
signal was. Of course, one might need to encode the information with more and 
more bits, so that most of them would get through and those lost could be 
regenerated from the others. The increased complexity and length of the message 
would make communication slower and slower, but essentially, below the limit, you 
could make the probability of error as low as you wanted.” 
It demonstrates that any communication system can be separated into components, 
which can be treated independently as distinct mathematical models. Thus, it is 
possible to completely separate the design of the source from the design of the 
channel. 
Digital representation of the content of a message is irrelevant to its transmission: it 
does not matter what the message represents. It could be text, sound, image, or 
video, but it is all 0’s and 1’s to the channel. Once data is represented digitally, it can 
be regenerated and transmitted without error. 
Coding a source removes redundancy in the information to make the message 
smaller, thus increasing the efficiency of information representation. The term 
‘source coding’ is today synonymous with ‘data compression’. 
(Shannon 1948) represents the situation as: 
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Figure 25 Shannon's architectural representation of information transmission 
across a digital data communication channel 
We can draw the following implications for our study: 
Information can be transmitted across data channels either without loss (if the required 
rate of transmission falls below the Shannon Limit for the channel) or (above that rate) 
with a level of loss which can be measured. 
Data and information are not the same things. The interpretation of a message is 
independent of the existence and low-level representation of that message. 
This supports the arguments advanced earlier, in section 2.6 concerning the definitions of 
data, information (and knowledge). (Ison 2013) notes that Heinz von Foerster, reflecting 
on the Macy conferences, later said that it was an unfortunate linguistic error to use the 
word information instead of signal.  
2.9 Towards meaningful data: making semantics more explicit 
In this section, I note how the literature and software support the need to make 
semantics explicit. This has the incidental effect of making it somewhat more likely 
that the meaning intended by the initiation of communicated information will be the 
meaning shared by recipients. 
Candidate data management approaches 
 Outliners and Developed Outliners 
The author used NetManage ECCO Pro. Another well-used program is Micro Logic’s 
Info Select 10. The internal data structure of these programs is similar. A data item 
is given meaning by being shown in its owning hierarchy. Thus, a person’s surname 
is a component of a composite Contact object.  
Part of the genius and the weakness of these programs is that the user has 
considerable control over the structuring of data. Both ECCO and Info Select permit 
the definition of forms to impose some order on this anarchy. A second aspect of 
  113 / 343 
 
their genius is that a data item can participate in more than one hierarchy. Thus for 
example, an appointment for a meeting can appear in an overall agenda or calendar, 
but also be linked to the name of each participant in the meeting. Effectively, the 
same datum is classified in more than one way. To the extent that knowledge is a 
product of the recognition by intelligent agents of connections between information 
otherwise not explicitly linked, this kind of tool can be used as a mechanism for 
storing some forms of relatively unsophisticated knowledge. 
To give a flavour of this kind of tool, consider this screen capture from ECCO: 
 
Figure 26 ECCO personal information manager - screenshot 
This screenshot shows a user’s diary or calendar, and the contents of two user-
defined folders: Students and Tutoring. 
It will be apparent from the dates on the screenshot that this is a program which I 
used for more than a decade to manage my personal data and to inform me in my 
everyday working life. However, outliners have always been a minority interest, 
used by relatively few knowledge workers. Small companies such as NetManage and 
Micro Logic have had great difficulty marketing outliners as PIM tools. In part this is 
because most knowledge workers work within corporate structures which provide 
standard software sets to the employees. Thus for example in many enterprises the 
personal productivity aids available to the employee are those which are provided 
within the Microsoft Office suite. Employees may be discouraged or even banned 
from using applications which are not corporately approved. Another reason that it 
has proven difficult to introduce outlining to a wider public is that there is an 
increasing expectation that software should be free, at least at the point of use. 
Whether by using open source software or because software is made available by 
the employer, the individual knowledge worker is not accustomed to having to pay 
for software. But the creation of new and relatively innovative applications has 
historically required that a revenue stream accrue to their originators. Thus, there 
have been many PIM applications developed, very few of which have survived to 
become mature and well established. NetManage Ecco is still used by a small band of 
devoted admirers many years after its development ceased – NetManage could not 
make the profit they needed from the product. Most employees have meanwhile 
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continued to use tools available from within standard office suites to manage their 
personal data. 
 Basic data management tools exist in proliferation: such as 
spreadsheets and databases 
Spreadsheets are a very powerful combination of the nearest approach to widely 
available end-user computer programming ever invented; and ways of storing 
(more or less) structured data in which the relationship between items of data is 
imposed by the use of formulae. 
It is possible to use spreadsheets and database management systems as the means 
by which personal data is stored, in other words, as the means by which a given 
individual carries out personal information management. 
 Spreadsheets – in general 
There are many problems associated with spreadsheets. See (Burnett et al. 2001) and 
(Peyton Jones, Blackwell, and Burnett 2003) for a discussion and suggestions of ways 
forward. 
 Functional spreadsheets 
The Functional spreadsheet is an idea which the author originally devised in 2007. See 
also (Burnett et al. 2003) and (Wakeling 2007) 
A functional spreadsheet deliberately simplifies and restrict the scope of spreadsheets, so 
that they can be formally represented, modelled, discussed and tested.  The idea is based 
on an insight documented by Simon Peyton Jones, of Microsoft, (Peyton Jones, Blackwell, 
and Burnett 2003)  but goes well beyond that paper (which constrains itself to consider 
only developments of Excel, not new approaches). A flavour of the concept is provided by 
this screenshot of a storyboarded interface.  
 
Figure 27 Potential functional spreadsheet - storyboard 
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The major advances over current spreadsheets are in two areas. A single function and a 
single group function applies to each column of the spreadsheet. Nominally user-defined 
functions are supported. The ideas draw on the possibilities provided by the Oz 
programming language and Mozart program development environment described in (Van-
Roy and Haridi 2004). Although the notion has been storyboarded, it has not been 
implemented in any practical form. Instead, similar ideas have surfaced in a product called 
InfoQube which is discussed later in this thesis (section 0). 
 Relational databases 
The currently dominant relational paradigm (albeit now challenged by NoSQL 
approaches (Stonebraker 2010)) enables arbitrary manipulation: that is to say that 
queries can be defined which will always have an answer. However, the data is 
constrained to appear in normalized relations or sets or entities – these terms are 
equivalent (Date 2003); they are implemented as database tables. 
 Object-oriented databases 
The object-oriented data paradigm allows other kind of associations between 
entities types; further, the structure of an entity, its class description, is much richer 
than the normalized model. However, the approach has two disadvantages: 
1. There is no software known to this author that permits end users to create 
and manipulate such databases; 
2.  It is no longer possible always to obtain an answer to a question. 
There is also a third disadvantage: because there is no rule of normalisation it 
becomes very difficult for community of users to share the data. 
Business database applications generally store data in relational structures while 
such things as pictures, video, audio etc. are often stored in object-oriented 
database. 
 XML documents 
The files on a typical computer can be loosely divided into documents and data. 
Documents, like mail messages, reports and brochures, are read by humans. Data, 
like calendars, address books, playlists and spreadsheets, are presented using an 
application program which lets them be viewed, searched and combined in many 
ways. 
Currently, the World Wide Web is based mainly on documents written in Hypertext 
Markup Language (HTML), a markup convention that is used for coding a body of 
text interspersed with multimedia objects such as images and interactive forms. A 
specific vision of the semantic web involves publishing the data in a language, 
Resource Description Framework (RDF), specifically for data, so that it can be 
manipulated and combined just as can data files on a local computer (Schwarz 
2006). 
The HTML language describes documents and the links between them. RDF, by 
contrast, describes arbitrary things such as people, meetings, and aircraft parts. 
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 XML 
XML (eXtensible Markup Language) is a specification developed by the W3C (World 
Wide Web Consortium) (XML 2010). 
 Why is XML important? 
Extensible Markup Language (XML) is a simple, very flexible text format derived 
from SGML. Originally designed to meet the challenges of large-scale electronic 
publishing, XML is also playing an increasingly important role in the exchange of a 
wide variety of data on the Web and elsewhere. 
 How does XML compare with other data 
management approaches? 
XML is an excellent data interchange mechanism, and is very widely implemented. It 
is verbose and less efficient than SQL for database-to-database exchanges. But it is 
unique in forming the basis for web services and service oriented computing; and as 
the basis for the Semantic Web. 
 RDF and OWL: the basis of a semantic web 
The Resource Description Framework (RDF) (W3C 2004) integrates a variety of 
applications from library catalogues and world-wide directories to syndication and 
aggregation of news, software, and content to personal collections of music, photos, 
and events using XML as an interchange syntax. The RDF specifications provide a 
lightweight ontology framework to support the exchange of knowledge on the Web. 
Making sense of data: the meaning of meaning 
Sense-making (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005) is an elaborate and very 
discursive attempt to make sense of how we make sense.  
At the time at which I first encountered the article, I attempted to model it and I 
wrote: 
“The concept map that follows (Figure 28) is an attempt I have made 
to make sense (sic) of sense-making understood in organisational 
behaviour terms. It is not completely accurate: it’s an attempt to 
make sense of sense-making. In part this is due to the fact that the 
style of literature is outside my normal reading. It may also be due – 
in part – to unwillingness on the part of the authors to accept 
constraints such as the limited capacity of human short-term 
memory. The authors have done little to break their reflections up 
using headings and sub-headings, for example. The article – which is 
very rich and very interesting to read – may well communicate 
better to people more versed in this literature than am I. I needed to 
make a concept map in order – literally – to begin to make sense of 
it.” 
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Figure 28 Sense-making according to (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005): a Mot+ 
concept map of the author’s own sense-making of sense-making 
I observe that sense-making is a complex cognitive and intellectual task which can 
in some circumstances and for some audiences be clarified by typed concept 
mapping. 
2.10 Paradigms in sociology and the sociology of knowledge 
The Emergence of Paradigms 
Kuhn defines paradigms as: “universally recognized scientific achievements that for 
a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners” 
(Kuhn [1962] 1996). Burrell and Morgan use the term as a: “commonality of 
perspective which binds the work of a group of theorists together” (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979; p. 23)  
(Burrell and Morgan 1979), in their book entitled “Sociological Paradigms and 
Organisational Analysis” define four paradigms: functionalism, interpretivism, 
radical structuralism and radical humanism. Others such as (Chua 1986) prefer three 
primary alternatives: positivism (and its various forms neofunctionalism, 
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postpostivism, etc.); interpretivism (hermeneutics, phenomenology, 
ethnomethodology, etc.), and critical (Marxism, Critical Social Theory, etc.). Burrell 
and Morgan’s four paradigms - Functionalist, Interpretive, Radical Humanist and 
Radical Structuralist - derive from quite distinct intellectual traditions, and present 
four mutually exclusive views, which stand in their own right, and generate their 
own distinctive approach to the analysis of social life.  
Whereas Burrell and Morgan broadly favour what they call nominalism over 
realism, my own ontological stance is more realist. What do these words mean?  
Nominalism assumes that society is relative. The social world is names, concepts 
and labels that make the individual structure reality. 
Realism assumes that the real world has hard, intangible structures that exist 
irrespective of our labels. The social world exists separate from the individual‘s 
perception of it. 
Burrell and Morgan distinguish nomothetic from ideographic methods. Nomothetic 
accepts the positivist conception of law-based reality borrowed from the natural 
sciences. Nomothetic focuses on detailed observation of society. Nomothetic 
involves hypotheses testing and employs methods such as surveys and other 
standardized research tools. 
The impact of paradigm thinking in the information systems field 
(Goles and Hirschheim 2000) note w hat they call the rather surprising importance 
given to the notion of paradigms in the information systems field. They note that the 
word as used by (Burrell and Morgan 1979) has a much broader sense than that of 
Kuhn – for whom it is “universally recognised scientific achievements that for a time 
provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners” (Kuhn 
[1962] 1996). 
They also note the then evidence of the overwhelming preponderance of 
functionalist research in the IS literature. Most information systems teaching then 
and now is concentrated in business schools, where positivism is still the dominant 
influence on research methods and indeed on the research questions which are 
asked and answered. Although (Goles and Hirschheim 2000) do not discuss critical 
realism as such, they talk about scientific realism, and they identify as an important 
author Roy Bhaskar. I include the following extensive quote because it succinctly 
summarises both realism and the significance and limitations of modelling: 
 “Scientific realism holds that while the world exists independently 
of its being perceived (`classical realism'), the world can only be 
known through models of the world. The models themselves are not 
immutable – they never can be known with certainty (`fallibilistic 
realism'); indeed, the job of science is to develop better models of the 
world (Hunt 1990)…” (Goles and Hirschheim 2000, p.252) 
 “To some extent, it is tempting to draw a parallel between 
pragmatism and the scientific realism of Bhaskar. For Bhaskar, 
scientific realism is more than an ontological stance in that it adopts 
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a particular epistemology as well. His version of scientific realism 
agrees with Kuhn that knowledge is a social and historical product. 
The task of science is to invent theories that aim to represent the 
world. In this way, science generates its own rational criteria that 
determine which theories are to be accepted or rejected. Crucially, it 
is possible for these criteria to be rational precisely because there is 
a world that exists independently of our cognizant experience. The 
theories which result from these rational criteria may be wrong, 
since they are based on the known world rather than the world itself. 
But nonetheless, they are what the community agrees on and is 
based on a community standard of what constitutes “valid” or 
“believable” knowledge claims. According to Bhaskar (Bhaskar 
1975), it is our knowledge of the world that is circular; the world 
itself exists, and we experience perceptions of that world. The goal of 
science is to build sophisticated models using rational criteria to 
represent the world. As already mentioned, the models represent 
only what we know of the world and this knowledge is inherently 
flawed; but as we build successive models we may improve our 
representation. By making use of cognitive materials and operating 
under the control of something like a logic of analogy or metaphor, 
we can postulate a model. We do not believe that the model exactly 
duplicates the world; but, if this model were to exist and act in the 
way specified, then it allows us to account for observed phenomena. 
Lastly, Bhaskar notes that models are composed of abstractions and 
are untruthful, by definition, since they oversimplify. The greater the 
level of abstraction, the more this is so since they move further from 
empirical phenomena and oversimplify by grouping lower level 
abstractions.” (Goles and Hirschheim 2000, p.261) 
Knowledge, learning and emergent meaning 
My internal supervisor Renaud Macgilchrist (Macgilchrist 2004) has undertaken a 
cross disciplinary study into a concept which he calls semantic morphogenesis. This 
study draws particularly from epistemology and from the sociology of knowledge. 
He identifies the significance of the dynamics of semantics. In summary, it is not 
possible to take a static view of semantics. Thus, the existing heritage of epistemics 
and heuristics needs to be refocused on the creation and mutation of meaning, a 
process which he labels as semantic morphogenesis. Macgilchrist implicitly accepts 
that semantics is a subset of semiotics, as has been suggested earlier in this review. 
Macgilchrist notes the mutation in the meaning of words which occurs as a result of 
epistemics and heuristics causing a paradigm shift which he discusses and 
illustrates. Macgilchrist points to the work of  (Lakoff [1987] 1990) on constructed 
conceptualisation and the earlier work of  (Rosch and Mervis 1975) who 
demonstrate that people categorise on the basis of how close something is to an 
ideal member of a category, what they call a prototype. Thus, a robin is more 
birdlike than an ostrich; the robin is the prototype bird. (Lakoff [1987] 1990) builds 
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on this prototype theory of categorisation so as to avoid some of the shortcomings, 
as he views them, of philosophical essentialism. Macgilchrist extends the idea of a 
prototype to what he calls a paradigm, “an ostensibly coherent and legitimate set of 
theories that share the same assumptions, in the form of Epistemics, about the 
workings of a particular aspect of the world… A scientific paradigm is a model of the 
world relative to a set of well formulated Epistemics”. He conjectures that all 
semantics is encapsulated within “paradigm belief systems” which in turn can best 
be described by the set of characteristic Epistemics which control their 
morphogenesis. The related notion of heuristics constitutes the mechanism through 
which knowledge is discovered, acquired and adapted. Macgilchrist justifies the 
morphogenetic nature of meaning by examining the roles of Epistemics within 
semantics. He proposes a model which draws on the catastrophe theory of René 
Thom (Thom [1980] 1993, [1972] 1989) and on the language game discussed in 
(Wittgenstein 1953)’s investigations into the nature of language. Macgilchrist adapts 
the language game to the theoretical framework of decision theory and the 
mathematical theory of games developed by (Von Neumann et al. 1953). The 
meaning of a word is then measurable in terms of the scope of decisions it can 
influence in a particular world. Meaning and hence understanding and 
communication can be reduced to the exploration of decision spaces. A jump in 
understanding by an individual leads to an extensive reorganisation of the 
relationship between semantic signifiers and their related prototypes. Such a jump 
is a consequence of the change from a lower level of understanding of a word to a 
higher level via an intermediate stage of initial confusion. Learning, whether general 
or individual, can thus be seen as a trajectory through a topology of paradigms 
where Epistemics are progressively acquired and modified. Cognitive mobility 
depends on the capacity to assimilate, change and reject paradigms through more 
powerful language systems. Semantic morphogenesis is thus a symptom and an 
evidence of an evolution of the understanding of meaning. 
I have recently worked with Renaud on an updated version of this paper which will 
be submitted for journal publication during 2016. Where I am referring to the ideas 
of Renaud I use the citation (Macgilchrist 2004). Where I am referring to ideas 
which I have contributed to the developing study, I use the citation (Macgilchrist 
and Gregory 2019). The as-yet unpublished paper (Macgilchrist and Gregory 2019) 
is a reworking of the earlier paper which includes a more cautious appraisal of the 
work of George Lakoff which however does not invalidate the main argument of the 
earlier paper. There is more discussion of the precise nature of morphogenesis both 
in its original context of evolutionary biology and in its application, particularly 
from a critical realist stance. Saussurian dyadic semiotics are compared with 
Peircean triadic signs. The application of the triadic sign, with its interpretant itself 
being a sign to further semiosis, reinforces the dynamic character of semantic 
morphogenesis, the morphogenesis of meaning. 
2.11 Semiotics, paradigms and the evolution of meaning and 
understanding by means of morphogenesis 
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The thinking presented in this section is based primarily on the work of Renaud 
Macgilchrist notably as presented in (Macgilchrist 2004). However, the critique of 
the work of George Lakoff is my own addition; see (Macgilchrist and Gregory 2019). 
Macgilchrist presents as his main thesis that all semantics is encapsulated within 
“paradigm belief systems” which in turn can best be described by the set of 
characteristic epistemics which control their morphogenesis. He regards meaning as 
an emergence which is subject to evolutionary forces. These forces manifest 
themselves in the form of topological trajectories where the concept of decidability 
plays the role of a “potential” - here using the language of René Thom (Thom [1980] 
1993, [1972] 1989). 
What do we mean by a paradigm? Not, in this context, a complete way of viewing the 
world adopted by a scientific discipline, as notably presented by (Kuhn [1962] 
1996). Instead, we can illustrate our understanding of paradigm by means of a 
significant example presented by George Lakoff, that of the so-called “objectivist” 
representation of knowledge.  
(Lakoff [1987] 1990, xii–xiii) states: 
“ 
The traditional view is a philosophical one. It has come out of 2000 
years of philosophising about the nature of reason. It is still widely 
believed despite overwhelming empirical evidence against it… We 
have all been educated to think in those terms… We will be calling 
the traditional view objectivism for the following reason: modern 
attempts to make it work assume that rational thought consists of 
the manipulation of abstract symbols and that these symbols get 
their meaning via correspondence with the world, objectively 
construed, that is independent of the understanding of any 
organism.… A collection of symbols placing correspondence with an 
objectively structured world is viewed as a representation of 
reality.… Thought is the mechanical manipulation of abstract 
symbols. The mind is an abstract machine, manipulating symbols 
essentially in the way a computer does, that is, by algorithmic 
computation. Symbols that correspond to the external world are 
internal representations of an external reality… Though such views 
are by no means shared by all cognitive scientists, they are 
nevertheless widespread, and in fact so common that many of them 
are often assumed to be true without question or comment. Many, 
perhaps even most, contemporary discussions of the mind as a 
computing machine take such views for granted. 
”  
So Lakoff rejects what he terms objectivism with its notion that rational thought 
concerns the manipulation of abstract symbols where those symbols gain meaning 
by correspondence with the world, somehow objectively construed. Lakoff, basing 
his work to a significant degree upon the earlier work of Eleanor Rosch (Rosch and 
Mervis, 1975; see also Rosch, 1999), suggests that categorisation is graded: that for 
  122 / 343 
 
example a robin is a more prototypical member of the category bird than is an 
ostrich. Nor are categories purely linguistic in character: even in languages which do 
not have a rich vocabulary, members of the linguistic community are well able to 
distinguish categories for which no distinct words exist. Rosch eventually defined a 
prototype as the most central member of a category: for example, chair is a 
prototype for the category furniture. Furthermore, although categories are 
hierarchically related, some categories are more basic than others. This may well be 
related to the difficulty experienced by individuals of providing exemplars at the 
superordinate and subordinate levels in a hierarchy. Thus, most people can make 
some attempt at drawing a chair. When asked to draw furniture, most will resort to 
a more-specific exemplar. Even to provide examples at a subordinate level may 
prove to be challenging or impossible. 
Lakoff had earlier claimed that “our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which 
we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff and Johnson 
[1980] 2008). These metaphors are a conceptual construction without which he 
holds that no form of abstract thought is possible. 
Lakoff claims that the mind is embodied. The functionings of the mind cannot be 
divorced from bodily manifestations such as the sensorimotor system and emotions. 
Embodied cognition suggests that the nature of the human mind is significantly 
determined by its location within the human body. Therefore aspects of cognition 
are shaped by aspects of the body.  
Lakoff is by no means alone in drawing attention to the embodied mind. In 
particular, see: (Varela, Rosch, and Thompson 1992) and (Mingers and Willcocks 
2014). 
 A critique of the work of George Lakoff  
(Vervaeke and Green 1997, 64) strongly attack the work of George Lakoff. They 
observe that semantic properties and relations must be distinct from epistemic 
relations if we are to be able to explain how we can use language to overturn even 
our deepest presuppositions about language and its relation to reality. A true 
account of meaning cannot just be a theory of how people understand or model the 
world. If it were, it would leave people hopelessly hamstrung, completely unable in 
principle to change their understandings. They hold that people typically have more 
special-purpose categorization schemes in addition to the formal hierarchical 
structure based on the kind-of relation. What Lakoff refers to as image-schemata are 
perhaps to be understood as being more like models or diagrams, as presented in 
(Lakoff and Johnson [1980] 2008). But for (Vervaeke and Green 1997, 64) a diagram 
is a picture that exists under a description. It is the description which reduces the 
referential indeterminacy of the picture. So Lakoff is admitting that much of the 
cognitive work is done by the descriptive – propositional – unique referent to the 
diagram. Propositional structures must be concerned with reference, consistency, 
logical structure, accuracy of representation: that is, with truth conditions. This 
directly contradicts Lakoff’s explicit rejection of a truth-conditional account of 
meaning. Nor can propositional models be reduced to allegedly self-interpreting 
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mental models as described by (Johnson-Laird 1983). (Wittgenstein 1953) showed 
the infinite regress of any rule-following argument, since in order to follow a rule 
one needs to know when to apply it, which itself needs a rule, and so on. Vervaeke 
and Green conclude that the prototype approach to meaning is untenable. 
I continue cautiously to use the language of Lakoff concerning prototypes and 
paradigms while being aware of the criticisms to which the underlying concepts are 
open. Specifically, I continue to see semantics as being encapsulated in what Lakoff 
and Macgilchrist call paradigms leading to a true repertoire of semantic significance.  
 Macgilchrist’s discussion of paradigms 
(Macgilchrist 2004) holds that we live through paradigms and we normally retain 
previous ones – our semantic legacy. Conversely, our own personal increased 
understanding – and that of collective social knowledge – both require that 
paradigms evolve and that subsequently knowledge (personal and socially-
legitimised) itself does so. 
It has for a long time been accepted in the natural sciences as normal that 
paradigms either evolve, or change “catastrophically” (Kuhn [1962] 1996); we can 
contrast normal evolution and revolution . Thus, we can talk about before-Newton, 
Newtonian, Einsteinian and quantum paradigms. Such paradigm shifts inevitably 
lead to changes in the meaning of words. Words, as semantic signifiers, are signs. 
Changes in the use of those signs correspond to changes in a linguistic or paradigm 
system. Such systems always encompass a truth-maintenance system or at the least 
a belief-maintenance system. Macgilchrist concerns himself in his article with the 
repertoire of Epistemics which he presents as a meta-repertoire, that is, with words 
associated with paradigm change.  
In (Macgilchrist and Gregory 2019), we consciously choose to use an analogy and 
specifically an analogy with genetics in which paradigms are the chromosomes. We 
suggest that there is a close analogy between the process of genetic mutation and 
the choice that is open to us between random mutation and beneficial mutation in 
the context of language use. In the same way in which genes contain chromosomes 
contain alleles, paradigms are based on evolving language and signifiers. Again, just 
as in genes and in the process of mutation there are both activators and inhibitors, 
so in language and its use. We note that the brain is capable of creating and to some 
extent managing an enormous level of variety. Drawing an analogy to a computer, its 
addressable space is of the order of 10 to the power 100. The brain itself is capable 
of 10 to the power 208 interconnections using the 10 to the power 111 neurones 
that we each possess. We note that such mutation has an associated cardinality, and 
that this cardinality increases with time – we start to use a larger repertoire. Once 
again, this is true both at the individual and at the societal level. Epistemics permit 
us to generate “new” variety for this life repertoire. Thus, an epistemic on which I 
frequently depend in this thesis is that of abductive conjecture which I confront with 
ontological reality. 
2.12 Design science research 
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(Iivari 2007) on design science research: Introduction 
I regard this research essay as very important in setting the parameters of my 
design science work. I therefore discuss it at length. In his essay, Juhani Iivari 
discusses ontology, epistemology, methodology and the ethics of research.  
 Ontology: 
The essay suggests that information systems as a design science needs to be based 
on a sound ontology, including an ontology of IT artefacts. 
 Epistemology: 
The essay emphasises the irreducibility of the prescriptive knowledge of IT artefacts 
to theoretical descriptive knowledge. They are different kinds of knowledge. The 
article suggests what it calls constructive research methods, which allow 
disciplined, rigorous and transparent building of IT artefacts as outcomes of design 
science research. Information systems as design science cannot be value-free. The 
essay also briefly discusses the relationship between action research and design 
science research. 
 The evolution of an IS ontology and epistemology 
Iivari suggests that information systems had an early focus on systems development 
approaches and methods, distinguishing socio-technical issues from the design 
science approach. However, more recently mainstream IS research had lost sight of 
its design science origin. Iivari suggests that this is because of the hegemony of the 
North-American business-school-oriented IS researchers over the leading IS 
publication outlets. Thus, the dominant research philosophy has been to develop 
cumulative, theory-based research and then to go on to make prescriptions. Iivari 
characterises this as theory with practical implications. He says that it has seriously 
failed to produce results that are of real interest to practitioners. 
The current interest in design science starts with important work by (Nunamaker 
Jr., Chen, and Purdin 1990), (Walls, Widmeyer, and El Sawy 1992) and then develops 
through (March and Smith 1995) and (Hevner et al. 2004). These papers should 
turn our attention to how to do design science research and in particular be more 
rigorous and more effective over the research process. Iivari quotes (Benbasat and 
Zmud 2003, 191): 
Our focus should be on how to best design IT artifacts and IS systems  
either: to increase their compatibility, usefulness, and ease of use  
or: on how to best manage and support IT or IT-enabled business 
initiatives.  
Iivari applies the framework of Burrell and Morgan but also includes the ethics of 
research and suggests what he calls constructive research to complement the 
nomothetic and ideographic research concentrated on by Burrell and Morgan. 
Iivari revisits his earlier paradigmatic framework in applying it specifically to design 
science research. Thus, he considers design science under the headings of ontology, 
  125 / 343 
 
epistemology, methodology and ethics of research. He seeks a sound ontology for 
information systems and proposes to use the three worlds of (Popper 1978) as a 
useful starting point. Iivari suggests a three-level epistemology: 
1. Conceptual knowledge 
2. Descriptive knowledge 
3. Prescriptive knowledge 
In particular, he states that the prescriptive knowledge of IT artefacts is a distinct 
knowledge area that cannot be reduced to that of descriptive knowledge. What 
distinguishes information systems as a design science from the practice of 
developing IT artefacts is the use of constructive research methods, which allow 
disciplined, rigorous and transparent building of IT artefacts as the outcomes of 
design science research. 
 Ontology of design science 
(Popper 1978) is taken as a starting point for a sound ontology. 
World one is about material nature. World two about consciousness and mental 
states. World three is about products of human social action. Institutions are social 
constructions that have been objectified, according to (Berger and Luckmann 1967). 
Artefacts cannot carry a truth value and they are only more or less useful for human 
purposes. 
Table 6 An ontology for design science 
World Explanation Research 
phenomenon 
Examples 
World 1 - 
material 
Nature IT artefacts plus 
world 1 
Evaluation of IT artefacts 
against natural phenomena 






IT artifacts + 
World 2 
Evaluation of IT artifacts 
against perceptions, 
consciousness 
and mental states 




Institutions IT artifacts + 
World 3 
Institutions 
Evaluation of organizational 
information systems 
 Theories IT artifacts + 
World 3 
Theories 
New types of theories made 
possible by IT artifacts 
 Artifacts 
• IT artifacts 
IT artifacts + 
World 3 
Evaluation of the performance 
of artifacts comprising 




• meta IT 
artifacts 
Artifacts embedded computing 
Source: (Iivari 2007, Table 1) 
(Orlikowski and Iacono 2001) popularised the phrase “IT artefact”. They define IT 
artifacts as “bundles of material and cultural properties packaged in some socially 
recognizable form such as hardware and/or software” (p. 121). Iivari contends that 
information systems as a design science should be based on a sound typology of IT 
artefacts and of IT applications. He finds the classification of IT artefacts into (1) 
constructs, (2) models, (3) methods and (4) instantiations suggested by (March and Smith 
1995) to be too general and difficult to apply – because he holds that its classification 
strongly reflects data/information modelling. 
Iivari holds the view that the primary interest of information systems lies in IT 
applications. He therefore suggests seven archetypes for each of which he suggests a 
metaphor and examples. See Table 7. 
Table 7 Archetypes of IT applications 
Role/function Metaphors Examples 
To automate Processor many embedded systems; 
many transaction 
processing systems 
To augment Tool many personal 
productivity systems; 
computer-aided design 
To mediate Medium email, instant messaging, 
chat rooms, blogs; 
electronic storage systems 
To informate Information source Information systems 
proper 
To entertain Game Computer games 
To artisticise Piece of art Computer art 
To accompany Pet Digital (virtual and robotic) 
pets 
Source: (Iivari 2007, Table 2) 
IT artefacts differ in their design, in their diffusion and in their acceptance. They 
have begun to invade our consciousness and mental states, affecting our perceptions 
of the world. They have become significant constituents of institutions such as 
organisations and societies. 
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 Epistemology of design science 
Design science does not necessarily share with pragmatism the notion of truth as 
practical utility. Artefacts do not have a truth value, and theories that describe and 
explain reality outside our mind have truth as correspondence (Niiniluoto 1999a). 
Iivari quotes the Finnish researcher (Lehtovuori 1973) who reuses a framework 
from economics to structure IS research. The four levels of research which he 




Table 8 Epistemology of design science 
type of 
knowledge 








 Systems concepts, 
Ontologies et cetera 
Much of the knowledge 
produced by IS research 









X causes A in 
situation B 
X tends to cause A in 




















knowledge and process 
knowledge was made 
by (Walls, Widmeyer, 







In order to achieve A, 
do actions. 
If you want to 
achieve A and you 
believe you are in 
situation be then you 
should or it is 
(Bunge 1967) shows 
that a technological rule 
is a sequence of acts 
that prescribe how one 
should proceed in order 
to achieve a 
predetermined goal. 
  128 / 343 
 
rational or it is 
profitable to do X 
normative 
knowledge 
 Philosophy   
Based on: (Iivari 2007, Table 3), itself based on (Lehtovuori 1973) 
 
The theoretical basis for information systems has largely been adopted from a 
number of reference disciplines (Hirschheim and Klein 2003) but the theories are 
weakly linked to IT artefacts and their design. Despite this weak reliance on 
descriptive theories people successfully design IT artefacts. 
(Walls, Widmeyer, and El Sawy 1992) originated the idea that information systems 
design science should be rooted in theories. They suggested that IS design theory for 
a product would consist of meta-requirements, meta-design, kernel theories 
(theories from the natural and social sciences governing design) and testable design 
product hypotheses. An IS design theory for a process would comprise a design 
method, kernel theories and testable design process hypotheses – the latter being 
used to verify whether the design method results in an artefact which is consistent 
with the meta-design. 
Iivari considers the existence of a kernel theory to be a defining characteristic of a 
design theory. Such kernel theories are sometimes difficult to identify. 
Table 9 Correspondence between types of knowledge 
type of knowledge - Iivari type of knowledge  - (Gregor 2006) 
conceptual knowledge Theories for analysing and predicting 
descriptive knowledge Theories for explaining and predicting 
prescriptive knowledge Theories for design and action 
normative knowledge  
(No equivalent) Specific theories such as critical social 
theory, structuration theory, actor-
network theory, activity theory 
 
 Methodology of design science 
Iivari suggests the phrase “constructive research” to denote the specific research 
methods required for constructing artefacts. This phrase does not appear in the 
standard classifications of IS research methods. Building artefacts in design science 
research should at least ideally be creative. It leaves much space for creative 
imagination – especially when the artefact in question forms part of a virtual world. 
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It is the rigour of constructing and evaluating IT artefacts that distinguishes 
information systems as design science from the practice of building IT artefacts 
undertaken by professionals. But practitioners, if they carry out the evaluation 
implicit in design science, are acting as researchers. Systems development is a 
natural candidate for methods of constructive research. This is particularly relevant 
when the purpose is to prove a concept by implementing (instantiating) a system. 
Iivari notes that there may be some conflict between the need for creativity and 
serendipity essential to innovation on the one hand and the desire to make the 
building process more disciplined, rigorous and transparent on the other hand. 
(Hevner et al. 2004) proposed that the rigour of design science research is derived 
from the effective use of prior research (existing knowledge base). Thus, Iivari 
suggests four major sources of ideas for design science research 
1. Practical problems and opportunities. 
2. Existing artefacts. 
3. Analogies and metaphors. 
4. Theories. 
 Summary of (Iivari 2007) 
1. Information Systems is ultimately an applied discipline. 
2. Prescriptive research is an essential part of Information Systems as an applied 
discipline. 
3. The design science activity of building IT artifacts is an important part of 
prescriptive research in Information Systems. 
4. The primary interest of Information Systems lies in IT applications and 
therefore Information Systems as a design science should be based on a sound 
ontology of IT artifacts and especially of IT applications. 
5. Information Systems as a design science builds IT meta-artifacts that support 
the development of concrete IT applications.  
6. The resulting IT meta-artifacts essentially entail design product and design 
process knowledge. 
7. Design product and design process knowledge, as prescriptive knowledge, 
forms a knowledge area of its own and cannot be reduced to the descriptive 
knowledge of theories and empirical regularities. 
8. Constructive research methods should make the process of building IT meta-
artifacts disciplined, rigorous and transparent. 
9. Explication of the practical problems to be solved, the existing artifacts to be 
improved, the analogies and metaphors to be used, and/or the kernel theories 
to be applied is significant in making the building process disciplined, rigorous 
and transparent. 
10. The term ‘design theory’ should be used only when it is based on a sound 
kernel theory. 
11. Information Systems as a design science cannot be value-free, but it may reflect 
means-end, interpretive or critical orientation. 
12. The values of design science research should be made as explicit as possible. 
Iivari makes the interesting observation that the current “obsession” of leading 
information systems journals with theory may be dysfunctional from the viewpoint 
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of design science if it is required that all contributions of design science research 
must have a strong grounding in theory. 
(Gregor and Jones 2007) on design science research 
(Gregor and Jones 2007) endeavour to specify information systems design theory 
(ISDT) as a special or particular class of theory. They identify eight separate 
components: 
• purpose and scope 
• constructs 
• principles of form and function 
• artefact mutability 
• testable propositions 
• justification knowledge (kernel theories) 
• principles of implementation 
• an expository instantiation. 
They conclude that a craft can proceed with the copying of one example of a design 
artefact by one Artisan after another; a discipline cannot. 
Amplifying, they go on to suggest that design theory is but one class of theory 
relevant to information systems and is distinguished by its focus on “how to do 
something”. The context is the sociotechnical system because we are concerned both 
with material objects and the social system. Further, we are concerned with 
artefacts, and more generally with the science of the artificial as identified by 
Herbert Simon. Outside information systems, (Van Aken 2005) in the field of 
management research considers that more use should be made of what he calls 
technological rules, which he sees as solution-oriented knowledge. He distinguishes 
between such rules, which he collectively terms management theory and contrasts 
this with more description-oriented knowledge which he calls organisation theory. 
Van Aken introduces this thinking in his desire to add a relevance criterion to the 
validity criterion more normally invoked to defend academic knowledge. He 
distinguishes between mode one knowledge whose production is purely academic 
and mono-disciplinary, while mode two is multidisciplinary and aims at solving 
complex and relevant field problems. Van Aken suggests as a possible research 
product of mode two research the “field-tested and grounded technological rule” – 
knowledge which can be transferred to contexts other than the one in which it was 
produced. He distinguishes between descriptive and prescriptive knowledge. 
Prescriptive knowledge is sometimes dismissed as “airport bookstore” management 
literature, strong on prescription and weak on justification. Van Aken argues at 
length for what he calls a design science approach in which he explicitly follows 
Herbert Simon. Thus, the core mission of a design science is to develop knowledge 
that can be used by professionals in the field in order to design solutions to the 
problems they encounter there. Specifically, he identifies the typical research 
product in a design science study as the technological rule originally suggested by 
(Bunge 1967) rather than the causal model of conventional positivist research. Van 
Aken quotes the definition of a technological rule given in (Bunge 1967, p.132) as 
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‘an instruction to perform a finite number of acts in a given order and with a given 
aim’. For van Aken, this is generalised to a chunk of knowledge linking an 
intervention or artefact with an expected outcome or performance in a certain field 
of application. A rule is applicable if it can be field-tested and grounded. The general 
logical form is “if you want to achieve Y in situations Z, then perform action X”. The 
rule will often be heuristic rather than algorithmic. Rules of this kind and principles 
for their application are commonly encountered in professions such as medicine and 
engineering. Van Aken argues that a similar approach can be taken to management. 
The extent to which technological rules are justified increases as they are applied in 
multiple cases and by third parties. Van Aken names the third party testing 
approach beta testing, following the practice common in software engineering. 
Technological rules must be grounded if their use is not to degenerate into mere 
instrumentalism, as is warned against by (M. S. Archer 1995). Van Aken then goes 
on to use the language of critical realism as he describes the use of generative 
mechanisms – which have been introduced into management thinking by (Pawson 
and Tilley 1997).  
“Pawson and Tilley’s point of departure is what they call the basic realist formula 
mechanism + context = outcome. Any social programme can be seen as a coherent 
set of interventions, applied in some context by some body of actors in order to 
produce particular desired outcomes. The generative mechanism is the answer on 
[sic] the question ‘why does this intervention (in this context) produce this 
outcome?’.” (Van Aken 2005).  
Van Aken goes on to suggest that what he calls “management action”, the sound 
design of interventions and of management structures and systems, can be 
expressed in the development of technological rules – managing as designing or at 
least as reflection-in-action (Schön 1983). Management rules are not so much 
instructions as design exemplars. (Van Aken 2005, 32) himself approvingly quotes 
Herbert Simon as the latter writes:  
‘The movement toward natural science and away from the sciences of the artificial 
proceeded further and faster in engineering, business and medicine than in the 
other professional fields I have mentioned . . . Such a universal phenomenon must 
have had a basic cause. It did have a very obvious one. As professional schools . . . 
were more and more absorbed into the culture of the general university, they 
hankered after academic respectability.’ (Simon [1970] 1996, 112) 
Returning now to the work of Gregor and Jones. They note that there is some feeling 
against recognising design principles as theory. They argue for a broad view of 
theory where the term encompasses what others might term conjectures, models, 
frameworks, or bodies of knowledge. Thus, when (Hevner et al. 2004) suggest that 
there are four outputs of design science – “constructs, models, methods, artefacts” - 
all but the last can be regarded as components of theory. They approvingly quote 
(Cross 2001) who agrees that at one level design work can proceed without 
reflection on theory, but goes on to say that in addition to this informal product 
knowledge, we need for design research: “the development of more formal 
knowledge of shape and configuration – theoretical studies of design morphology” 
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(Cross 2001). Better understanding of the nature of design theory will then provide 
an avenue for a more systematic specification of design knowledge. (Gregor and 
Jones 2007) claim to detect the aspects of their overall design theory anatomy as 
they apply it to the seminal relational database work of Ted Codd (Codd 1970, 
1982). They seek an ISDT information systems design theory which builds on the 
pioneering work of (Walls, Widmeyer, and El Sawy 1992) who at page 36 define an 
information systems design theory (ISDT) as “a prescriptive theory which integrates 
normative and descriptive theories into design paths intended to produce more 
effective information systems”.  
Gregor and Jones quote at length from (Simon [1970] 1996) as he presents the view 
that the knowledge underlying the construction of artefacts has the status of theory. 
Design theory is concerned with how things ought to be in order to attain goals. An 
objective of design activity is the description of an artefact in terms of its 
organisation and functioning, even if only in part capable of being formalised. Both 
the shape of the design and the shape and organisation of the design process are 
essential components of a theory of design. Frequently artefacts are designed 
without a full understanding of the workings of the component parts which may in 
any event be irrelevant. Since forecasting the likely path of events in a design 
process is extremely difficult, Simon recommends the mechanisms found in adaptive 
systems for dealing with change: homeostatic mechanisms that make the system 
relatively insensitive to the environment and retrospective adjustment to the 
environment’s variation based on feedback.  
In the early development of information systems as a field of enquiry there was a 
strong emphasis on systems development; thus for example (Nunamaker Jr and 
Chen 1990) provided a multi-methodological approach that included as separate 
steps theory building (conceptual frameworks, mathematical models and methods), 
systems development (prototyping, product development and technology transfer), 
experimentation (complete assimilation, field experiments and laboratory 
experiments) and observation (case studies, surveys and field studies). More 
recently, (March and Smith 1995) developed a framework to demonstrate the 
relationship, activities and outputs of design and natural science research in 
information technology. Gregor and Jones suggest that the construction of an 
artefact that is sufficiently novel can be seen as a significant contribution in its own 
right. However, they also note that (Van Aken 2005) is less concerned with the 
design of products than with the methods or processes. As they note, all are of 
interest in information systems. Thus, a design theory for information systems 
should concentrate both on designed products and on design methodology or 
process. 
Gregor and Jones note that they necessarily depend upon realist ontology where the 
world contains certain types of entities that exist independently of human beings 
and of human knowledge of them. They note that both Habermas and Popper 
discuss three different worlds. Thus, (Habermas 1987) recognises three different 
worlds – the objective world of actual and possible states of affairs, the subjective 
world of personal experiences and beliefs and the social world of normatively 
regulated social relations. They suggest that these are related to the three worlds 
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evinced by (Popper 1978). As discussed in section 0, Popper suggests that world one 
is the objective world of material things; world two is the subjective world of mental 
states; and world three is an objectively existing but abstract world of man-made 
entities such as language, mathematics, knowledge, science, art, ethics and 
institutions. Gregor and Jones note the congruence of these realist expressions with 
the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar as discussed by (Mingers 2011). In applying 
(Bhaskar 1989) to management science, a realist view of being is established in the 
ontological domain while in the epistemological domain knowledge remains 
relativist because socially and historically conditioned. Gregor and Jones note the 
importance of the instantiation of material artefacts and (more controversially) 
actions and processes of intervention as the result of design research. 
Gregor and Jones appeal empirically to a number of cases in addition to the 
relational database work of Ted Codd already mentioned. They then go on to discuss 
their eight theory components; I summarise that discussion in the table which 
follows: 
 
Table 10 The components of a theory of information systems design 
Component Notes  
• purpose and scope This design component says what the system is for, the 
overall goals of the type of system to which the theory 
applies. The system cannot be divorced from its 
environment, which must also be considered. There may 
also be some comparison with other design artefacts of 
the same type. 
• constructs Either physical phenomena or abstract theoretical terms. 
These should be defined as clearly as possible. In many 
cases, a hierarchical breakdown of each construct will be 
necessary – this being one way to deal with complexity as 
discussed by (Simon [1970] 1996). 
• principles of form and 
function 
This component refers to the principles that define the 
structure, organisation and functioning of the design 
product or design method or process. This may take the 
form of abstract blueprint or architecture for a product 
and the shape and features of a method. 
• artefact mutability The information systems artefact has the special 
characteristic or nature that that is an an almost constant 
state of change – even of evolution, where flexibility and 
adaptability may be enabled by feedback loops as the 
design is refined: Heidegger’s poiesis. The evolutionary 
path – and the emergence – of IT artefacts are seen as key 
unresolved issues for the IS field. 
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• testable propositions An ISDT may give rise to testable propositions or 
hypotheses about the system or tool to be constructed. 
These might be as general and as powerful as “if these 
certain principles are instantiated then it will work be 




This component provides the justificatory, explanatory 
knowledge that links goals, shape, processes and 
materials. The types and sources of these justificatory 
theories may come from many sources. Some will depend 
upon knowledge of human cognitive capacities – this is 
particularly true in the area of human computer 
interfaces. In some cases, the theory can be identified but 
its internal structure will remain unknown for some while 
to come. However, justificatory knowledge of this type 
does provide an exploration of why an artefact is 
constructed as it is and why it works and is therefore a 
desirable part of a theory specification. In instances where 
existing justificatory theoretical knowledge is limited, this 
is probably an indication of a future research question. 
• principles of 
implementation 
This component concerns the means by which the design 
is brought into being – a process involving agents and 
their actions in inextricably linked process and product. 
Sometimes referred to as style, both the shape of the 
design and the organisation of the design process are 
essential components of a theory of design. 
• an expository 
instantiation. 
(Hevner et al. 2004) believe that “design research must 
produce a viable artefact in the form of a construct, model, 
method or instantiation”. A realistic implementation 
contributes to the identification of potential problems in a 
theorised design and demonstrates its potential 
usefulness. However, instantiated artefacts of things in the 
physical world, while a theory is normally taken as an 
abstract expression of ideas about such phenomena. The 
artefact itself may have representational power: Thus, the 
artefact can assist with the communication of the design 
principles in a theory. 
Based on (Gregor and Jones 2007) 
 
The whole notion of an information systems design theory is itself a theory. It is also 
a pointer, can be taken as a set of guidelines, as to what should be included in an 
article or thesis that reports constructive research. 
2.12.1.1 Significance of (Gregor and Jones 2007) for design science 
research 
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I conclude with the speculation that the set of principles that I am putting forward 
for the specification and/or evolution of a PIMS within the context of a PWS could be 
tested against (Gregor and Jones 2007)’ design theory components. Even if at this 
stage the evaluation suggests that the theory remains embryonic and incomplete, it 
will also tend to indicate where further work is required. Gregor and Jones note that 
theory recorded after the fact is by no means less of a theory, so long as it still 
satisfies the requirements of being abstract and general. In the construction of a 
particular system, it will be necessary to represent the important principles 
underlying its construction in such a way that they are applicable to other systems 
as yet not constructed. Multiple iterations might be required in order to clarify the 
emergent general principles. 
Design is a creative activity and some would therefore argue it is not a science as 
such. However, design knowledge is of vital concern to industry and improving 
design theorising should increase the relevance of the work of the IS community. 
2.13 Technological affordances 
Affordances, positive and negative 
Affordances were first identified by (Gibson 1977), who noted the perception of 
affordances by animals in their environment: “The affordances of the environment 
are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. 
Refers to both the environment and the animal… Implies the complementarity of the 
animal and the environment.” 
Affordances were then discussed by (Greeno 1994), who noted that abilities in 
activity depend on attunements to constraints. 
Erol Şahin’s formalisation of affordance 
(Şahin et al. 2007; Şahin 2008) define affordance as “an acquired relation between a 
behavior of an agent and an entity in the environment such that the application of 
the behavior on the entity generates a certain effect”. They illustrate it as Figure 29: 
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Figure 29 How affordances arise (Şahin et al. 2007; Şahin 2008) 
 
2.14 Baskerville’s revised thinking on individual information 
systems -- (Baskerville 2011a) 
 Individuals are designing complex systems in which 
information and communications technologies help 
process, create and store individual information. 
 Information systems are viewed as the discipline required 
in this area of design theorising. 
 Towards a definition of an individual information system 
Baskerville is no longer sure that it is necessary to refer to individual work systems, 
since there is an implication of a corporate context and of a customer. Personal 
information system is a possible alternative. Baskerville argues that something 
closer to the notion of human activity system (Checkland and Scholes 1990) may be 
more appropriate. Whence his definition: “an individual information system is an 
activity system in which individual persons, according to idiosyncratic needs and 
preferences, perform processes and activities using information, technology and 
other resources to produce informational products and/or services for use by 
themselves or others.” 
 The individual information system of the pseudonymous 
Sam Spade 
Sam Spade is both a professional and a home computer user. The application of 
which he makes the most use is the word processor with in the overall productivity 
software package which also incorporates spreadsheets, presentations and email. 
He uses Skype. Data related to these major activities is synchronised between his PC, 
his laptop and his smartphone. Spade also makes use of cloud services provided by 
his employer and other professional services which he subscribes to. Additionally, 
he makes use of a cloud of personal finance services. Data from these is 
synchronised and is directly used in the preparation of tax returns. Parts of his own 
IIS are also available to other members of his family. In addition, the family shares 
infrastructure including a LAN and Internet access. The overall individual 
information system architecture is no longer bounded simply by personal 
computing. In addition to the computing systems and the network systems, there 
are a number of other layers in the overall architecture which Spade makes use of. 
Baskerville suggests that there is a professional activity system which corresponds 
to his work as an employee and a personal activity system which spans those 
information-processing activities which fall outside his role as an employee. 
 Researching individual information systems 
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Historically, individual information systems have received very little attention from 
the IS research community. The simultaneous arrival of the personal computer and 
of office automation in the early 1980s gave rise to some interest in the social and 
organisational implications of personal computing. However, PCs continued to be 
regarded as an end node in data networks – as a smarter and more useful device 
than a dumb terminal but not in essence different. Individuals as users continued to 
be regarded primarily as end users of corporate information systems. The use or 
non-use of information systems is far too coarse a distinction; rather individuals 
may choose to adopt information systems at varying levels of sophistication. It is 
difficult actually to research the nature of IS usage in any context – Baskerville notes 
that in general researchers have concentrated on intention towards usage rather 
than any attempt actually to measure that usage. But intention as opposed to actual 
behaviour has been used as a more readily operationalised construct – cf. the 
technology adoption model of (F. D. Davis 1989). There has been interest in the 
literature in end user and of participative information systems development, but 
once again it has normally been seen as being in the service of the organisation. 
Baskerville suggests the possibility of turning this on its head so that consideration 
be given to the individual’s perspective whereby the organisation and its 
information system are an extension of their own individual information system. 
  
There is a notion of personal information system current in the library and 
information science community which arose also in the early 80s. Here personal 
information systems are often viewed from the device’s point of view. Baskerville 
speculates that if senior employees and C-suite executives had access to individual 
information systems this could lead to better organisational strategy setting and by 
extension to improve decision-making throughout all levels of an organisation. 
  
Any success in this area has been achieved in the absence of planned management. 
 Elements of design theorising for individual information 
systems 
Individual information systems are specifically that, they are individual. They are 
likely to be idiosyncratic in character. Most users will have a limited understanding 
of ICT and information systems. The necessarily resource-limited and 
undereducated individual information system designer must therefore learn how to 
design by experiencing the design activity. Baskerville’s paper seeks to develop a 
practice design theory that focuses on how the designers themselves operate on 
explanatory design theories. 
 
It is reasonable to expect that some existing information systems theory will be 
transferable into the realm of individual information system. In particular, research 
which is closely related to users with a human and social perspective can logically 
be extended in this direction. Baskerville gives as an example that of the double-loop 
learning of (Argyris and Schön 1978); this is anchored to the notion that changes in 
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individuals guide changes in organisations. Baskerville concludes that a subset of 
existing theories about information systems is likely to hold for individual 
information systems theories – the extent of the overlap yet to be determined. 
 
Much as in research in information science, individual information systems are 
likely to be idiosyncratic in character. The values underlying individual information 
systems may be very different from those associated with corporate systems. 
Baskerville cites  from the literature of PIM, (Bergman et al. 2008), to support his 
contention that the idiosyncratic nature of individual information systems requires 
a richer set of subjective attributes in its information management. Social 
considerations are also more significant in the IIS realm than elsewhere. 
 
The construction of an IIS in terms of ICT components may be very unusual, involve 
rather complicated workarounds and be accepting of multiple imports and exports 
in order to maintain some degree of compatibility between otherwise incompatible 
software packages. 
 Experiential design 
Experiential design occurs when the act of design merges together with the 
experience of the artefact being designed. The example that Baskerville gives is the 
construction of a sandcastle by a child. The design emerges as much from the 
construction of the artefact as vice a versa. Experiential design is a concept similar 
to action learning in that the design outcome is learned by the designer while the 
design activity is still unfolding. Because the IIS is rarely replaced as a whole, it will 
often consist of a hodgepodge of components, of piecemeal assemblies acquired 
over periods of time with little thought to the Confederation of any overall future 
system. Instead, it is an emergent product of cumulative elaboration, often based on 
spur of the moment and Thus, idiosyncratic purchase decisions. Newer purchases 
are often constrained by previous purchases [thus, buying an iPod eventually leads 
to a whole Apple infrastructure]. Baskerville attempts a diagrammatic synthesis of 
the elements of IIS design theorising [which I find rather unconvincing]. 
Interestingly, as he draws it he distinguishes it as an influence model and not as a 
process model. Baskerville holds that the process is one of practice design theory 
that theorises the IIS design activity itself. 
 Conclusions  
Baskerville suggests that his paper is an example of a practice design theory named 
experiential design. This may also emerge in fields outside individual information 
systems including emergent systems, agile systems, web systems and the like. Since 
at this stage only a practice design theory is put forward questions arise about more 
general explanatory design theories. Functional explanations may be limited 
because the designs are sometimes completely idiosyncratic and may defy all 
general explanatory design theories. It might be that every IIS design activity 
invokes unique explanatory design theories. In such a case, the design science 
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activity would be indistinguishable from the design activity beneath it. It is 
necessary to explore the boundaries between the subset of known IIS theories that 
will hold in an IIS, and those that will not. There may be an extensive overlap but 
that can only be discovered by extensive empirical investigation. Baskerville notes 
that his paper only provides an information systems viewpoint. He suggests that 
there are other viewpoints – but I would comment that many of these have already 
been addressed in the general PIM literature. 
2.15 Insights from existing theory of relevance to PIMS 
The material in this section draws inspiration from my conference paper (Gregory 
and Descubes 2011a). 
The original action researcher, Kurt Lewin, stated that “there is nothing so practical 
as a good theory” (Lewin 1951). Good theory has explanatory power and suggests 
extrapolation into new applications. As an example of such theory we advance Ross 
Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety: “Variety absorbs variety, defines the minimum 
number of states necessary for a controller to control a system of a given number of 
states” (albeit in a discrete state controller) (Ashby 1956). Ourselves reflecting on 
that law, we rediscovered (Conant and Ashby 1970). Roger Conant produced his 
Good Regulator theorem stating that "every good regulator of a system must be a 
model of that system". The design of a complex regulator includes the making of a 
model of the system to be regulated. The theorem shows that any regulator that is 
maximally both successful and simple must be isomorphic with the system being 
regulated. Making a model is thus necessary.  
Drawing together the law of requisite variety and Conant and Ashby’s theory, we 
suggest that a personal work system PWS (viewed broadly as including the person 
who uses and manages it as well as any computer-based elements) has to be 
sufficiently rich in its variety and close in its internal models to the processes and 
actions which its user undertakes if it is to be effective. It must be isomorphic with 
the process. Furthermore, when the PWS and its constituent PMIS are being 
designed they must themselves be modelled and those models must be as simple 
and accurate as they can be. We aim for simplicity by a separation of concerns 
(following (Rzevski 1981), who is himself following (Dijkstra 1974), reproduced as 
(Dijkstra 1982)).  
For this reason, it will often be appropriate and necessary to create more than one 
complementary model. Specifically, it is necessary to model at least the work 
system, then the data structures and information outputs required within the 
processes and activities identified by the work system analysis and to ensure that 
the information system is capable of producing those outputs because its data 
structures are adapted and adequate to the creation of those outputs. 
 Synthesis of propositions underlying the current 
work 
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We here synthesise certain propositions which we deem to be essential for 
understanding the personal information and knowledge management that underlie 
inquiry and learning, specifically learning by means of research: 
   
Number Proposition Observation 
1. That knowing and doing are 
almost inextricably interlinked 
and meet in individual 
knowledge and action. 
This proposition derives from a 
reconsideration of the concepts of 
knowledge, information and data which is 
synthetic and not original. 
2. That in the early stages of the 
research process a powerful 
source of insight is reflection on 
the researcher's own 
knowledge and practice. 
We have illustrated this in the context of 
this research. Such autoethnography is not 
in itself a verifiable source of findings, but 
can provide initial insight. 
3. That that reflection may take 
the form of self-observation 
structured by means of model 
building. 
In this research we highlight concept 
mapping which explicitly distinguishes 
processes from concepts.  
4. That Ross Ashby's law of 
requisite variety continues to 
have value in justifying 
modelling in information 
systems research. 
We have re-explored the implications of 
Requisite Variety and revisited the 
associated Good Regulator theorem of 
Ashby and Conant in a teaching context. 
Their implications and wider application 
merit further work by ourselves and by 
other IS researchers, teachers and 
practitioners. 
Table 11 Summary of propositions and observations 
To expand upon the fourth proposition in particular. In systems terms, when 
undertaking research an evolutionary learning or semantic system (Macgilchrist 
2004) exists which has to be open if it is to continue to evolve. Every researcher has 
continually to struggle to make explicit her or his own knowledge and to reflect 
upon how it needs to change. We need to criticise and to encourage one another as 
we do that. The gradual process of refining a research question requires a learning 
and personal knowledge management approach which must be sympathetic to the 
emergent quality of a research project, at least in its early stages. The process is 
human and engaged; it can also benefit from effective personal information 
management systems. Thus, we need to consider, alone and together, the role of 
information and communications technology (ICT) in improving everything we do. 
That should include imaginative use of tools and techniques, such as concept maps. 
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2.16 Learning by enquiry: some parallels with Checkland’s 
LUMAS 
We present here a concept map which illustrates, in summary form, some of the 
propositions that we have discussed. 
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We would comment that this diagram illustrates an inner learning loop as the researcher 
engages with perceived reality in accordance with some research methodology. She or he 
learns in a problem-focussed way as (s)he uses methods in an applied methodology.  Just 
as (Argyris 2000) describes double loop learning in organisations, we suggest that there 
potentially exists also an outer loop by means of which the researcher may learn at the 
more profound level described by Peter Checkland. (Checkland 2000) presents (inter alia) 
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LUMAS, Learning for a User by a Methodology-informed Approach to a problem Situation. 
Taking as his definition of methodology ‘a body of methods used in a particular activity’, 
Checkland suggests that a user knowledgeable about a methodology perceives a problem 
situation and uses the methodology to try to improve it. The methodology as a set of 
principles is converted by the methodology user into a specific method which the user 
feels to be appropriate for this particular situation at this moment in its history: 
“The user U, appreciating a methodology M as a coherent set of principles, and perceiving 
a problem situation S, asks himself (or herself): What can I do? He or she then tailors from 
M a specific approach, A, regarded as appropriate for S, and uses it to improve the 
situation. This generates learning L, which may both change U and his or her appreciations 
of the methodology: future versions of all the elements [of] LUMAS may be different as a 
result of each enactment of the process shown.”  (Checkland 2000) 
 
Figure 31 Checkland's LUMAS model Source: (Checkland 2000) 
Checkland stresses that it is not the methodology which leads to improvement. It is 
the user as (s)he benefits from using the guidelines, as (s)he takes the formally 
defined methodology M to create or tailor A, the actual, user- and situation-specific 
approach adopted to the Real –world problem R that (s)he perceives a concern for. 
2.17 Peter Checkland as presented by (Stowell 2013) 
Asked recently in an interview by Frank Stowell (Stowell 2013), whether he sees the 
“systems approach” as “a scientific methodology”; if so, how does it guide scientific 
inquiry, in your opinion? If not, how would you describe the relationship between a 
“systems approach” and “scientific inquiry?” Peter Checkland has replied: 
“ 
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As for the phrase ‘a systems approach’ I see it as being the name of 
any epistemology which encompasses the idea ‘system’; defined as 
the name of the concept of an adaptive whole which can adapt and 
survive in a changing environment. It thus has only epistemological, 
not ontological status. This is crucially important for the Systems 
Movement, this difference between Natural Science and so called 
‘Social Science’. Thus, Marx has a theory of history, and his ideas 
change history, which is not law-governed. On the other hand 
Copernicus and Galileo have different theories concerning whether 
our local universe is sun-centred or earth-centred; but these ideas 
can have no effect whatsoever on what is the case out there in the 
universe, which is law governed. What this means for a ‘systems 
approach’ is that if it engages with human and social phenomena it 
can develop only useful epistemology, not discover laws. 
” (Stowell 2013) 
Thus, we suggest the existence of problem-focussed or situational learning – 
using methods in an applied methodology; and higher-level learning – which will 
manifest itself in a deepening appreciation of methodology and a concern to develop 
it further in action. We also suggest the possibility that the outer loop corresponds 
more-or-less directly to the inquiring / learning cycle of Checkland’s Soft Systems 
Methodology SSM. 
2.18 How research questions arise or emerge 
(Alvesson and Sandberg 2011) accept that what they call “research gap spotting” is 
the orthodox way in which research questions are generated. But they argue 
strongly that what makes a theory interesting and influential is that it challenges our 
assumptions in some way. In this article, Alvesson & Sandberg propose what they 
call “problematisation” as a methodology for identifying and challenging 
assumptions underlying existing literature and, based on that, formulating research 
questions that are likely to lead to more influential theories. In developing a 
typology of what types of assumptions can be problematized they propose a set of 
methodological principles for how this can be done. In doing this they refer to the 
“large and overlapping body of literature on reflexivity dealing with key aspects of 
research… Since our emphasis is on how to work with reflexivity when formulating 
research questions, we only marginally address other issues of reflexivity in 
research, such as invoking awareness of the researcher him/herself, the role of 
rhetoric, and ongoing constructions of reality in the research process.”  
In fact in an earlier book, Alvesson and a different collaborator (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg 2009) are much more explicit in their insistence upon the abductive logic 
of enquiry and on the role of reflection or reflexivity in research methodology.  
2.19 Literature concerning evaluation 
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Evaluation of information systems development 
(Beynon-Davies, Owens, and Williams 2004) investigate the evaluation of 
information systems in conjunction with explaining the phenomenon of information 
systems failure. They suggest that evaluation is necessarily to be linked into the IS 
development life cycle. They note that there is much greater emphasis on pre-
implementation evaluation than on post-implementation. They stress that both 
product and process required to be evaluated and suggest that there is a need to 
stimulate organisational learning in relation to information systems development. In 
this connection, they depend upon the double-loop learning originally suggested by 
(Argyris and Schön 1978). They lament the vast amount of prescriptive material and 
the comparative dearth of empirical work on information systems evaluation. Their 
work is illuminated by a case study. 
Evaluation within a critical realist study 
(Volkoff, Strong, and Elmes 2007) draw together evaluation criteria originally 
suggested by (Strauss and Corbin 1998) in the context of grounded theory and by 
(Miles and Huberman 1994) in research which they suggest takes a critical realist 
stance.  
“One makes judgments about (1) the data, i.e., the validity, reliability, 
and credibility of the inputs to the research process, (2) the theory 
itself, i.e., the credibility of the output of the theory-development 
process, (3) the adequacy of the research process through which the 
theory is generated, focusing on analysis methods, and (4) the 
empirical grounding of the research, i.e., the grounding for the 
resulting concepts and theory.” (Volkoff, Strong, and Elmes 2007)) 
Evaluation of design science research  
(Baskerville, Kaul, and Storey 2015) is entirely devoted to the justification and 
evaluation of knowledge production within design-science research. They suggest 
that within the bounds of a single study anything up to four different modes of 
reasoning, which they dub “genres of enquiry” may come into play. The four genres 
which they identify are the product of distinctions between two dualities. The first 
duality is that of design versus science; the second is that between nomothetic and 
ideographic knowledge production processes.  
Nomothetic knowledge production processes aim to produce general theories or 
concepts applicable to an entire class of cases, or at any rate to an identifiable 
section of the population of such cases. They identify criteria such as applicability, 
generalisability, external validity, transferability, consistency, reliability and 
dependability.  
Ideographic knowledge production processes involve the study of particular cases.  
Design science research is iterative and incremental. There will be both the 
production of knowledge and the generation of artefacts, although not necessarily in 
the same timescales. 
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They set out criteria for knowledge justification and evaluation criteria for each 
composite genre: nomothetic design (ND), nomothetic science (NS), ideographic 
design (ID) and ideographic science (IS). The language used here stems originally 
from (Burrell and Morgan 1979). 
The artefacts generated can take several forms, including constructs, models, 
methods, and instantiations (March and Smith 1995), design patterns, design 
propositions, technological rules (Van Aken 2005), design principles (Sein et al. 
2011), organizational designs and management practices, new properties of 
technical, social, and/or informational resources, and design theories (Gregor and 
Jones 2007); (Walls, Widmeyer, and El Sawy 1992). 
 
(Baskerville, Kaul, and Storey 2015) also reconsider the modes of enquiry originally 
identified by (Churchman 1971) and summarised in Table 12. See also where I 
include IS types suggested by (Mason and Mitroff 1973). 
Table 12 (Churchman 1971)'s modes of enquiry according to (Mason and Mitroff 1973) 
Mode of enquiry (Baskerville, 
Kaul, and Storey 2015) 
(Mason and Mitroff 1973) 
Leibniz: Fact nets Leibnitzian IS 
Locke: Consensus Lockean IS 
Kant: Representation Kantian IS 
Hegel: Dialectic Hegelian IS 
Singer: Progress Singerian-Churchmanian IS 
Simon (their addition): Artifice  
“The evolutionary and iterative nature of a design-science study compels different 
knowledge goals and scope at different moments throughout a project. Because of 
this momentary nature, a single design-science study can be associated with 
multiple genres of inquiry.” (Baskerville, Kaul, and Storey 2015, p.541) 
Evaluation of autoethnographic studies  
(Schultze 2000) devotes considerable space to an evaluation of the confessional 
(autoethnographic) account she gives of knowledge work. She therefore set out to 
develop evaluation criteria for what she calls confessional writing in table 2 of her 
article. I here re-present that in an abridged form as. Clearly, these evaluation 
criteria are only applicable to the confessional element of my research and 
specifically to the research journal itself and the summary that journal which is 
given in this thesis. Schultze recommends presenting “raw data”; in accordance with 
this suggestion, I am making all but those journal entries entries which I have tagged 
as personal available on my website HTTP://markrogergregory.net for inspection 
by other researchers. 
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For reasons primarily of space, I have not included significant extracts from the 
journal in the thesis; therefore I give here no detailed evaluation of my 
autoethnography. I have however followed several items of advice given by 
Schultze. 
  








indeed immersed in 
the field) 
Provide descriptions of: 
… 
the relationship between the fieldnotes and the written-up 
ethnography. 
Presenting "raw data" such as fieldnotes, documents, and transcribed 
interviews; and conducting post-hoc respondent validation. 
Plausibility (present 
the findings as 
relevant to the 
common concerns 
of the audience) 
Adhering to academic article genre with specific headings, referencing, 
and formatting. 
Justifying the research and differentiating its contribution through the 
identification of gaps in our understanding or the development of a 











Using personal pronouns; 
detailing—to the extent that it is relevant to the research— 
ethnographer's age, gender, race, epistemological assumptions and 
theoretical point of view; 
disclosing details that present an unflattering picture of researcher, 
e.g., mistakes made; rendering canonical the problematic and less-




Interlacing self-reflexive and autobiographical material with "actual" 
ethnographic material: limiting autobiographical material to 
information that has relevance to the subject of the research. 
Source: Based on (Schultze 2000, table 2) 
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 FRAMEWORK 
The framework – philosophical, semantic and semiotic - is described and a 
particular modelling approach, that of Conceprocity, is described at length. The 
significance of critical realism to this study is discussed. 
3.1 Abduction, autoethnography, textual analysis and 
conceptual modelling 
 An abductive leap: for me even to be able to complete a PhD in personal 
information management systems it would be necessary to build a PIMS – a piece of 
design research – and possible to carry out autoethnographic research on that 
design process and associated learning. 
To build a PIMS is an instance of design science research (Hevner et al. 2004); 
(Gregor and Hevner 2013); (Iivari 2015); or of Action Design Research (Sein et al. 
2011). (Baskerville and Wood-Harper 1998) suggested a catholic approach to a 
variety of action research approaches. The action design research undertaken in this 
study further extends their list of action research approaches. 
Autoethnography is admissible and fruitful in this initial exploratory research. 
(Schultze 2000) reports an autoethnographic study that she undertook into the 
production of informational objects, an activity central to knowledge work. Schultze 
found it impossible to maintain the objectivity normally demanded of the 
ethnographer. Instead, as she observed knowledge workers – competitive 
intelligence analysts, librarians and IS specialists – she became involved in their 
work. In a process of reflexivity she came to understand a number of informing 
practices that both they and she undertook in their work, which she identifies as ex-
pressing, monitoring and translating. Similarly, both they and she found it necessary 
to balance subjectivity and objectivity. Her article also points up a major difficulty 
with publishing autoethnographic research, which is the sheer volume of data to be 
collected, analysed and presented. I have myself maintained a PhD journal for a little 
under five years, constructed as a large table in Microsoft Word. It currently extends 
to nearly 390,000 words. 
In order to increase the reflexivity and objectivity of such autoethnography, I have 
therefore also employed category and textual analysis together with conceptual 
modelling of aspects of the developing exploration. The highlighted terms are 
expanded upon later in this chapter. 
3.2 Ontological influences on this study 
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In principle, every piece of research needs to demonstrate its epistemology: how 
we claim to know what we know.  
In this research, it has additionally been necessary to think about and develop both 
a clear ontological stance and also a specific ontology: specifically, a classification of 
what I know. This additional insistence upon ontology is essential for two reasons. 
Firstly, the critical realist stance which I have adopted emphasises ontological 
reality. So to some degree we have to make explicit the reality of which we speak. 
The second is that the conceptual modelling approach which I develop in this thesis 
depends upon both a scientific realist and a social ontology. I have no choice but to 
be serious about my ontological stance. 
Ontology in philosophy 
We take ontology to be “that branch of philosophy which deals with the order and 
structure of reality in the broadest sense possible” – quoted by (Wand, Storey, and 
Weber 1999, 496). 
Ontologies in information science 
An ontology is a formal naming and definition of the types, properties, and 
interrelationships of the entities that really or fundamentally exist for a particular 
domain of discourse. 
It is thus a practical application of philosophical ontology. 
Ontologies, formal and personal 
A formal ontology (or upper-level ontology) is defined by axioms in a formal 
language and aims to provide a domain- and application-independent view of 
reality, which can help the modeller of domain- or application-specific ontologies to 
avoid perhaps erroneous ontological assumptions. Formal Ontologies have great 
value in areas such as biology and genetic science. It is much less clear that they can 
be applied in social or personal contexts. 
The notion of a personal ontology is not well-developed but we demonstrate by 
example that it is fundamental to more exact personal information management and 
more explicit personal knowledge management. By its very nature a personal 
ontology is likely to be more relativistic, less objective than is a formal ontology. 
Crucially, it is not fixed once for all time, in the way suggested the certain upper 
Ontologies. There is very little in the literature concerning personal ontologies. 
(Katifori et al. 2008) report on the development of a prototype personal ontology 
maintenance system within a framework provided by that of HCI research. 
However, this work did not lead to a reusable tool. 
Philosophical historical background 
Philosophical ideas tend to develop over much longer timescales than are associated 
with, for example, developments in information systems theory and practice. Thus, 
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many of the important ideas are not particularly recent. We note that the concepts 
of abduction or retroduction; existential graphs to express first order logic; 
semiotics as signs which lead to further signs and even data as relational tables are 
all present in the work of the late 19th and early 20th century American polymath 
and philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce, e.g. (Peirce 1902). Peirce was arguably a 
phenomenologist before phenomenology was given that name. 
The work of the Argentinian/Canadian philosopher Mario Bunge effectively 
reconnects to an earlier realist stream which was largely set aside in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries. Bunge has been concerned to re-establish scientific realism and 
modelling-as-theory – he devotes two volumes of his "treatise on basic philosophy" 
to ontology, “the furniture of the world” (Bunge 1977, 1979). He in the first volume 
applies this to areas such as physics, chemistry, life sciences and in the second to 
what he identifies as social systems. Bunge’s ontology is unabashedly realist in 
character. It has become very significant in the area of conceptual modelling. 
Specifically, Ron Weber, Yair Wand and others associated with their particular 
strand of ontological realism in conceptual modelling (Wand, Storey, and Weber 
1999, 496), (Wand and Weber 2002) very explicitly base their work on the ontology 
originally put forward by Mario Bunge. This ontological approach has become very 
influential in conceptual modelling for requirements analysis, so much so that it is 
frequently referred to as the Bunge-Wand-Weber BWW approach. 
The Bunge-Wand-Weber BWW ontological constructs 
(Green and Rosemann 2000) is a contribution to the literature concerning 
ontological evaluation of various modelling approaches, largely undertaken by Yair 
Wand and Ron Weber but in this case by Peter Green and Michael Rosemann. This 
specific article considers the event process chain EPC approach, as discussed for 
example by (Scheer 2000; Scheer, Thomas, and Adam 2005). Error! Reference 
source not found. is based on their work but includes commentary in red italics  
on ways in which they depart from Bunge’s original formulation. 
 
Ontological Construct Explanation 
THING* 
A thing is the elementary unit in the BWW ontological 
model. The real world is made up of things. Two or more 




IN PARTICULAR  
HEREDITARY 
EMERGENT INTRINSIC 
Things possess properties. A property is modelled via a 
function that maps the thing into some value. For example, 
the attribute “weight” represents a property that all 
humans possess. In this regard, weight is an attribute 
standing for a property in general. If we focus on the 
weight of a specific individual, however, we would be 
concerned with a property in particular. A property of a 
composite thing that belongs to a component thing is 





called an hereditary property. Otherwise it is called an 
emergent property. Some properties are inherent 
properties of individual things. Such properties are called 
intrinsic. Other properties are properties of pairs or 
many things. Such properties are called mutual. Non-
binding mutual properties are those properties shared 
by two or more things that do not “make a difference” to 
the things involved; for example, order relations or 
equivalence relations. By contrast, binding mutual 
properties are those properties shared by two or more 
things that do “make a difference” to the things involved. 
Attributes are the names that we use to represent 
properties of things. 
CLASS 
A class is a set of things that can be defined via their 
possessing a single property. 
KIND 
A kind is a set of things that can be defined only via their 
possessing two or more common properties. 
Event 
The vector of values for all property functions of a thing is 
the state of the thing. 
CONCEIVABLE 
STATE SPACE 
The set of all states that the thing might ever assume is the 




A state law restricts the values of the properties of a thing 
to a subset that is deemed lawful because of natural laws 
or human laws. The stability condition specifies the states 
allowed by the state law. The corrective action specifies 
how the value of the property function must change to 
provide a state acceptable under the state law. 
LAWFUL STATE SPACE 
The lawful state space is the set of states of a thing that 
comply with the state laws of the thing. The lawful state 
space is usually a proper subset of the conceivable state 
space. 
EVENT 
This element is not present in the first table in the article 
and is introduced in the second table, where each 
ontological construct is examined in terms of the various 
views present in the ARIS product. 
PROCESS 
This element is not present in the first table in the article 
and is introduced in the second table, where each 
ontological construct is examined in terms of the various 
views present in the ARIS product. 
CONCEIVABLE 
EVENT SPACE 
The event space of a thing is the set of all possible events 
that can occur in the thing. 
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TRANSFORMATION* 






A lawful transformation defines which events in a thing 
are lawful. The stability condition specifies the states that 
are allowable under the transformation law. The 
corrective action specifies how the values of the property 
function(s) must change to provide a state acceptable 
under the transformation law. 
LAWFUL EVENT SPACE 
The lawful event space is the set of all events in a thing 
that are lawful. 
HISTORY 
The chronologically-ordered states that a thing traverses 
in time are the history of the thing. 
ACTS ON 
A thing acts on another thing if its existence affects the 




Two things are said to be coupled (or interact) if one thing 
acts on the other. Furthermore, those two things are said 
to share a binding mutual property (or relation); that is, 
they participate in a relation that “makes a difference” to 
the things. 
SYSTEM 
A set of things is a system if, for any bi-partitioning of the 
set, couplings exist among things in the two subsets. 
SYSTEM COMPOSITION The things in the system are its composition. 
SYSTEM 
ENVIRONMENT 
Things that are not in the system but interact with things 
in the system are called the environment of the system. 
SYSTEM STRUCTURE 
The set of couplings that exist among things within the 
system, and among things in the environment of the 
system and things in the system is called the structure. 
SUBSYSTEM 
A subsystem is a system whose composition and structure 




A decomposition of a system is a set of subsystems such 
that every component in the system is either one of the 
subsystems in the decomposition or is included in the 
composition of one of the subsystems in the 
decomposition. 
LEVEL STRUCTURE 
A level structure defines a partial order over the 
subsystems in a decomposition to show which subsystems 
are components of other subsystems or the system itself. 
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EXTERNAL EVENT 
An external event is an event that arises in a thing, 
subsystem, or system by virtue of the action of some thing 
in the environment on the thing, subsystem, or system. 
STABLE STATE* 
A stable state is a state in which a thing, subsystem, or 
system will remain unless forced to change by virtue of 
the action of a thing in the environment (an external 
event). 
UNSTABLE STATE 
An unstable state is a state that will be changed into 
another state by virtue of the action of transformations in 
the system. 
INTERNAL EVENT 
An internal event is an event that arises in a thing, 
subsystem, or system by virtue of lawful transformations 
in the thing, subsystem, or system. 
WELL-DEFINED EVENT 
A well-defined event is an event in which the subsequent 




A poorly-defined event is an event in which the 
subsequent state cannot be predicted given that the prior 
state is known. 
Figure 32 BWW ontological constructs according to (Green and Rosemann 2000) 
 
Some notes on this table. A thing is an elementary ontological construct which 
corresponds to an instance of a real-world phenomenon. The authors of the paper 
introduce two notions which are not present in the original Bunge ontology (or, at 
least, not under those names). These two notions are those of event and process. 
Green and Rosemann suggest that a process is represented by the whole process 
model. A function type that is further decomposed also represents a process. 
Process modelling languages focus on the behavioural aspects of what is being 
modelled in contrast with for example, the entity relationship model which 
concentrates on the static structure. Green and Rosemann point out that what is 
called an event in the Bunge ontology corresponds to a triple in the event process 
chain EPC model in which event type leads to function type leads to event type. 
Thus, the homonym event here requires special attention:  
“Transformations are represented by function types in the event-driven process 
chains while states are depicted as event types. Accordingly, the triple, event type + 
function type + event type, in an EPC represents the ontological construct event, and 
usually, internal events that are well-defined. The homonym between the EPC 
event type and the ontological event requires careful attention during the analysis. 
Similarly, a state law consisting of a stability condition and a corrective action can 
be represented by the triple, function type + connector + event type, while a lawful 
transformation can be represented by the pattern, event type + connector + 
function type. An external event may be represented by the start event type at the 
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beginning of an EPC while the final stable state (of an object) may be represented 
by the end event type at the bottom of an EPC.” (Green and Rosemann 2000, p.82) 
 
What may appear to be ontological deficiency in the event process chain model may 
suggest misclassification in the BWW. Thus, a number of ontological analyses of 
various modelling grammars have consistently identified certain ontological 
constructs that do not have representations in information systems analysis and 
design ISAD grammars. These include conceivable state space, conceivable event 
space and lawful event space. Green and Rosemann argue that the ontology may be 
over-engineered. I would take an additional perspective and suggest that there are 
many areas of the real world which can only be expressed in an information system 
and not the meta-model of an information system constituted by a conceptual 
model. The BWW model has already extended Bunge’s ontology with the notion of 
the various types of property. Similarly, there is clear value in separately identifying 
process and event as is done in the table above. The value is to do with the clear 
separation of event, process and state which again is something that you need in 
information systems even if you may not necessarily model it at the conceptual 
level. Green and Rosemann suggest that in practice systems analysts frequently find 
it impossible to model business rules – the conditions of transformation – 
adequately using the grammars available to them in conceptual modelling languages 
and they therefore resort to textual descriptions. 
They go on to summarise generic ontological deficiencies: 
Ontological Incompleteness (or Construct Deficit) exists unless there is at least one modelling 
grammatical construct for each ontological construct. 
Ontological Clarity is determined by the extent to which the grammar does not exhibit 
one or more of the following deficiencies: 
Construct Overload exists in a modeling grammar if one grammatical construct 
represents more than one ontological construct. 
Construct Redundancy exists if more than one grammatical construct represents the 
same ontological construct. 
Construct Excess exists in a modeling grammar when a grammatical construct is present 
that does not map into any ontological construct. 
Green and Rosemann suggest that these ontological deficiency situations may not be 
weaknesses in the EPC; rather they might indicate misclassification in the Bunge 
Wand Weber BWW models. I would point out: 
1. That the list does not derive entirely from Bunge; thus process, although discussed 
by Bunge at some length by him, is not defined by him as a fundamental 
ontological construct. The volume (Bunge 1977) is entitled “Change” and has an 
extensive description of process viewed in terms of events and states. DEFINITION 5.6 
A complex event [i.e. one formed by the composition of two or more events] is called a process. 
(Bunge 1977).  
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Subsequently process is construed by Bunge in terms of event, state and the state 
space. 
2. That some of the ontological entities are difficult to represent directly in a meta-
model. Thus, state itself belongs to a property or attribute; it can only have 
meaning in a real-world system or an information system. Similarly, although 
lawful state space can appear in a meta-model, it is rarely if ever realised as a 
construct within an actual modelling approach. 
3. A language or knowledge representation that corresponded to the entire set of 
ontological constructs would be large, probably unwieldy and difficult to 
“implement”. 
 Distinguishing between meta-model, model and target 
information system 
The primary purpose of conceptual modelling is often taken to be the analysis of 
requirements for a target information system. A conceptual modelling language 
and toolkit is used to create a conceptual model for the target information system. 
In some instances, the model is active in the sense that a toolkit can make use of it 
in order to build elements of the target information system directly from the 
description stored in the conceptual model. Thus, if the conceptual model includes 
a data model, and the conceptual modelling toolkit acts as an active data 
dictionary, elements of the required target information system can be generated 
from the description stored in the dictionary. 
3.3 Critical Realism: tenets of significance to this research 
Critical Realism CR distinguishes between the real, the actual and the empirical 
(Bhaskar 1975, 1978, 1989; Collier 1994). It argues for ontological realism (cf. (B. 
Smith 2014)) as it accepts epistemological relativism: the social world is transitive, 
can be explained but not predicted. It is characterised by a "Critical attitude, self 
reflection, awareness of hidden presuppositions, and disclosure of assumptions of 
various perspectives" (Tsoukas 1992) quoted by (Dobson 2002). 
Critical realism and its implications for this research 
 I have adopted a critical realist stance – Roy Bhaskar (Bhaskar 1975, 1978, 1989; 
Collier 1994), Margaret Archer (M. S. Archer 1995), Philip Dobson (Dobson 2002); 
cf. Barry Smith (B. Smith and Ceusters 2010; B. Smith 2014). Accordingly, 
philosophy is viewed as the “underlabourer and occasional midwife” (Bhaskar) 
which helps us towards applied and applicable knowledge. Among the reasons for 
which I have adopted critical realism, its underlying retroduction (abductive) 
inference mechanism is especially important. Critical realism is attracting increasing 
importance; the recent paper (Mingers, Mutch, and Willcocks 2013) is a paper which 
acts as an introduction to a recent special issue of MIS Quarterly on critical realism 
in IS research. (Mingers and Willcocks 2014) links critical realism, semiotics and 
information systems. (Zachariadis, Scott, and Barrett 2013) clearly sets out what 
critical realism is as an introduction and adjunct to a discussion of mixed-methods 
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research. Some writers, as for example (Carlsson 2006), (Carlsson 2010), explicitly 
link CR and design science. 
3.4 Critical realism and affordances 
(Volkoff and Strong 2013) take as their starting point that a central task in 
developing theories of IT-associated organisational change is to uncover the 
generative mechanisms by which IT is implicated in organisational change. It is 
therefore necessary to understand how the concept of generative mechanisms 
fundamental to critical realism applies in an IS context. They note that convincing 
arguments have also been made for using the affordances posited by Gibson 
originally in ecological psychology for developing theories of IT-associated 
organisational change. They therefore argue that affordances are the generative 
mechanisms which can be identified in the real domain from the relation 
between organisations and IT artefacts that we can observe in the actual 
domain. 
3.5 A synthetic model of critical realism  
The model shown in Figure 33 is based on the reading already outlined and in 
particular on my interpretation of (Mutch 2010). 
 
Figure 33 A Conceprocity model of critical realism's main mechanisms 
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3.6 Cybernetics and systems thinking 
(Checkland 2012) sets out four conditions for serious systems thinking and action 
• Any entity called a system may also contain within itself functional 
subsystems and may itself as a whole be a functional part of a wider 
system. So a system will in principle be part of a layered structure 
making a hierarchy of systems. 
• To achieve adaptation to change, there will have to be processes of 
communication. These will have to involve both the system and its 
environment. These processes will enable performance to be monitored 
so that a decision to adapt or not can be taken, whether by automatic 
processes or by human beings. 
• If action to adapt is to be taken, the system will have to have available to 
it a number of possible control processes (responses to the shocks 
from the environment and to internal failure), which can be appropriately 
activated to bring about [adaptive] change. 
• There will be definable emergent properties that characterise the 
particular system or systems of interest, this being the pre-eminent 
systems idea. 
Whence we note the principle that we must recognise and make explicit the 
emergent properties of the layers of a system. 
The Law of Requisite Variety and PIMS 
The law of requisite variety can be stated thus, following (Ashby 1956, p.206) 
paraphrased:  
Variety absorbs variety, defines the minimum number of states necessary for a 
controller to control a system of a given number of states (in a discrete state 
controller). If a system is to be stable and / or controlled the number of states of its 
control mechanism – its regulator - must be greater than or equal to the number of 
states in the system being controlled.  
Ashby elsewhere states the law as "only variety can destroy variety" (Ashby 1956, 
p.207).  
In (Ashby 1958) Ashby sees the law of requisite variety as introductory to 
Shannon’s Information Theory (Shannon and Weaver 1949). This deals with the 
case of "incessant fluctuations" or noise. Regulation seeks to keep fundamental 
variables within a system or organism within ranges of values at which that 
organism can continue to survive. An effective regulator has access to variables 
which seek to disturb desirable outcomes and thus is able to counter them. This data 
passes through communication channels whose effectiveness and fundamental 
limitations had earlier been established by the information theory of Shannon. 
Ashby states: “R’s capacity as a regulator cannot exceed its capacity as a channel for 
variety.” (Ashby 1958).  At p. 88, we find: “The law of requisite variety then says that 
  158 / 343 
 
such regulation cannot be achieved unless the regulator R, as a channel of 
communication, has more than a certain capacity. Thus, if D threatens to introduce a 
variety of 10 bits into the outcomes, and if survival demands that the outcomes be 
restricted to 2 bits, then at each action R must provide variety of at least 8 bits.” At 
p.91, “Our ‘disturbance D’, which threatens to get through to the outcome, clearly 
corresponds to the noise…” [affecting Shannon’s communication channel] “and his 
theorem says that the amount of noise that can be prevented from appearing in the 
outcomes is limited to the entropy that can be transmitted through the correction 
channel.” In a 100% regulated system, there is no message to be transmitted; the 
message has zero entropy. Ashby gives as an example, in a mammal blood 
temperature is kept as near as possible to a value which never changes. “Thus, all 
acts of regulation can be related to the concepts of communication theory by our 
noticing that the ‘goal’ is a message of zero entropy, and that the ‘disturbances’ 
correspond to noise.” (p.91). Ashby then discusses the implication: that any man’s 
intelligence is subject to the fundamental limitation that it cannot exceed his 
capacity as a transducer. Even a team or organisation is severely limited in its 
capacity to understand, let alone manage, the phenomena and systems of great 
complexity which it encounters in its environment. Much more so the individual 
who is the focus of this paper. 
 
We can note the folowing implications: 
• A good PIMS amplifies good variety while attenuating bad variety. 
• The principal adaptive element in a PIMS is the individual knowledge 
worker herself. 
• She adopts and adapts PIM tools over time. Their use can contribute to 
improved variety management. 
The Good Regulator theorem 
Basing their work on Ashby’s earlier cybernetic writings and in particular on the 
information theory of Shannon, (Conant and Ashby 1970) introduced the Good 
Regulator theorem which requires autonomous systems to acquire an internal 
model of their environment to persist and achieve stability or dynamic 
equilibrium. (Conant & Ashby 1970, p.89)’s Good Regulator theorem states that  
"Every good regulator of a system must be a model of that system… The design 
of a complex regulator thus includes the making or maintenance of a model of the 
system to be regulated. The theorem shows that any regulator that is maximally 
both successful and simple must be isomorphic with the system being 
regulated.”  
Applying this to individuals suggests and mandates that the actor (doer) and 
learning thinker has to absorb and counter threatening variety within her 
environment by devising (developing and maintaining) a regulator or controller. 
This controller is analogous to Ross Ashby’s homeostat (Ashby 1956); (Ashby 
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1962). A homeostat exhibits behaviours such as habituation, reinforcement and 
learning through its ability to maintain appropriate levels of stability in a changing 
environment. 
The shape required of the regulator is that of the situation to be regulated: “the 
theorem says that the best regulator of a system is one which is a model of that 
system in the sense that the regulator's actions are merely the system's actions as 
seen through a mapping." (Conant and Ashby 1970). 
The implications of the good regulator theorem are both profound and far-
reaching. 
(Scholten 2010b) attempts to re-express Conant and Ashby’s theorem using more 
accessible maths than those assumed by the original authors. However, even to 
understand his simplified approach remains somewhat challenging. Therefore 
Daniel Scholten has also written (Scholten 2010a); this primer is supported by a 
simulation model which can be found at http://www.goodregulatorproject.org/. 
“Every Good Key Must Be A Model Of The Lock It Opens”. 
Systems thinking and modelling 
(Stowell and Welch 2012, xiv) following (Checkland 1981, 198); see also (Stowell 
2013); identify as the basic building blocks of systems thinking (1) emergence, (2) 
hierarchy, (3) communication and (4) control. They discuss how a system is 
defined from the perspective of an observer, who chooses to draw a boundary 
reflecting a field of interest and giving to the system so defined a name. They remind 
us of the taxonomy of three systemic models originally identified by Russell Ackoff 
(Ackoff, Gupta, and Minas 1962) and they extend it with a fourth following Brian 
Wilson (B. Wilson 1984) to yield: 
1. An iconic model is a model of reality, the properties of which equate to 
those of the real article such that (albeit on a different scale) the model can 
be expected to behave in the same way as the real thing. I would give as an 
example of such a model the wind tunnel model of a new aircraft. 
2. An analogical model is an attempt to simulate the behaviour of the 
original although its physical appearance is quite different to that of the 
original. Most simulation models fall into this category. 
3. An analytic model is created from mathematical or logical relationships 
that are believed to lead to the behaviour of some situation of interest. 
Typical examples include spreadsheet models. Analytic models may 
subsequently provide the data for analogical models. 
4. A conceptual model includes pictures or symbols which are used to 
represent the subjective and qualitative aspects of a situation. 
(Stowell and Welch 2012) present modelling as a kind of surrogate representation 
of some situation. It is in the process of forming, reforming and structuring that 
model that we begin to learn about the situation of interest and its similarities and 
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differences to the situation that we are modelling. Among the dangers inherent in 
such modelling are that it becomes an end in and of itself. Instead a model is only an 
abstraction of our perception of reality. As a simplification it is also often subjective. 
Checkland’s systems thinking 
(Stowell and Welch 2012) advocate Checkland’s idea of a system (Checkland 1981). 
In (Stowell 2013), the interviewee Peter Checkland reemphasised his insistence that 
a system is not something “out there” whose identification any two dispassionate 
observers could agree upon. 
The product of Checkland’s thinking, based upon 30 years of action research, is 
firstly a process of enquiry which through a number of hermeneutic cycles10 learns 
its way to the accommodations which enable “action to improve” to be taken. There 
follows his view of social reality as the ever-changing outcome of the social process 
in which we all continually negotiate and renegotiate our perceptions and 
interpretations of the world outside ourselves. Thus, according to Checkland, the 
system is not something in the world; it is the enquiring process. 
(Checkland 2012, 466) states:  
“The bare minimum set of concepts needed to express the nature of an 
adaptive whole is four in number.” 
We can summarise these as: 
1. Emergence – (Goldstein 1999) defines emergence as “the arising of novel 
and coherent structures, patterns and properties during the process of self-
organization in complex systems”. Checkland calls emergence the pre-
eminent systems idea. 
2. Hierarchy – any entity called a system may also contain within itself 
functional subsystems and may itself be a part of a wider system. 
3. Communication – in order to achieve adaptation to change, there must be 
processes of communication both within the system and to and from its 
environment, and human or intelligent decision-making. 
4. Control – processes which responds to shocks in the environment and to 
internal failure. 
Information Systems from a cybernetic perspective 
An excellent framework for (inter alia) the initial analysis of information systems 
requirements is provided by the work systems method of Steven Alter (Alter 2006). 
Alter defines a Work System as a system in which people and/or machines perform 
a business process using resources (e.g., information, technology, raw materials) to 
create products/services for internal or external customers. Supporting the work 
system will be a number of information systems - although the mapping between 
10 The hermeneutic circle refers to the circle of interpretation that is involved in the 
understanding of knowledge. 
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information system and work system is many to many; see (Alter 2002a). Following 
and extending (Paul 2010) we define an information system as “information and 
communications technology in use”; we here add “by people”. Simplistically, we 
can characterise an information system as taking inputs in the form of data, yielding 
as output information whose purposes may include  
❑ Better visibility / vision of what’s happening 
❑ Monitoring and control 
❑ Improved decision making 
Generally speaking, information systems are filters on the inward path, amplifiers 
on the forward path or components of the feedback path used to control a complex 
system. Thus, for example business information systems BIS may be used to 
coordinate and control the work of an enterprise. Figure 34, taken from 
(Schwaninger 2004), illustrates the need for the amplification and attenuation that 
BIS can provide. 
 
Figure 34 Dealing with the inevitable mismatch between variety in the controller 
and that in the environment. Source: (Schwaninger 2004, figure 1). 
Following (Baskerville 2011b), we regard the individual knowledge worker as being 
the most important component of a personal work system. Following Checkland, we 
suggest that the only element of an information system – people using information 
and communications technology – that demonstrates emergent behaviour is the 
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person herself interacting with the technology; the technology itself does not 
normally adapt, at any rate in the short term. We posit that the controller (that is 
homeostat or regulator) for a knowledge worker is her personal work system PWS 
supported by her personal information management system, which we take to be 
analogous to her memory extension memex (Bush 1945) in that it embodies her 
conceptual data structures CDS and the associated data (Völkel and Haller 2009). 
Her knowing brain constitutes the doing (processing) and variety-generating 
element within the personal work system by which she gets things done. She can 
increase her requisite and available variety – her ability to cope with complexity 
(Backlund 2002) - by information gathering, by learning and by calling upon her 
network or her mentors. Information here is to be understood as meaningful and 
true interpretation of data as discussed by (Floridi 2005).  
The means by which her knowledge and rule-base is changed is learning. We 
recognise two kinds of learning: learning existing knowledge as it has already been 
distilled and published (knowledge diffusion and acquisition); and the discovery of 
new knowledge (knowledge creation). Learning has the effect of changing the 
working model that the actor has of her life and purpose. Learning may be achieved, 
inter alia, via the processes of conventional teaching or with a dialogic mentor 
(Gregory, Kehal, and Descubes 2012a). The teacher or mentor acts as deus ex 
machina – a source of new purposeful variety. Together and apart the mentor and 
mentee learn and thus, for a while, survive and thrive. 
Based on the good regulator theorem of Conant and Ashby, we posit that there must 
exist a model of the personal working system of each individual – since we all do 
succeed to some extent to Get Things Done (D. Allen 2003) and to Keep Found 
Things Found (W. P. Jones 2007b). We give this model a name: “Personal Working 
Model”. 
We hold that there must exist this personal working model. The argument runs as 
follows. 
We conjecture that the level of abstraction and the type of the learning and 
therefore of the Working Model required depend on the nature of the work that the 
actor has to undertake. Thus, where plumbers use largely tacit techniques, where 
teachers diffuse knowledge and assist learning and engineers create new artefacts 
and techniques: the researcher needs to discover or create new knowledge. The new 
knowledge is here explicit. 
The Working Model needs to be as simple as possible but no simpler. Put another 
way, it should encourage “requisite complexity” (an updating of Ashby’s requisite 
variety, which is very well introduced by (Stowell, 2013, pp. 118–121)). Since, as 
Ashby and later Stafford Beer (Beer, 1984) demonstrate, it is in practice almost 
never possible to create more states of variety in a controller than exist in its 
environment, the pragmatic necessity is to apply appropriate heuristics which filter 
and absorb inappropriate variety and permit identification of threatening and 
friendly variety requiring to be countered and dealt with. Perhaps among other 
approaches, the creation, maintenance, development and sometimes conscious 
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design of an appropriate personal information management system have the 
potential to make a major contribution to an effective personal work system. 
The roles of theory and of learning in the Working Model 
(Conant and Ashby 1970) require that a good regulator model be isomorphic with 
the situation to be regulated. In practice isomorphism is usually not achievable; 
instead, we achieve various degrees of homomorphism. (Beer 1999) reprises his 
earlier (Beer 1966) identification of what he called the yo-yo model, one feature of 
which is that isomorphism can be identified between linked ideas each of whose 
derivation is homomorphic. In (Gregory and Descubes 2011c), we highlighted a 
critical dependence on two phenomena identified by (Argyris and Schön 1974, 6–7); 
these are normally discussed in an organisational context but have applicability also 
at the individual level. These two phenomena are: 
❑ The difference between espoused theory and theory-in-use 
❑ The desirability of double-loop learning 
“When someone is asked how he would behave under certain 
circumstances, the answer he usually gives is his espoused theory of 
action for that situation. This is the theory of action to which he gives 
allegiance, and which, upon request, he communicates to others. 
However, the theory that actually governs his actions is this theory-
in-use.” (Argyris and Schön 1974, 6–7)  
(M. K. Smith 2001) describes how (Argyris 1980) makes the case that effectiveness 
results from developing congruence between theory-in-use and espoused theory. 
Smith suggests that where there is a mismatch between intention and outcome, 
organisations and individuals may exhibit either single- or double-loop learning. 
The latter involves questioning the role of the framing and learning systems which 
underlie actual goals and strategies in a process which (Argyris 1982, pp.103-4) 
identifies as deeply reflective: 
“Reflection here is more fundamental: the basic assumptions behind 
ideas or policies are confronted… hypotheses are publicly tested… 
processes are disconfirmable not self-seeking”. 
This reflective and reflexive double loop learning is a major 
influence on the Working Model. 
(M. K. Smith 2001) discusses how Argyris goes on to suggest the necessity for a 
model II theory-in-use in which the governing variables are critically reviewed and 
change. However, this approach is extremely difficult in practice and has not been 
the subject of much (academic) research. Smith prefers the approach, grounded in 
Dewey’s pragmatism (Dewey 1931; Sleeper 2001) but extending well beyond it, 
summarised by (Schön 1983, 69) as reflection in action: 
“The practitioner allows himself to experience surprise, puzzlement, 
or confusion in a situation which he finds uncertain or unique. He 
reflects on the phenomenon before him, and on the prior 
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understandings which have been implicit in his behaviour. He carries 
out an experiment which serves to generate both a new 
understanding of the phenomenon and a change in the situation… He 
does not keep means and ends separate, but defines them 
interactively as he frames a problematic situation. He does not 
separate thinking from doing… Because his experimenting is a kind 
of action, implementation is built into his enquiry.” 
See also (M. K. Smith 2009) on the work and influence of Donald Schön and (Finger 
and Asún 2001) on its implications for learning, teaching and mentoring.  
Limitations of models and objections to their use 
Modelling was a very large part of information systems thinking and practice in its 
early days,  in for example the dataflow diagrams of Larry Constantine (Yourdon and 
Constantine 1976) and the entity-relationship modelling of (Chen 1976, 1977) – the 
latter being particularly valuable because of the ease with which an E/R model can 
be translated into a relational database design (Codd 1970, 1971). More recent 
software engineering practice has tended to subsume modelling into design (or 
even attempted to eliminate it as an explicit step). But the original role of modelling 
was in the analysis of requirements which should normally precede design and very 
definitely should inform it. Requirements analysis is difficult precisely because it 
requires modelling by (or with the very active involvement of) domain specialists: 
the users and their managers of the information systems built to enable and 
improve work systems. Without explicit requirements models, there is a very strong 
likelihood that the model of what is needed will not correspond with the model 
which the eventual computerised IS actually implements. With appropriate models – 
that is, models of “reality” and of the domain of application – communication 
between domain specialists and developers at least becomes possible. Among those 
who have called for a return to an emphasis on appropriate modelling is (Alter 
2003a, 2003b). Alter does not call for complex graphical models. Instead he 
concentrates on getting practising managers to create models which are in essence 
tables. 
The recent revival within the information systems community of interest in design 
science and in design science research is in this sense a welcome return. See for 
example (Hevner and Chatterjee 2010b; Hevner et al. 2004; Iivari 2007); see also 
(Baskerville et al. 2010; Baskerville 2011c) 
Beer’s suggestion for easing the requirement for strictly isomorphic 
regulatory models 
(Beer 1999) is candid about the difficulty of modelling and of understanding models 
since models are mental constructs that must never be confused with “reality”, 
which we often only dimly perceive. But he reminds us that starting from simile and 
passing through analogy we may recognise and achieve a degree of isomorphism 
(via homomorphism) to a situation which we do know how to manage - this is the 
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yo-yo analogy previously referred to (section 0). In fact we should be seeking to 
identify what Beer calls systemic invariance. Feedback mechanisms, attenuation of 
inappropriate environmental variety, and above all retention and amplification of 
requisite internal variety, are all desirable characteristics of good management – 
personal as well as organisational. 
Recent insights from cybernetics 
The theoretical biologist (Nikolić 2015) applies and extends these cybernetic 
principles as he considers the mind-body question. He identifies Practopoiesis: The 
key for achieving intelligence through adaptation is that mechanisms at a lower 
level of organisation, by their operations and interaction with the environment, 
enable creation of mechanisms at a higher level – a phenomenon which he calls the 
cybernetic traverse. Practopoiesis is suggested as a general cybernetic theory of 
adaptive systems. The underlying idea is that each adaptive mechanism, at any 
level of self-organisation, receives feedback from the environment. Practopoiesis 
extends existing cybernetic theory, in particular the law of requisite variety and the 
good regulator theorem, in the sense that it explains how systems obtain their 
cybernetic capabilities, that is, how they learn what and where to control. Nikolic 
suggests that there are three essential elements in any system which has the 
capability to learn to control. These are: 
Monitor-and-act machinery: an adaptive system must consist of components that are 
capable of detecting conditions necessity to act and of acting. An example is a neuron. A 
monitor-and-act component is capable of detecting information, acting on it and observing 
the effects of the action. In this sense, it already possesses certain knowledge about the 
effects that its actions are likely to exert on the world. 
Poietic hierarchy: the monitor-and-act units are organised into a hierarchy in which low-
level components, by their actions, create, adjust, service and nourish high-level 
components. 
Level-specific environmental feedback: monitor-and-act components receive necessary 
feedback from the environment to which the system is adapting. 
Nikolić identifies what he calls the Cybernetic knowledge of a component, for 
example, knowledge on when to act and how (Ashby 1956). [This is a very low-level 
notion of knowledge, and has nothing to do with the use more generally made in this 
thesis.]  
Since every component of a system must be able to adjust to its environment, this 
cybernetic knowledge is necessarily subjected to the good regulator theorem of 
(Conant and Ashby 1970).  
The combination of poiesis and level-specific environmental feedback implies that 
the process of building the system is also the process of adapting the system which 
is also the very process of acquiring further cybernetic knowledge. In this way, 
newly created structures become a model of the system's environment. Provided 
that they are also capable of generating requisite variety, they become good models. 
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A practopoietic hierarchy implies transition from high to low levels of generality of 
knowledge in an active adaptive traverse of knowledge, or simply a traverse. 
Anapoiesis is the traverse which reuses long-term knowledge in the service of short 
– the basis for higher-level learning. 
In a four-level hierarchy, there are three traverses possible. A system with this 
characteristic is identified as a T4 system. A T4 system possesses three cybernetic 
traverses. A T1 system is capable of control and of deduction. A T2 system is capable 
of supervision and induction. A T3 system is capable of anapoiesis and of abduction; 
Nikolić calls a T3 system the mind. Anapoiesis of a T3 system can be described as a 
use of past knowledge to guess which knowledge is correct for a given situation and 
then evaluating the degree to which the guess matches reality and adjusting the 
discrepancies that may appear. This guess-based logical operation is what is 
known as abduction, or inference to the best explanation: and is due to Charles 
Sanders Peirce. In a probabilistic form, abduction is described by Bayes theorem.  
The key contribution of practopoietic theory is the generalisation of the role of 
feedback: in any given system, the principles by which the variety is adjusted can be 
also adjusted themselves by yet another set of principles, and so on. Since each set of 
principles can have its own variety, the hierarchy can in principle grow indefinitely. 
Each step in this hierarchy is one traversal of cybernetic knowledge. In practice, 
systems beyond T3 either do not exist or are not yet significant in our 
understanding of the world. 
A wide range of applications are followed up by Nikolić. The capability of the human 
mind to conceptualise the world may be accounted for by anapoiesis of knowledge. 
Thus, our conceptual knowledge, stored in long-term memory, consists of 
generalised, abstract rules of interacting with the world. These general principles 
are matched to a specific situation by means of anapoiesis.  
The significance of these new cybernetic insights for this current study include a 
further demonstration of the pervasiveness and global significance of abduction; see 
also (Tohmé, Caterina, and Gangle 2015). Additionally, these cybernetic mechanisms 
are generative; their identification provides explanation. 
Fundamental questions and putative answers 
Q: What is the system under investigation? 
A: It is the work system constituted by the knowledge worker as she gets things 
done, as she informs her work, and as she reflects and learns 
Q: What is the form and function of the model which regulates that system? 
A: A « Working Model » which is a dynamic active  representation of the life she 
seeks to live 
▪ The true isomorphic model is likely to be difficult to perceive, 
changeable, very individual and fragmented 
▪ But the effort has to be made to discern it at least homomorphically 
and to make it concrete and active 
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Q: How can we model the model? 
A1: In this research, we have chosen to design and develop a knowledge mapping 
semi-formalism, called Conceprocity. This knowledge mapping formalism has then 
been used to create putative models for a single knowledge worker, the author 
himself. This is a representation of a specific working model. 
A2: A PIMS assembled from affordances. The data stored in this PIMS actively 
influences the actions of the knowledge worker. 
Q: What are the generative mechanisms that must exist if personal information 
management systems are to emerge and be recognisable? 
A1: Some element of volition, whether bricolage or explicit design 
A2: Technology-enabled affordances 
Q: Why is this significant for personal work management?  
A: The need for self organisation and control in an open and continuously evolving 
system mandate systematic and adaptive personal information management 
3.7 Critical realism and systems thinking 
Systems approach: systems thinking and critical realism 
(Mingers 1999) discusses the  relations  between  information  and  meaning,  as  
generated through  the  interactions  of  individuals,  and  communication,  at  the  
level  of  society,  from  an autopoietic perspective. He notes the significance of 
embodied knowledge and cognition.  
He proposes a category of organisationally closed, or self-referential, systems. The 
contribution made in this paper is to link these analyses at the level of the individual 
up to the social system of communication (based on structuration theory. 
(Mingers 2011) makes a careful historical analysis of systems thinking, initially 
evidenced as hard systems thinking – general systems theory and cybernetics; 
followed by a second phase of soft systems thinking – SSM; followed by non-linear 
dynamical systems (complexity theory). Mingers then discusses systemic concepts 
in the first phase of the work of Roy Bhaskar. He suggests certain equivalences 
between the concepts in the work of Roy Bhaskar and better defined terms in 
systems theory. However, Mingers does identify that the CR term generative 
mechanism has particular value.  
The view which Mingers takes is based on the interdependence of emergence and 
the dynamics of components presented by (Thompson and Varela 2001):  
“so there is a ‘reciprocal causality’ in play in which the components 
interact directly and locally, generating and sustaining the behaviour 
of the whole, while the whole sets the control parameters and 
boundary conditions for the components. Thompson and Varela give 
general examples such as autopoiesis and the immune system… 
Equally we can use the example of social systems within critical 
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realism. Here, social structure (or system) is only instantiated 
through the activities of social agents, but at the same time the social 
structures of roles and practices conditions the activities that agents 
can undertake.” (Mingers 2014, p.45). 
The application to my work that immediately comes to mind is the interaction 
between personal work system and personal information management system. Very 
clearly, there is an extent to which the personal work system is an emergence based 
on components such as the personal information management system. But almost as 
obvious is the shaping of the PIMS by the PWS. Here, the generative mechanisms 
include the embodiment of the volition of the designer in the shape – the vocabulary 
and the viewed form – as she arrives at a PIMS, both designed and “bricolé”. And 
although when I model the PWS and the PIMS and the designerly knowledge which 
go into the realisation of both I shall impose boundaries, those boundaries are very 
much ones which I perceive and which I draw. 
 
Continuing his discussion of dialectical critical realism, Mingers discusses absence 
and negativity as major presuppositions in critical realism. An absence can be 
illustrated by that of not paying a bill. This non-action has a consequence. Mingers 
suggests that this has its parallel in a concept put forward by Gregory Bateson 
(Bateson 1972): 
“Causal explanation is usually positive… In contrast to this, 
cybernetic explanation is always negative. We consider what 
alternative possibilities could conceivably have occurred and then 
ask why were many of the alternatives not followed, so that the 
particular event was one of those few which could, in fact, occur.” 
 
Mingers draws the parallel between such absence and the behaviour of a feedback 
system as it tries always to close a gap (make absent an absence) between the 
desired state of the system and its actual state. He then goes on to discuss 
autopoiesis, which takes a concept explicitly present both in systems thinking and in 
critical realism. Autopoietic systems are self-producing or self-constructing. The 
concept of autopoiesis is due originally to (Maturana and Varela 1987, 1980). They 
developed the concept of autopoiesis to explain the special nature of living as 
opposed to non-living systems. Autopoietic systems are closed and self-referential – 
they do not primarily transform inputs into outputs; instead they transform 
themselves into themselves.… They are said to be organisationally closed but 
interactively open. (Mingers 1995) 
Mingers concludes that Roy Bhaskar is heavily informed by systems thinking but 
fails to reference it in his work. Thus, Mingers holds that many of the fundamental 
ideas of critical realism have already been developed within the disciplines of 
systems thinking and cybernetics. Systems thinking sometimes provides clear 
articulations of key concepts such as circular causality through positive and negative 
feedback loops. Conversely, critical realism can also be beneficial by providing a 
more rigorous philosophical underpinning – which systems thinking often lacks. 
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Particular concepts are better developed in critical realism; he concludes by 
highlighting absence/negativity; but similarly, he has previously identified 
generative mechanisms as a conceptual strength of critical realism. 
Modelling, CR and the systems approach 
(Goles and Hirschheim 2000) do not discuss critical realism as such. Instead, they 
talk about scientific realism as they identify as an important author Roy Bhaskar. 
(Goles and Hirschheim 2000, p.252):  
“Scientific realism holds that while the world exists independently of 
its being perceived (`classical realism'), the world can only be known 
through models of the world. The models themselves are not 
immutable – they never can be known with certainty (`fallibilistic 
realism'); indeed, the job of science is to develop better models of the 
world (Hunt 1990)”. 
(Goles and Hirschheim 2000, p.261) address the scientific realism of Bhaskar. They 
make the interesting observation:  
“To some extent, it is tempting to draw a parallel between 
pragmatism and the scientific realism of Bhaskar. For Bhaskar, 
scientific realism is more than an ontological stance in that it adopts 
a particular epistemology as well. His version of scientific realism 
agrees with Kuhn that knowledge is a social and historical product. 
The task of science is to invent theories that aim to represent the 
world. In this way, science generates its own rational criteria that 
determine which theories are to be accepted or rejected. Crucially, it 
is possible for these criteria to be rational precisely because there is 
a world that exists independently of our cognizant experience. The 
theories which result from these rational criteria may be wrong, 
since they are based on the known world rather than the world itself. 
But nonetheless, they are what the community agrees on and is 
based on a community standard of what constitutes ``valid'' or 
``believable'' knowledge claims. According to (Bhaskar 1975), it is 
our knowledge of the world that is circular; the world itself exists, 
and we experience perceptions of that world. The goal of science is 
to build sophisticated models using rational criteria to represent the 
world. As already mentioned, the models represent only what we 
know of the world and this knowledge is inherently flawed; but as 
we build successive models we may improve our representation. By 
making use of cognitive materials and operating under the control of 
something like a logic of analogy or metaphor, we can postulate a 
model. We do not believe that the model exactly duplicates the 
world; but, if this model were to exist and act in the way specified, 
then it allows us to account for observed phenomena. Lastly, Bhaskar 
notes that models are composed of abstractions and are untruthful, 
by definition, since they oversimplify. The greater the level of 
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abstraction, the more this is so since they move further from 
empirical phenomena and oversimplify by grouping lower level 
abstractions.” 
3.8 Conceprocity: Concept Process Reciprocity 
Conceprocity is both a product and a contribution of this research but also a 
mechanism used within the research itself. I therefore introduce it here in the 
framework chapter. 
Knowledge Representation 
(Hjørland and Nicolaisen 2005) discuss knowledge representation. They remind us 
that “Knowledge representation is thus depending both on the objective pole: what 
knowledge exists to be represented and on the subjective pole: the representator or 
selector.” (Hjørland and Nicolaisen 2005).  
We can summarise their findings in tabular form as Table 14: 
Table 14 Knowledge representation according to (Hjørland and Nicolaisen, 2005) 
with additional commentary in italics 







Declarative sentences and inferencing. Comment: We 
would suggest that propositional calculus, predicate 
calculus, first order logic and Horn clauses (as used in 















“Frame-based systems are knowledge representation 
systems that use frames, a notion originally 
introduced by (Minsky 1975) as their primary means 
to represent domain knowledge. A frame is a structure 
for representing a concept or situation such as 
"restaurant" or "being in a restaurant". Attached to a 
frame are several kinds of information, for instance, 
definitional and descriptive information and how to 
use the frame. Frames are supposed to capture the 
essence of concepts or stereotypical situations, for 
example going out for dinner, by clustering all 
relevant information for these situations together. 
This means, in particular, that a great deal of 
procedurally expressed knowledge should be part of 
the frames. Collections of such frames are to be 
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organized in frame systems in which the frames are 




 Parallels are drawn between neural nets and 
behaviourism. There is an emphasis on noting 
stimulus and response in an empiricist tradition and 
comparatively little interest in what is happening 




large corpora of 
data 
 “The statistical approach to AI involves taking very 
large corpora of data, and analyzing them in great 
depth using statistical techniques. These statistics can 
then be used to guide new tasks. The resulting data, as 
compared to the knowledge-based approach, are 
extremely shallow in terms of their semantic content, 
since the categories extracted must be easily derived 
from the data, but they can be immensely detailed and 
precise in terms of statistical relations. Moreover, 
techniques - such as maximum entropy analysis - exist 
that allow a collection of statistical indicators, each 
individually quite weak, to be combined effectively 
into strong collective evidence. From the point of view 
of knowledge representation, the most interesting 
data corpora are online libraries of text. Libraries of 
pure text exist online containing billions of words; 
libraries of extensively annotated texts exist 
containing hundreds of thousands to millions of 
words, depending on the type of annotation. Now, in 
2001, statistical methods of natural language analysis 
are, in general, comparable in quality to carefully 
hand-crafted natural language analyzers; however, 
they can be created for a new language or a new 
domain at a small fraction of the cost in human labor”  
(E. Davis 2001) 
Large corpora of data may be approached by methods 
related to empiricism, which seems to be what Ernest 
Davis is suggesting. There is an important difference, 
however, between traditional empiricist approaches 
to knowledge representation and “text corpora” 
approaches. The traditional approach represents what 
is considered knowledge by the person doing the 
representation. There is only one voice present. In 
large corpora of texts many voices are present (what 
kind of voices varies according to how the text corpus 
is selected, e.g. if it consists of newspapers or scholarly 
papers). 
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Author’s comment: textual analysis tools such as 
Leximancer are capable of analysing large text corpora 
and summarising their findings in the form of concept 
maps. The remark concerning “many voices” is valid 
and important. For this reason it is pragmatically 
desirable to subset large text corpora and to analyse 











Origins and history of Conceprocity 
I initially chose G-MOT as originated by UQAM LICEF - (Paquette 2010), but evolved 
this as I created my own KR approach. Conceprocity – concept ↔ process 
reciprocity CPR – is a visual and textual language and toolset intended for 
capturing, expressing, communicating and co-creating models of topic areas of 
domain knowledge by domain experts or learners. I began to develop it in spring 
2013 and was first able to use it with students in the early summer of the same year. 
It employs semi-formal semantics – human emphasis, used when investigating 
problem situations; but grammar rules exist and are (currently partially) enforced. 
Conceprocity origins 
Ancestor: existential graph meta-model (and pragmatic construction) - (Peirce 
1933); (Atkin 2013). 
The intellectual roots and origins of Conceprocity lie in the work originally 
undertaken by the Québecois research group LICEF. This work is part of a 
knowledge mapping approach which is studied and used particularly in 
Francophone countries. Primary theoretical influences on the LICEF approach come 
from cognitive science and psychology. See (Paquette 2010). However, when I 
sought to position my approach to concept process mapping, I looked for theoretical 
roots for my own variant of this approach rather in the conceptual modelling 
tradition associated with information systems and specifically with requirements 
analysis. The reason for this choice is that there is a great deal more published 
research in the conceptual modelling tradition than there is in the knowledge 
mapping area. In particular, there is a greater philosophical coherence evident in the 
conceptual modelling literature than that which I have been able to discover in the 
knowledge mapping approach. 
I believe that I am the first person to attempt to bridge these two streams of 
research: 
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1. the conceptual modelling tradition typically associated with the work of 
Yair Wand, Ron Weber and others who align more or less with the 
information systems discipline; 
2. and the knowledge mapping or knowledge cartography tradition 
epitomised by the work of Gilbert Paquette – the LICEF research centre 
which he founded is informed by computer science, artificial intelligence 
studies, educational studies and by cognitive psychology and studies in 
cognition. 
More generally, we can identify four distinct streams of concept mapping 
approaches: 
 Cmap concept mapping 
The approach to concept mapping originated by Joseph Novak and Alberto Cañas, 
which is based on work by the development psychologist David Ausubel. This 
approach is particularly strong in the American Hispanophone community and for 
this reason I give it the shorthand designation the Florida approach; it is grounded 
in cognitive psychology. A major application of this approach, and one which has 
influenced its form, is to initial instruction of, and learning by, schoolchildren in 
science. It therefore takes a very simple representational form. 
 G-MOT knowledge mapping 
The Francophone approach of Paquette and his collaborators: typed object 
mapping, clearly informed by object-oriented programming and analysis – but very 
much also a knowledge organisation approach. This school, which sometimes also 
identifies itself as knowledge cartography, sees wide applicability of knowledge 
mapping approaches in areas such as instructional design, business process 
modelling and even – in a more formalised variant – the construction of formal 
ontologies RDF and OWL by means of diagrammatic concept maps. I give it the 
shorthand designation the LICEF approach. 
 Knowledge organisation systems KOS  
The community which surrounds the journal Knowledge Organization, whose 
current editor is Richard Smiraglia. This would appear to draw in particular from 
the library and information science tradition. It takes a broad view of concept 
mapping. It does not seek to impose a particular approach, much less a particular 
modelling language. Recent articles have sought to summarise the semi-formal 
underpinnings of this approach. (Rocha Souza, Tudhope, and Barcellos Almeida 
2010) present a taxonomy of knowledge organisation systems (KOS) itself in the 
form of a concept map.  
I dub this tradition the KOS approach.  
 Bunge Wand Weber BWW conceptual modelling  
The information systems requirements analysis conceptual modelling school, whose 
most significant sub-stream measured by volume of publications is informed by the 
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so-called Bunge Wand Weber BWW approach associated in particular with Yair 
Wand and Ron Weber. This approach has the strongest theoretical, particularly 
ontological, basis. However, I would argue that it displays a weakness in that it 
restricts itself very largely to requirements analysis and does not see a wider role 
for conceptual modelling. A strength which is also a weakness is the strong 
commitment to a scientific realist ontology. It is a strength in so far as it gives a 
philosophical and intellectual coherence to the approach. It is a weakness in that we 
normally apply the term Information Systems in the area of human activity systems 
where a social ontology is at least as significant as a strictly scientific realist one. The 
work of Salvatore March and Gove Allen (March and Allen 2014) suggests the 
extension of the ontology to include elements of the social ontology of John Searle, 
and this basic approach is the one which I am developing. 
From the evidence available to this author, these four strains have been working 
largely in ignorance one of another. I think that this raises a very interesting gap 
which I am perhaps well positioned to fill. In this thesis, all I can do is identify that 
gap but also suggest that my approach has learned from them all and that I have 
then extended the BWW ontology so that it meets the challenge in particular of 
social ontology. 
What this new understanding of the uniqueness of Conceprocity gives me is the 
opportunity to strengthen the contribution which I claim has arisen from the 
process of its design, the product itself and its use and usefulness. A gap exists 
because the best theoretically justified approach, that of Bunge Wand Weber BWW, 
has rarely been applied in the area of conceptual knowledge mapping to which in 
fact it is well-suited. The LICEF approach helpfully introduces typed object 
modelling but does not apply it in the area of information systems requirements 
analysis. In addition, it semiotics are difficult to read and to learn. The Florida 
approach is too semantically imprecise to be used outside its original application to 
the education of students and of children. I believe the Conceprocity, with its 
informal early usage profiles and its much more formal TROPICPEA approach, is 
both gradually learnable and ultimately fairly semantically precise. 
Areas in which Conceprocity has followed G-MOT 
There are very many areas in which Conceprocity has followed design decisions 
made in G-MOT. These include fundamental areas such as the notion of typed 
objects. 
Gilbert Paquette, the originator of the G-MOT approach, has written (Paquette 
2010) which discusses the relationship between structured knowledge 
representation and learning, which he sees as being inextricably linked. Thus, 
understanding is impossible without identifying and classifying objects and ideas 
and linking them by association in some organised way. These mental structures or 
schemas vary in complexity. The concept of schema as the building block of mental 
structures is now well established in cognitive psychology. The language and the 
thinking derive initially from the work of Jean Piaget (Inhelder and Piaget 1955), 
who discussed the meta-concepts of schema, structure, strategy and operation to 
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describe cognitive processes. According to Piaget, growth of the intellect is achieved 
through increasingly logical, numerous and complex schemas. Such schemas play a 
central role in the construction of knowledge which in turn is essential to the 
learning process.  
“Learning is a process by which a representation of a certain 
knowledge representation is transformed into another 
representation of that knowledge. Learning is a process, whereas the 
representation of knowledge is both the starting point and result.” 
(Paquette 2010) 
The G-MOT (and therefore Conceprocity) representation system is based on the 
theory of schemas. We distinguish between two broad categories of schemas, these 
being declarative or conceptual; and procedural. The first category involves data 
while the second includes the procedures and methods used in processing data in 
order to organise information. We also follow Paquette in recognising a third 
category of conditional or strategic schemas which consist of principles having one 
or more conditions that describe context and conditional sequences. Those 
conditions can either be embedded in principles (in both G-MOT and Conceprocity) 
or they can be made explicit in the form of logical connectors attached to events 
(Conceprocity only). 
How and why Conceprocity differs from G-MOT 
So why not simply reuse the existing G-MOT formalism? Table 15 summarises a 
(gentle) critique of Mot+ and G-MOT and outlines how Conceprocity differs: 
Table 15 How Conceprocity differs from G-MOT 
G-MOT Conceprocity 
G-MOT is in part based on the object-
oriented (OO) approach extensively 
used in software engineering, but 
just as the OO approach is often 
vague about its philosophical and 
pragmatic antecedents, so 
(sometimes) is G-MOT 
UML itself is not always crystal-clear about its 
antecedents and the reasons for which various 
design choices have been made. Conceprocity is a 
little closer to UML than is LICEF – particularly in 
the ways in which concepts are related. However, 
this thesis attempts to make explicit the 
antecedents of Conceprocity. 
G-MOT is object-influenced, most 
obviously by class diagrams. But it 
separates procedures out from 
concepts, thus eschewing 
encapsulation  
Conceprocity follows G-MOT. Inheritance is 
explicitly supported between concepts by means 
of a specialisation- generalisation relationship. 
The effect of encapsulation can be achieved by 
deft use of hierarchy: what appears at one level to 
be an atomic concept is expanded at a lower level 
in the modelling hierarchy. In addition, 
Conceprocity 3.0 introduces the package 
(swimlane) notion, which permits the 
identification on a single diagram of an element 
with a closed boundary. 
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G-MOT Conceprocity 
The visual representation used is 
sometimes obscure, specifically in 
the areas of how the different types 
of relationship are displayed; they 
are signified by a character label 
rather than by a visual device 
Conceprocity prefers a UML-influenced style in 
which the type of arrow shows the kind of 
relationship. This is initially a little more difficult 
to teach and learn, but subsequently makes 
Conceprocity models easier to read and to 
understand. Because it is more difficult to apply 
initially, in the simple usage profile which is called 
CIAOPEA, these more complex relationships are 
not used. They are introduced in the full 
TROPICPEA usage profile. 
The visual representation used is 
sometimes unclear, particularly the 
visual distinction between classes 
and object-instances (although this 
is better in G-MOT than in the earlier 
Mot+) 
Conceprocity is clearer again in this respect. 
Instances have a darker colour and a pecked 
outline which clearly distinguishes them from 
classes. 
The expression is not very visual, 
depending too much on textual 
elements and not on images and 
icons: it does not engage the right 
brain 
Particularly in the simple usage profile, users are 
actively encouraged to make full use of icons, 
images and sketches. 
It does not permit the clear 
expression of algorithms, in 
particular conditionality (if… then… 
else… endif) and repetition (do 
while…; repeat until…) 
Whereas in G-MOT conditional statements are 
represented as principles, Conceprocity prefers to 
make this visually much clearer by using logical 
connectors and the separate event syntax (here 
following the event process chain paradigm 
suggested by (Scheer, Thomas, and Adam 2005)). 
The language does not encourage 
consideration of object state and/or 
events 
Conceprocity uses the event notion to make this 
much clearer. 
Cardinality and ordinality 
(multiplicity) is not made explicit in 
associations  
Conceprocity follows the conventions of UML 
class diagrams in this respect, making multiplicity 
much more evident – if the modeller chooses to 
make this clear. 
G-MOT is a standalone (“desktop”) 
application available only for 
Windows. It is therefore not SaaS, 
software as a service – which is 
needed to make web-based 
collaboration on concept maps 
possible and easy 
Conceprocity is implemented using the Lucidchart 
web-based diagramming system, which is SaaS. 
  177 / 343 
 
3.9 The semantics of Conceprocity 
What do we mean by a concept? 
This question is very much the province of philosophy. It is also one to which 
different answers will be given in accordance with the different streams of thought 
which I have previously identified. Within the realm of analytical philosophy, a 
prominent thinker is Christopher Peacocke: see in particular (Peacocke 1992) – 
whose audience is professional analytical philosophers – and the slightly more 
approachable (Peacocke 1996). The latter holds as axiomatic that a concept is 
individuated by its possession condition. In the simplest cases, a possession 
condition is stated by giving a truth-individuating statement of the form: 
F is the unique concept C to possess which a thinker must meet the condition A(C) 
where A( ) meets certain restrictions. Within A( ), the concept F must not be 
mentioned. The condition A( ) “will speak of certain canonical ways of coming to 
accept contents containing the given concept, and/or of certain canonical 
conclusions that can be drawn from contents containing that concept” (Peacocke 
1996). A combination of characteristics should be found to be primitively 
compelling, without reference to other concepts. Concepts are constituents of 
complete contents which are themselves evaluable as either true or false. A concept 
accesses a semantic value. This semantic value must be fixed such that the belief-
forming practices mentioned in the condition always yield true beliefs. There must 
also exist a theory of determination for the proposed possession condition. The 
theory implies the existence of an observer who is a creature capable of at least 
rudimentary conceptual thought. 
Such formality contrasts vividly with the informality associated with the concept of 
a concept in the Hispanophone and Francophone traditions previously identified. 
Why Conceprocity distinguishes concepts, procedures and principles 
In his book (Paquette 2010) the originator of the G-MOT approach Gilbert Paquette 
suggests as a reason for distinguishing the notions of concepts, procedures and 
principles the need to address the weaknesses of existing modelling approaches – 
such as flowcharts and decision trees. Paraphrasing Paquette, these weaknesses can 
be seen to include: 
1. Imprecise meaning of the links between the entities that compose the 
model. 
2. The ambiguities in graphs where objects, actions on objects and statements 
of properties that those objects possess are all mixed up and are not 
represented in a way that helps to differentiate them and uncover their 
relationships. Paquette suggests distinguishing classes of objects as 
concepts, actions on concepts as procedures and statements of properties 
as principles. 
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3. The difficulty of combining in one model objects which at a high summary 
level in the model need to be developed at a lower level with sub-models 
whose nature is not the same. Thus for example, a principle at a high level 
might need to be developed as a procedural or conceptual sub-model. 
4. Existing visual representation formalisms have emerged largely from the 
computer science and software engineering communities. Formalisms such 
as Entity Relationship models, structured systems analysis in the SSADM 
and MÉRISE traditions, conceptual graphs (John F. Sowa 2000b; J. F Sowa 
1984) following Charles Peirce, the object modelling technique and the 
successor Unified Modelling Language UML are all representation 
approaches which have been built primarily for the design of complex 
software systems. Even to read such diagrams and the links between them 
is hard, and to create such models requires considerable expertise and an 
abstraction and conceptualisation capability which may be lacking among 
the more general knowledge workers whom Paquette (and I) wish to 
address and empower. Paquette states: 
“Our goal is different. We need a visual representation system that is 
both simple enough to be used by educational specialists and 
learners who are not computer scientists, yet general and powerful 
enough to represent the structure of knowledge and learning / 
working scenarios. The distinction and the integration of basic types 
of knowledge and links in the same language are essential… We 
present three major steps starting with (1) informal visual modelling 
for the educated layperson, to help represent interesting knowledge. 
We then (2) move onto semi-formal modelling to help define target 
competencies and activity scenarios for knowledge and competency 
acquisition by learners and workers. Finally (3) we present the more 
formal visual models (Ontologies) that can be used by software 
agents to ensure execution of knowledge-based processes on the 
semantic web.” [(Paquette 2010) slightly amended for clarity.] 
Positioning Conceprocity 
▪ Immediate parent: G-MOT (Paquette 2010) 
▪ => typed concept mapping 
Conceptual modelling, as used in traditional IS Requirements Analysis: has 
employed dataflow diagrams, entity / relationship models, supplemented by rich 
pictures and concept maps. 
Conceprocity is particularly influenced by event process chains (Scheer, Thomas, 
and Adam 2005). 
We position Conceprocity as a knowledge organisation system - (Friedman and 
Thellefsen 2011), (Friedman and Smiraglia 2013). 
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We have sought to make the modelling language even more theory-based than its 
immediate predecessor G-MOT (whose roots lie in cognitive psychology , cognition 
and modelling of learning and instruction). 
We continue to respect realist ontologically-based “BWW” conceptual modelling: 
(Wand, Storey, and Weber 1999), (Wand and Weber 2002) 
▪ But whereas their primary focus is on information 
systems requirements analysis 
▪ Ours derived from the need to identify the (conceptual) 
work system which any personal information 
management system must support 
▪ Consequently, our ontology is broader, benefitting from 
critical realist insights 
Modelling nuggets in the Conceprocity approach 
A Conceprocity model of a "nugget" (a piece of knowledge, often actionable) may 
include: 
❑ A set of Conceprocity maps – these are visual representations of 
aspects of the model 
❑ A Conceprocity dictionary – this helps to clarify the semantics of the 
model by naming properties 
❑ A set of supporting “resources”, that is, files which, together with the 
maps and the dictionary, constitute this nugget 
o For example, for a taught class, these might include a PowerPoint 
presentation and supporting articles 
3.10 Conceprocity semiotics 
Conceprocity semiotic notions: main symbol types 
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Figure 36 Further basic Conceprocity notions 
More semiotics: representing relationships 
▪ Different kinds of arrow are used: 
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Figure 37 Relationship types 
Sources: (Paquette, 2010); (Booch, Rumbaugh and Jacobson, 2005); (Wand, Storey and 
Weber, 1999) 
More semiotics: example logical connectors 
 
Figure 38 Principal logical connectors 
 




Example KR: a Conceprocity map of the nugget “Planning and doing the 
shopping” 
 
Figure 39 A Conceprocity map of doing the shopping 
Dictionary for “Do the shopping” 
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Figure 40 Dictionary in Microsoft Access 
 
Figure 41 A Conceprocity dictionary stored in UnIQue 
 
No one model is in and of itself sufficient to describe the world. For this reason a 
Conceprocity knowledge map should always be accompanied by tabular dictionary 
entries. 
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3.11 The development of Conceprocity 
Types and examples of knowledge 
In a revised Bloom’s taxonomy, (Krathwohl 2002, p.214) distinguishes the following 
kinds of knowledge: 
 A. Factual Knowledge – The basic elements that students 
must know to be acquainted with a discipline or solve 
problems in it. 
 A1. Knowledge of terminology 
 A2. Knowledge of specific details and elements 
 B. Conceptual Knowledge – The interrelationships among 
the basic elements within a larger structure that enable 
them to function together. 
 B1. Knowledge of classifications and categories 
 B2. Knowledge of principles and generalizations 
 B3. Knowledge of theories, models, and structures 
 C. Procedural Knowledge – How to do something; 
methods of inquiry, and criteria for using skills, 
algorithms, techniques, and methods. 
 C1. Knowledge of subject-specific skills and 
algorithms 
 C2. Knowledge of subject-specific techniques and 
methods 
 C3. Knowledge of criteria for determining when to 
use appropriate procedures 
 D. Metacognitive Knowledge – Knowledge of cognition in 
general as well as awareness and knowledge of one’s own 
cognition. 
 D1. Strategic knowledge 
 D2. Knowledge about cognitive tasks, including 
appropriate contextual and conditional knowledge 
 D3. Self-knowledge 
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Types and examples of knowledge – G-MOT and Conceprocity 
• Factual knowledge (facts). Records of how to fill out a form. 
• Conceptual knowledge (concepts). A car, its sub-systems and 
components. 
• Procedural knowledge (procedure). Income tax calculation procedure. 
• Prescriptive knowledge (principle). How to design and implement a 
Conceprocity model of a nugget. 
Additional notions in Conceprocity and why they have been added 
Conceprocity goes even further than G-MOT in distinguishing between different 
notions. The following sections identify the additional notions (object types). 
Events 
The existence of events in Conceprocity is directly influenced by event process chain 
diagrams (Scheer, Thomas, and Adam 2005). The success of event process chain 
diagrams owes much to their simplicity and the self-imposed constraint of chaining 
event to function to event to function. We admire that, and note in passing that 
business students seem much more adept at creating event process chain diagrams 
that they are at other formalisms such as entity relationship diagrams. Thus, we 
have introduced events into Conceprocity. This permits us to restrict the use and 
meaning of arrows in Conceprocity to a single reading for each direction of the 
arrow, “gives rise to” (“prompts”) or “is the result of”. Temporal ordering is 
indicated by using either a procedure – whose inputs are indicated by an arrow in 
and whose output is indicated by an arrow out – or an event. 
Forms to model interactions 
This notion is introduced for the purpose of Information Systems modelling, 
specifically to extend use case diagrams in what we call usage diagrams. We have 
made this extension because use case or usage models are intended to model 
interactions between actors and processes; when a process is computerised, that 
interaction normally involves completing a form or using a view. An interaction is a 
representation of a form or view or report. 
Data 
Data and concepts are closely related but not exactly equivalent. For this reason, we 
represent data in much the same way as concepts making as a visual distinction the 
fact that they are dark blue in colour rather than light blue. In addition, we 
recommend that data notions be maintained in a separate data swimlane when 
Conceprocity is being used to model requirements for information systems. Data 
  186 / 343 
 
and form elements can be included in extended event process chain diagrams; these 
are called event process data diagrams. 
Logical operations 
An important usage of Conceprocity is in modelling algorithms and heuristics. In 
modelling algorithms, it is necessary to represent sequence, condition and iteration. 
We prefer to make condition explicit in the form of XOR, OR or AND, and NOT. (G-
MOT uses principles for this purpose.) Conceprocity does not introduce a specific 
visual representation for iteration. There are a number of iteration primitives, which 
include do while, repeat until, for and for each. Rather than seek to introduce visual 
symbols for all of these forms of iteration, we have decided to use logical operators 
either as means of splitting – that is, the logical operator has one input and two or 
more outputs; or as a means of joining – that is, the logical operator has multiple 
inputs and only one output. Iteration can then be represented using a backward 
precedence arrow (typically the arrow goes up the page) and a joining XOR logical 
operator. Because Conceprocity encourages the use of visual elements, there is 
nothing to prevent specific sub-communities from introducing their own 
conventions. 
Set operators 
We have introduced further logical connectors, in particular to represent set 
operations.  These are likely to have particular value in showing how concepts relate 
to one another, for showing for example UNIONs. 
Set operators are examples of additional relationship types – somewhat tongue in 
cheek, we call these special relationships – which have been introduced in 
Conceprocity version 3.0. consisting either of an isosceles triangle for directed 
relationships or a lozenge for undirected relationships. The Conceprocity modeller 
then writes whatever text she wants onto that symbol. She may also choose to 
include icons that add to the expressiveness of the notation – we suggest the use of 
Venn diagrams for this purpose. A fairly complete list of special relationships is 
provided in appendix 2 to this document. However, this list is not complete; users 
can add to it as they see fit – this provides an element of extensibility to the 
Conceprocity notation. 
Tables and lists as the result and the instigator of action 
Tables are also models. They may have a purely descriptive role; but they may also 
exist in order to inform or bring about action. 
The analytic philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe (Anscombe 1957) also used the 
example of a shopping list as a part of her work on intentionality. Consider: 
 
"Cognitive states describe the world and are causally derived from 
the facts or objects they depict. Conative states do not describe the 
world, but aim to bring something about in the world. Anscombe 
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used the example of a shopping list to illustrate the difference - see 
(Anscombe 1957, para. 32). The list can be a straightforward 
observational report of what is actually bought (thereby acting like a 
cognitive state), or it can function as a conative state such as a 
command or desire, dictating what the agent should buy. If the agent 
fails to buy what is listed, we do not say that the list is untrue or 
incorrect; we say that the mistake is in the action, not the belief. 
According to Anscombe, this difference in direction of fit is a major 
difference between speculative knowledge (theoretical, empirical 
knowledge) and practical knowledge (knowledge of actions and 
morals). Whereas 'speculative knowledge' is 'derived from the 
objects known', practical knowledge is – in a phrase Anscombe lifts 
from Aquinas – 'the cause of what it understands.’ " 
http://www.liquisearch.com/g_e_m_anscombe/work/intention  
Anscombe showed that the natural and widely accepted picture of what we mean by 
an intention gives rise to insoluble problems and must be abandoned. Nevertheless, 
the shopping still needs to get done and pragmatically we accept the value of making 
a shopping list. Anscombe’s  essay subsequently informed the discussion by John 
Searle of intentionality (Searle 1983). 
How philosophy is making a difference 
The application to conceptual modelling of the philosopher John Searle’s social 
ontology, as suggested by (March and Allen 2014), builds a complete new layer of 
institutional facts above what (March and Allen 2014) – following Anscombe and 
later Bunge - term the “brute facts” in Mario Bunge’s ontology. 
Bunge might counter that his philosophy is one of scientific realism and he 
specifically excludes concepts as facts. 
By contrast, Conceprocity accepts the reality or validity of concepts on the basis of 
critical (rather than scientific) realism. 
Conceprocity changes made because of philosophy 
We incorporate from (Searle 2006) via (March and Allen 2014): 
▪ collective intentionality as a subtype of principle 
▪ institution as a subtype of actor 
▪ constitutive rule as a subtype of principle 
▪ deontic power as a subtype of principle 
▪ action as sometimes a subtype and sometimes an 
instance of process 
We can also model affordances. 
Conceprocity recent developments - 2015 
Conceprocity is also enhanced in the following areas: 
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o Clear separation of attributes and properties 
▪ Attributes characterise conceptual objects (cf. classes), 
properties the corresponding instances 
▪ Either can be represented as a table within a diagram 
▪ They will more normally be represented in separate 
tables 
o Sub-typing of major notions 
▪ This permits a distinction of type between, for example, 
concrete (Bunge) and social (Searle) notions 
o Representation of nugget, system and subsystem boundaries by means of 
swimlanes or nested diagrams 
o Wider scope and significance of logical connectors and relationship types 
Trope-based conceptual modelling 
An alternative ontological basis for conceptual modelling is presented in the work of 
(Guarino and Guizzardi 2006), (Guizzardi and Halpin 2008), (Guizzardi and Wagner 
2008). 
Their approach is based on the notion of a trope, which is an instance of a property 
– e.g. the redness of the T-shirt which John is wearing (Guizzardi, Masolo, and Borgo 
2006). Tropes are particulars which can only exist in other individuals, i.e. they are 
existentially dependent on other individuals. 
Tropes are arguably more defensible in moving away from excessive essentialism. 
Areas in which Conceprocity departs from Bunge-Wand-Weber 
Bunge, and therefore BWW, insist that properties cannot have properties – but this 
is “manifestly” indefensible (we distinguish degrees of redness) and is frequently 
departed from in practice. 
(Guizzardi, Masolo, and Borgo 2006) suggest that this is a fundamental weakness of 
the BWW approach. 
However, I am rejecting their alternative trope-based ontological approach at the 
present time – so far as I am aware, no major conceptual modelling approach has yet 
adopted it in practice and its proponents appear as yet not to have to put forward a 
visual modelling language based upon it. 
My position is that pragmatically I allow properties to have properties in 
Conceprocity. The notion is useful in practice. 
Other uses of Conceprocity 
We have found that model-based reasoning (Nersessian 1999) has great practical 
value, particularly in teaching and learning. 
o There are various interpretations of this phrase, but I illustrate it by the 
observation that during the construction of a model from a starting list of 
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notions it frequently becomes evident that other notions and/or 
relationships are required. 
o For example, consideration of a logical operator such as an XOR may well 
point to the need for additional notions and relationships. 
o Where it’s impossible to identify a structural relationship, a procedure may 
abductively be identified as necessary to carry out a transformation. 
Conceprocity: all things to all people? 
Conceprocity is a visual modelling language. 
As a language, it is necessarily agnostic about the uses to which that language is put. 
In order to permit the expression of ideas, regardless of whether I would agree with 
those ideas, I have allowed notions about whose validity I am uncertain. 
In particular, I admit as useful the trope-derived notion of resemblance (via the 
keyword like) as one of the fundamental semantic relationships identified in Table 
31, which is based on (Miller 1995). 
Conceprocity positioned in accordance with other conceptual data 
structures 
Table 16 is an attempt at a synthetic view and positioning of Conceprocity within 
the spectrum of conceptual data structure CDS, here following (Völkel and Haller 
2009): 
 
Table 16 Conceptual data structures and their associated metadata Source: author 
Technique Metadata Expressiveness, precision and 
recall 
Spreadsheets Pragmatic – the meaning of the data is 
not explicit, but is partially expressed 
in the natural language semantics of 
column and/or row headings; and 
partially in relationships expressed as 
formulae between cells 
Potentially very expressive and 
frequently imprecise or even 
contradictory. Charting permits 
visually-arresting representations 
of some of the underlying data. 
Relational databases If the data is normalised (Codd 1971; 
Date 2003), then the column headings 
name sets of atomic (non-divisible) 
data items. This is deliberately 
constricting, because human-readable 
metadata, in the form of a natural 
Deliberately very restricted 
expressiveness. All data is 
constrained to appear as tables to 
permit generality and precision of 
subsequent querying. The results of 
queries are themselves virtual 
In any knowledge representation scheme, it will normally be necessary also to 
represent data.  
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language description (name) for each 
attribute, can be exploited by users as 
they enquire from the data, enabling 
precise answers to questions they 
have. 




The relative positioning of the items 
in a hierarchy groups and classifies 
data; and associates meaning with 
each group and sub-group. The 
addition of a grid, as in the products 
Ecco and InfoQube – see (Gregory 
2010) - permits further structuring 
and expressiveness. 
Hierarchies themselves are 
cognitively powerful or not 
depending on the prior training of 
the user. 
Mindmaps The relative positioning of the items 
in a diagram groups and classifies 
data; and associates meaning with 
each branch and sub-branch. An 
image is (potentially) associated with 
each branch or sub-branch 
Visually very powerful, the user 
perceives both structure and 
meaning. Querying is very 
imprecise or non-existent. 
Concept maps (Novak 
and Cañas 2008) 
The relative positioning of the items 
in a diagram groups and classifies 
data; and associates meaning with 
each branch and sub-branch. 
Visually very powerful, the user 
perceives both structure and 
meaning. Relationships are 
distinguished from concepts. 
Querying is very imprecise or non-
existent in current 
implementations. 
XML, RDF and OWL The meaning of an XML document is 
described in an associated Data Type 
Definition (DTD) or Schema. The RDF 
Schema carries this forward. 
XML-based approaches potentially 
combine the strengths of outlining 
and of relational database. Because 
XML is both a language and a meta-
language, it is possible to define 
specialised languages such as 
OPML.* 
Conceptual graphs or 
conceptual structures 
    
Conceprocity maps The relative positioning of the items 
in a diagram groups and classifies 
data; and associates meaning with 
each branch and sub-branch. An 
image is (potentially) associated with 
each branch or sub-branch. Each 
object has a type, as does each 
relationship (link). Appropriate use of 
hierarchy enables encapsulation.  
Visually very powerful, the user 
perceives both structure and 
meaning. Querying is currently 
non-existent but because objects 
are semantically classified it would 
be relatively straightforward to 
construct a dictionary for each 
Conceprocity map and a lexicon 
(index) across multiple maps.  
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The latter in a cloud context might 
permit the emergence of shared 
ontologies, especially if the maps 
are constrained to conform to RDF 
and OWL standards. The latter is 
not yet proposed for Conceprocity 
but has been achieved with 
extensions to the similar G-MOT 
approach. See (Paquette 2010) 
First order logic and 
Horn clauses 
  Expressiveness and precision very 
high; readability and visual appeal 
very limited (although these can be 
enhanced by the use of libraries 
which create visualisations from 
Prolog statements). Querying is 
very general and strong logical 
inferencing capabilities are offered. 
Inaccessible to end users without 
the creation of intermediate 
interpreters. 
 
3.12 Explicit design and serendipitous bricolage 
My research largely takes the form of design science research and action research 
(design school) or observation (behaviour school) – see (Hevner et al. 2004). The 
work of (Hevner and Chatterjee 2010b) and (Hevner and Chatterjee 2010c) on 
design science in IS research, and of (Wand and Weber 2002) on conceptual 
modelling and information systems have informed both this paper and the design of 
Conceprocity. To the extent that one potential use of Conceprocity is to 
conceptualise and therefore support the design of target personal information 
management systems, the design perspective identified by Hevner and his 
colleagues is perhaps sometimes appropriate. However, since we suspect that most 
personal information management systems are the result of serendipitous bricolage 
(Ciborra and Jelassi 1994) rather than the product of deliberate design, it is the 
more behavioural perspective identified by Hevner which is also significant in the 
study of actual personal information management systems. 
3.13 Affordances: bottom-up enablement 
Affordances: embedding routines in technology 
(Volkoff, Strong, and Elmes 2007), arguing from a critical realist perspective, show 
how routines and roles acquire a material aspect when they are technologically 
embedded 
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I started from tools and have never been able to escape them! 
It is the individual who must seize opportunity as she builds bridges between her 
information needs and the specific affordances offered by technology and tools 
Affordances arising from the use of InfoQube, an outliner and functional 
spreadsheet 
InfoQube was described in its then state of development in the paper (Gregory 
2010). In the seven years since that paper was written, the program described has 
continued to develop (although it has still yet to achieve a formal release and 
remains in beta test at the time of writing of this thesis).  See (InfoQube 2019). 
An example of community knowledge transfer: InfoQube 
An aspect of our research into the adoption of PIM tools can be summarised as: 
“Some will prefer highly expressive, but more difficult to query and to manage, 
general solutions… Many, perhaps most, will not be able to realise those benefits 
without knowledgeable ’hand-holding’”. The author has himself made extensive use 
over several years of a product in development called InfoQube (InfoQube 2019)., 
and observed its development and the role played by its community of users in that 
development. 
 Background: Outlining and Outliners 
Outlining is a long-established approach to structuring and writing text (Price 
1999). 
An outline is a hierarchical way to display related items of text so as to depict their 
relationships graphically. The position on the page of one item of text vis-a-vis 
another piece of text indicates their respective significance in a hierarchical 
relationship. Frequently this is further highlighted by the use of special symbols, 
type style or colour. Outlining is a technique which may be implemented in general 
office programs or in specific computer programs known as “outliners”. An outliner 
is a special text editor that allows text to be structured as an outline. Outliners are 
typically used for collecting or organizing ideas or as part of the process of designing 
a computer program. Outlining is the technique widely used in programs such as 
Microsoft Office PowerPoint, in which the main headings of a presentation appear as 
separate slides and on each slide appear points and sub-points; and in Microsoft 
Word’s Outline view.  
In outlining, an aspect of the meaning of a data item is is given by being shown in its 
owning hierarchy. Thus, a person’s surname may be shown as a component of a 
composite Contact object.  
Realised in Word and formatted in a particular way, an outline has an appearance 
similar to: 
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Figure 42 Outline formatted as a hierarchy of points, sub-points, sub-sub-points. 
Here, the owner in the hierarchy as shown is 11. Semantic Web. It is the eleventh 
point in a document – it is implicitly owned by the document of which it forms a 
part. 
It owns items 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, … 
11.3 owns 11.3.1, 11.3.2, … 
The owning item for 11.2, 11.3 … is 11. 
The relative positioning of an item conveys meaning in that the label of the owner 
classifies or otherwise gives contextual information concerning the owned item. 
Outliner programs go further; thus (Ecco 1997) permits the definition of forms to 
impose some order on the anarchy of poorly-related items that can otherwise result. 
Further, a data item can participate in more than one hierarchy; an appointment can 
appear in an overall agenda or calendar, but also be linked to the name of each 
participant in the meeting. Effectively, the same datum is classified in more than one 
way.  
 InfoQube 
InfoQube (InfoQube 2019), a Microsoft Windows application developed by NeoTech 
Systems, is a one-pane outliner (in that hierarchy and rich text can be displayed in 
the outline itself). It is also technically a two-pane outliner, in that any item in an 
outline can also be associated with an arbitrary amount of fully-formatted HTML 
which is displayed in a separate pane. Standard features include task and project 
management, a calendar which can display any item having a date attribute, basic 
concept mapping and crucially a grid of values associated with any given item in a 
list of such items which is governed by the Grid filter. The definition of the grid, and 
therefore the associated semantics, are entirely under user control. Grids display 
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item values as a row; forms display them as a column. Technically, a grid is a view of 
data values which are stored in underlying system-maintained relational tables 
accessed by behind-the-scenes nested SQL queries. Thus, any field definition (and 
associated values) can occur multiply and simultaneously in any of an arbitrary 
number of grids. A grid can also be linked to dynamically from Word or Excel.  
IQ implements row-level and column-level equations. The syntax for these is based 
on Visual Basic (the default scripting engine is VBScript). Further, the program 
provides a repertoire of system-defined functions. Users with programming skills 
can program their own functions with the built-in VBScript editor. Thus IQ, by 
offering both row and column equations, can also be seen as a functional 
spreadsheet in the sense identified above. Information presentation facilities 
include sorting, multi-criteria filtering, summary tables, charts, Gantt charts, pivot 
tables and conditional formatting. Web clippings and emails can be incorporated 
within the HTML pane. Windows file hierarchies can be linked to dynamically. 
IQ was originally developed to meet a specific company’s needs. It takes its 
inspiration from (Ecco 1997), whose development ceased in 1997 but which retains 
many enthusiastic users. Technically, IQ is built using Visual Basic on a packaged 
Microsoft Office Access database.  
IQ has yet (December 2016) to achieve a formal release. Instead, a growing 
community of largely enthusiastic users acts as a bank of beta testers. Minor 
releases occur about fortnightly. The incidence of minor bugs is low and major bugs 
(ones causing data loss) are almost unheard of. As an Access database application, 
IQ is inherently multi-user and supports some concurrency.  
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Figure 43 InfoQube screen shot 
The software can quickly be modified by its developer as users make suggestions; 
provided that those requests fall within the "global" architectural vision of its 
developer (this approach retains architectural coherence and protection of data 
investment). Both developers and users benefit from this close collaboration. 
The user interface is very flexible and supports scripting. This allows its use as a 
framework for custom software solutions (similar to Microsoft Access).  
The underlying database engine is inherently multi-user and supports replication, 
so the collaboration applies not only to the development of the product but also to 
the actual finished product use in supporting both connected (i.e. LAN-based) and 
disconnected (i.e. Web) topologies. 
InfoQube permits its users to clip content from browsers and from email clients. 
Thus, an item is stored which retains a hyperlink to its original source; furthermore 
the content of the original webpage or email can be stored in the HTML pane 
referred to above. This content can help the human user to preserve context and 
thus retain more meaning. 
(a) Exchange between developer and IQ users, 
and between IQ users 
An infrastructure was put in place to connect the users with the developers. 
NeoTech Systems maintains a forum using the Drupal content management system 
(Drupal 2010). A small but very active community of users is associated with the 
site. New users are helped to get started by others with longer experience. NeoTech 
is very responsive to user suggestions for new functionality provided they are 
architecturally coherent. Being in beta, the community can and does have a large 
impact on the development. 
Thus, we have identified at least one PIM (InfoQube) which offers a semi-relational 
database style, outlining, inter-item linking, unification of the system file store and 
the meta-data it contains about those file and web links, functional-spreadsheet-like 
capability, classification and wiki-style tagging, and pivot tables which can be 
dynamically linked to actual spreadsheets. We have indicated the need for peer-to-
peer mutual assistance when seeking to maximise the benefits offered by such 
functionality. Thus, this PIM can be said to meet the preference suggested above for 
highly expressive, but more difficult to query and to manage, general solutions. 
Forum users (and importantly, former forum users) report a steep learning curve. It 
took me several years to reach the point where I could use InfoQube as a system 
building tool to build an adapted personal information management system. This 
development, called UnIQue, is a significant part of the research which will be 
reported in the rest of this thesis. 
InfoQube is a very powerful program but one which is therefore also rather difficult 
to learn initially. A recent review 
(http://www.pcworld.com/article/2369056/infoqube-review-intricate-
information-manager-has-a-steep-learning-curve.html) suggested that its features 
are intertwined with interface paradigms and assumed usage patterns that are not 
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mainstream. The same review noted that “The primary interface for InfoQube is the 
Grid, which contains items (rows) with fields (columns). You can have many grids 
open concurrently, each containing different items and columns. Using only a single 
grid and the default column of “Item,” InfoQube works well as a two-pane outliner 
with several advanced features, such as multiple parents. A single item can be placed 
into many positions in the hierarchy by using the Ctrl key to drag it around. Items 
can have multiple fields, including calculated fields. Each item is also associated with 
an HTML object, which is edited in a WYSIWYG style, and includes a good range of 
formatting options. Pivot tables (a component must be downloaded from Microsoft 
to enable them; this is free), summary fields, date and time functions, advanced 
filtering, and sorting options. One of the more complex concepts that must be 
learned to take advantage of InfoQube is that data items do not “belong” to grids. 
Grids display items, and, by default, every item created in a given Grid has a custom 
fields whose name matches that of the Grid. If you create a Grid called “Contacts,” 
each item created in that Grid has a field called “Contacts.” This makes a Grid 
something like a table in a traditional database—but not completely. Any given item 
can have any arbitrary set of fields, and what’s displayed in a Grid is determined by 
the “Source” setting for the grid, along with the filter options chosen. This flexibility 
offers a lot of power, but it also requires a real understanding of how things work, or 
what you see in a Grid might not be what you expect.” 
3.14 Framework: summary 
o Philosophy 
o Critical realist objective ontology 
o Systems approach 
o Good regulator theorem 
o The visual modelling approach: Conceprocity 
o Model as regulator 
o Affordances 
Framework: concluding remarks 
I started the literature review by declaring that my motivations lie in a desire to be 
involved in relevant, engaged and even passionate research and related teaching. 
We observe that some of the most influential research and teaching, as too the most 
entrepreneurial business propositions, are undertaken by iconoclasts whose 
methods are sometimes unsafe. So also as researchers, rather than always 
pretending to a positivist or ethnographic objectivity that somehow escapes us, we 
may believe in and value personal and shared action as the cockpit in which 
knowledge is enacted, tested, refined and in which it evolves. Following the 
pragmatist and educational pioneer (Dewey 1960) we want knowledge that builds 
on what we already know and that we can believe and act upon. Scientific enquiry 
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sometimes builds exhaustively on existing research, identifies a knowledge gap and 
seeks to fill it. But we have argued and illustrated here that the emergence of 
research questions may also be based on reflective self-observation, perhaps 
structured by means of personal knowledge management tools, often between and 
after cycles of action research.  So enquiry may initially be informed by structured 
self-observation and then proceed by further learning, informed by theory and 
enacted and internalised by means of practice and further reflection. 
As the only route to truth such an approach is woefully inadequate. Other logics of 
enquiry and research designs will be needed in future work, work outside the scope 
of this PhD. But as a starting point, it has merits, as I hope to demonstrate in the 
remainder of this study.  
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 METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology is introduced and described. 
4.1 Principal research question and design 
In summary, the way in which I have addressed the research question and design is 
as follows: 
 What is the contribution of personal information 
management systems PIMS to the Working Model and 
personal work system of knowledge workers? 
 Necessary precursor: appropriate modelling (analysis) and 
design (synthesis) approaches  
 Initial exploration (1): homomorphic conceptual models – 
created using Conceprocity 
 Going on to “design” and “test” a regulator which is 
nearer to an isomorphic model of the system under control 
– the working life of the individual 
 Initial exploration (2): A proof-of-concept PIMS 
 Which includes a personal taxonomy and a tagged 
classification scheme 
4.2 Conjectured Learning Informed Action 
Summarising the earlier discussion, I conjectured the following basis for learning 
informed action: 
 For each knowledge worker (Drucker 1999):  
We posit the existence of (1) a Personal Work System 
PWS. This PWS is individual to each person’s (2) 
Working Model. That PWS is supported by (iii) a Personal 
Information Management System PIMS:  
(Gregory and Descubes 2011d, 2011b). This PIMS is 
broadly the same as the Individual Information Systems 
IIS supporting personal and work-related Work Systems 
suggested by (Baskerville 2011b) following (Alter 1999), 
(Alter 2010). 
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 These together permit Learning Informed Action. 
4.3 Unit of analysis and level of analysis 
I understand level of analysis to be: 
“The level of analysis refers to the level at which that phenomenon 
occurs i.e. does the phenomenon concern individuals, groups, 
departments, the organization as a whole, the institutional field, 
networks, sections of society etc. Deciding level of analysis 
determines the kind of theoretical resources and previously 
published empirical research which can be used to explain the 
phenomena under investigation.  Level of analysis therefore delimits 
the type of explanation that can be applied to the data which have 
been collected. One would not, for example, use theories of social 
structure to explain a study of individual psychological traits. The 
theories apply at a different level of analysis.”(Source: comments on 
my original probation report – advice by my Open University OU 
assessor.) 
Concerning level of enquiry: (Markus and Robey 1988) made a very strong plea for 
the theoretical basis of each piece of information systems research to be made more 
explicit. In discussing what constitutes "good theory", Markus and Robey used three 
dimensions of the structure of theory: causal agency, logical structure, and level of 
analysis. For them, level of analysis refers to the entities about which the theory 
poses concepts and relationships - individuals, groups, organizations, and society.  
(Markus and Robey 1988) discuss the problems of inference and ideological biases.  
Concerning inference, they argue that it is dangerous to generalise about 
organisational motives on the basis of observations of individuals within those 
organisations. The levels of analysis have become confused. Therefore although this 
present study focuses on individual information systems, these of course interact 
with organisationally-provided IS, which are however not studied here. 
Markus and Robey broadly divide ideological biases into macro-level and micro-
level. They suggest that this distinction is largely associated with the discipline of 
the researchers concerned. Thus, we might say that anthropologists will differ in 
their observations and conclusions concerning the same evidence from say 
sociologists. 
They state (the emphases are mine): 
"In contrast to our caution against mixing process and variance 
theory, we believe that mixing levels of analysis may be useful in 
research and theory on information technology and organizational 
change. In defense of mixed-level theory (Rousseau 1985) asserts 
that technologies such as office automation are neither strictly micro 
nor macro in character. She believes that mixed-level research 
should abound in an inter-disciplinary field where mixed-level 
phenomena are the inevitable subject of study (1985; pp. 2-3). That 
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it does not is a disturbing commentary on the power of discipline-
based research groups." 
Knowledge workers are continually frustrated by the need to keep and to integrate 
three levels of information: the corporate, the group and the individual. I feel that I 
cannot make a presupposition about the "right" level of analysis prior to my 
empirical research; it is essentially individual-within-small-group. I have chosen 
that level because that is the one which is too infrequently studied – the vast 
majority of IS literature concerning itself, explicitly or implicitly, with the corporate 
or departmental work system (Alter 2006) levels of analysis. The very notion that 
work systems might also be individual was first recognised in the IS literature by 
(Baskerville 2011b). 
4.4 Logics of enquiry 
A question which I admit as being of the utmost importance is that of 
distinguishing between logics of enquiry. If we accept the simple distinctions with 
which Wendy Stainton-Rogers (Stainton-Rogers 2006) frames her discussion of 
logics of enquiry, we can distinguish at least induction, deduction and abduction. She 
makes a strong case for considering abduction. My initial approach is abductive and 
it is pragmatic: I follow Charles Sanders Peirce as interpreted by (Yu 1994). I 
summarise this as: 
“ 
The logics of abduction and deduction contribute to our conceptual 
understanding of a phenomenon, while the logic of induction adds 
quantitative details to our conceptual knowledge. 
Neither induction nor deduction can help us to unveil the internal 
structure of meaning. As exploratory data analysis performs the 
function as a model builder for confirmatory data analysis, abduction 
plays a role of explorer of viable paths to further inquiry.  
Hypotheses (or at least, initial questions) should be generated by 
means of critical thinking applied to pattern recognition. The 
objective of abduction is to determine which hypothesis or 
proposition to test, not which one to adopt or assert. 
Classification plays a major role in making hypotheses; that is the 
characters of phenomenon are placed into certain categories. 
Researchers must be well-equipped with proper categories in order 
to sort out the invariant features and patterns of phenomena. 
” 
Stainton-Rogers links abduction to constructivism. When Peirce first discussed 
abduction, constructivism had not been explicitly identified. Abduction is 
pragmatically useful whether or not one accepts a wholeheartedly constructivist 
stance (which I do not). Peirce defined abduction as “the process of forming an 
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explanatory hypothesis” (Peirce, n.d.), p.55. Stainton-Rogers describes how Peirce 
formally defines abduction through syllogism: 
Result -- the surprising fact, C, is observed. 
Rule -- but if A were true, C would be a matter of course (i.e. not in 
the least surprising). 
Case -- hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. 
One among perhaps many ways of investigating personal (that is, individual) 
information management is by up-close observation and participation in the 
personal information management experiences of a sample, however statistically 
unrepresentative, of individuals who have information to manage. Different 
individuals will reach different “solutions” or working compromises. Some will build 
more effective personal information management systems than others. Note my use 
of the term personal information management systems, which to the best of my 
knowledge has only ever been used previously by the library scientist Deborah 
Barreau – see for example (Barreau and Nardi 1995); and by PIM researcher Ofer 
Bergman (e.g. (Bergman et al. 2008), more recently in collaboration with Steve 
Whittaker, notably in (Whittaker and Bergman 2016).11 Yet whenever a computer 
user sets out to manage some information by making a list and structuring it, she in 
her use of that list to drive her subsequent actions has constituted a personal 
information management system (whose primary components are the 
computerised list, the technology she employs to maintain it and she herself as an 
active agent or actor). The apparently-trivial example I employed above is that of 
making and using a shopping list. Viewing that use of technology as an information 
system highlights a crucial distinction, that between information technology and 
information systems. This distinction is fundamental to the existence and self-
awareness of the information systems discipline or field with which I identify 
myself. See for example (Paul 2010). 
4.5 Research gap: Individual information systems as a 
research arena 
It is a surprising fact that (almost) no research I have been able to find treats 
personal information-management systems. 
It is also a surprising fact that almost no academic has discussed how people build 
personal information management systems, nor how they can be helped to do it 
better – which will always involve learning and might involve teaching and / or 
mentoring. 
My contention is that a personal information management system exists when 
someone uses IT in a more or less systematic way to store and manage data which 
11 Bergman and Whittaker’s work uses the word system, but largely as a term for a 
collection of inter-dependent components. Much of the value of their work lies in the 
notion of ‘user subjectivity’, which is discussed elsewhere in this document; see section 0 
(f). 
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they then use as they act purposefully, based on the information they obtain from 
that data as interpreted by their knowledge, explicit and tacit. 
I sought to enquire into how people learn to build individual information systems 
and how they can be helped to design a better system by means of observing them 
and by actively helping them. I initially thought that this could be done using 
ethnography or that it could be done using action research. To anticipate, the 
approach which I identified and its subsequent evolution is as follows: 
To observe myself as I manage the information I do – this is a research approach 
which is sometimes called autoethnography and which others have identified as 
systematic self-observation. This approach is clearly subjective and limited, and thus 
incapable in itself of leading to generalisable conclusions. It is not, however, devoid 
of insight. The inspiration for this autoethnographic approach arose in discussions 
with my external supervisor, David Weir late in 2007 and in the early part of 2008. 
It was then my intention, by reference to the considerable literatures on information 
systems, information technology, computer science, learning, cognitive science and 
the like, to construct learning materials which have the potential to assist people as 
they learn to create and (more usually) to improve their personal information 
management systems. I would then use those learning materials firstly myself, then 
as an element in active intervention with research volunteers – people who are 
willing to allow me to mentor them. This is an approach which I identified as 
mentored action research. I wrote the conference paper (Gregory, Kehal, and 
Descubes 2012b) in conjunction with my then internal supervisor Mounir Kehal and 
my colleague Irena Descubes in order to set out this research approach in advance 
of its application. 
In order that I could build up sufficient experience and knowledge I knew that I had 
firstly to do two things.  
One was to read extensively as I sought to understand the role of the learning 
knowledge worker as she participates in an open and continuous evolution as part 
of a self-organising individual work system. The italicised phrase was suggested 
to me by my internal supervisor, Renaud Macgilchrist. I have had to learn for myself 
what it is to be part of such an individual work system.  
The second was to experience for myself the process of evolving a personal 
information management system – the data-oriented subsystem – to that 
individual work system. The construction and evolution of the individual work 
system, the personal work system PWS and of the personal information 
management system PIMS have been achieved by means both of what Claudio 
Ciborra identified as serendipitous bricolage (Ciborra and Jelassi 1994) and what 
Richard Baskerville calls experiential design (Baskerville 2013). I have had to learn 
before I can mentor.  
This thesis summarises what I have learnt so far. I do not claim that the knowledge 
gained is scientific in the sense of being fully generalisable. I shall set out reasons 
why any such knowledge claims will always be only partial. However, the learning I 
have gained is useful and aspects of it are worthy of dissemination. In this thesis, I 
go on to justify that assertion. 
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4.6 Overall research objectives – pre- and post-PhD 
Objective 1 - To begin to uncover my working model and to (re-) design my own PWS and 
PIMS 
Objective 2 - To discover by mixed research methods: 
▪ How each individual’s Personal (Baskerville 2011b) Work 
System (Alter 1999), (Alter 2010) PWS can better be 
supported by her Personal Information Management 
System PIMS  
▪ Learn how to help people to improve their PIMS and 
PWS via explicit modelling and implicit learning (by both 
research volunteers and a researcher-mentor) 
▪ Specifically, to understand how to “surface” the Working 
Model that underlies the PIMS and PWS 
4.7 The role of Conceprocity in my PhD research 
Conceprocity is a semi-formal visual knowledge representation language which 
enables and encourages the modeller to be more precise in defining, bounding and 
relating conceptual and procedural knowledge. 
It is in effect a means to constrain and enhance natural language expression and 
thereby to increase the precision of the meaning which the modeller seeks to 
express. 
To the extent to which two modellers can agree upon a Conceprocity model, it is 
also a means to establish and to verify communication of ideas and concepts. 
My use of concept maps was originally motivated by the following felt needs: 
▪ Structuring my understanding of the published work of others. For 
examples, see (elsewhere) my concept maps concerning the work of 
(Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005) on sensemaking and of (Polya [1945] 
1988) as introduced in the discussion of Polya’s heuristics by (Macgilchrist 
2004). 
▪ Planning my PhD research, which has conceptual and process elements. 
The main initial Conceprocity test use case is in fact work system modelling, 
particularly personal work system modelling. I first make this explicit three years 
ago in a PhD journal entry in which I stated that  
1. “My thesis, based upon abductive insight and well-established cybernetic 
theory, is that the effectiveness of the individual knowledge worker 
depends to a significant degree upon the following factors: 
2. Each of us has a more or less explicit personal working model which 
encapsulates our understanding of how we should organise our personal 
work. In most cases, that model is inexplicit. I would expect the extent to 
which our personal working model is an effective regulator of our personal 
work system to be determined (inter alia) by the faithfulness, the degree of 
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isomorphism, of that working model with the "reality" with which we have 
to deal. For I think the first time, there will be some empirical evidence 
available concerning that conjecture. The risks are that the "inter alia" - 
unidentified - will interfere with the expected result; or indeed that 
evidence will contradict the theoretically-based prediction, putting the 
theory in question. 
3. My conjecture is that the effectiveness of personal work can be increased 
by individuals who more explicitly model - and thus understand - their 
personal work system before seeking to design improvements to aspects of 
that system; and that in many cases, individuals will benefit from 
mentoring as they audit, model and redesign their work system. 
4. I have deemed it necessary to create an improved conceptual modelling 
approach. Called Conceprocity, concept process reciprocity, the approach 
is a lineal descendant of the existing G-MOT formalism invented by the 
LICEF research centre in Canada.” 
4.8 Research motivation, initial and ongoing 
I desire to be engaged in relevant and passionate research and related teaching or 
consultancy. 
I desire to influence teaching and practice. 




• Academic journal articles 
• Educating the educators: working with teacher - researchers 
• Executive education 
4.9 The research epistemology 
This thesis presents exploratory research which seeks where possible to identify 
what critical realism calls generative mechanisms – thus yielding some degree of 
explanation. 
The research approach is essentially multi-method, including autoethnography, 
action design research, content analysis by means of textual analysis, model-based 
reasoning. 
This enquiry is informed by the sequence identified by (Psillos 2009) following C.S. 
Peirce, but does not directly follow it. 
▪ Abduction – to establish plausible hypotheses. 
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▪ Induction: design, bricolage (Ciborra 1992; Ciborra and Jelassi 
1994) and model-informed observation – to investigate those 
hypotheses 
▪ Deduction? First we explore, then later zero-in on more precise 
questions – perhaps hypothetico-deductive? Such later enquiry is 
post-PhD. 
The method of enquiry put forward by Charles Sanders Peirce is discussed by 
(Psillos 2009) who delineates two distinct phases in the development of the 
reasoning process of Peirce, only the latter of which I discuss here. Retroduction, 
which is the word Peirce uses for explanatory reasoning, particularly on the basis of 
post-action reflection, is taken as part of a broader three-stage methodological 
pattern identified as the method of enquiry. Explanatory reasoning continues to be 
the sole generator of new content. However, its conclusions require further 
justification which is achieved by means of deduction and induction. That 
justification will take the form either of deduction of predictions or of confirmation, 
the word Peirce uses for completed induction. Gradually, beliefs become doubt-
resistant. This First Stage of Inquiry reasons from consequent to antecedent 
(Peirce’s collected works 6.469).  
In the second stage of enquiry, the new hypotheses must be tested by submitting 
various conditional experiential consequences to testing - deduction and testing.  
In the third stage, judgements are made as to whether the hypothesis is sensibly 
correct or may require some minor modification or may need entirely to be rejected. 
The characteristic form of reasoning used in this phase is induction. 
“Induction is no less indispensable than abduction in the overall 
process of inquiry— but its role is clearly different from the role of 
abduction. Peirce put this point in a picturesque way when he said 
that our knowledge of nature consists in building a “cantilever 
bridge of inductions” over the “chasm that yawns between the 
ultimate goal of science and such ideas of Man’s environment”, but 
that “every plank of [this bridge] is first laid by Retroduction alone” 
(6.475). 
” Peirce quoted by (Psillos 2009, p.34) 
4.10 Methodology and techniques 
Methodology and techniques considered but not used 
o Quantitative and mixed methods 
▪ Mixed methods research mainly refers to quantitative and 
qualitative research in differing mixes. 
Methodology and techniques used 
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o Autoethnography (structured self-observation (Rodriguez and 
Ryave 2002)): telling my own action-story as I seek to 
understand and to prototype better techniques 
▪ Means: confessional PhD journal – cf. (Schultze 2000) 
▪ Outcome: textual and category analysis of PhD journal 
(2011 to 2016; 390000 words) 
 
o Design science research 
▪ A perspective of this current thesis is that design is 
necessarily abductively inspired, undertaken within the 
presence of constraints, respectful of the principle of 
separation of concerns and thereafter pragmatic. 
o Action design research (Sein et al. 2011) 
▪ Outcome: proof of concept PIMS 
▪ Based in part on serendipitous bricolage (Ciborra and 
Velasi 1994) and in part on action design 
▪ Outcome: Conceprocity models of knowledge fragments 
▪ Outcome: Conceprocity itself 
o The beginnings of mentored action research (Gregory, 
Kehal, and Descubes 2012b) 
▪ Now beginning: Working with some research participants 
leading to co-designed Conceprocity maps and targeted 
PIMS improvement 
▪ Outcome: a small number of cases, illustrated by 
narrative and conceptual models 
o Post-PhD: fuller mentored action research – in particular, 
educating the educators; working with teachers and researchers 
and, if possible, with doctoral students 
  207 / 343 
 
 FINDINGS 
The PWS is described, as is the PIMS. The practical uses made of UnIQue, 
Conceprocity and Zotero linked to UnIQue are illustrated. 




Figure 44 Multiple perspectives: a different viewpoint on PIMS and PWS 
This diagram concentrates on the different relationships which exist between the PIMS 
and PWS. The directional relationship triangle indicates that the PIMS is a subset of the 
PWS. The procedures incorporates and enables indicate specific transformations 
that take place as data flows between the two elements. Finally, the structural relationship 
indicates that there is exactly one PIMS for exactly one PWS. 
At this level of abstraction, the PIMS is regarded as being a collection of ICT artefacts, 
whose existence is not dependent upon the existence of a PIMS. Conversely, a PIMS cannot 
exist unless there is at least one ICT (or paper!) artefact. 
5.2 The Personal Work System PWS of a knowledge worker 
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Figure 45 The PWS - larger scale 
5.3 Some details concerning my personal work system PWS 
Procedures: example use cases / processes in my own personal work system 
include: 
Procedure 
Day-to-day time management 
Identification & planning of projects (e.g. PhD) 
Managing programmes 
Delivering teaching modules 
Managing research 
Stay informed: read academic and practitioner literature, maintain article library, 
classify and tag – the PWS must be open and evolve 
Maintain and improve personal taxonomy – this also provides evidence of 
semantic morphogenesis 
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Create and maintain nuggets 
Career management 
Household management and family matters 
Involvement in voluntary organisations 
General form: nuggets of actionable knowledge, each represented by a 
Conceprocity model and by other resources such as a dictionary and a 
hierarchical outline 
 




Figure 46 A specific example of a PIMS 
Undertaking a large task, a project, such as a Ph.D. has a goal and a structure or 
architecture with components. Thus, creating what we once referred to as “working 
documents” and now name nuggets is a major component of the task which a 
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researcher undertakes. In a sense she is seeking to surface her knowledge bank – to 
make her knowledge explicit, in the language of (Nonaka 1991). 
5.5 Bricolage in PIMS 
A « power user » of PIM is characterised by the competence to make the broadest or 
most general use of computer programs or systems. In this, she both identifies and 
makes use of affordances, and she ssembles an evolving collection of computer tools 
which together facilitate her work. 
The term “power user”, used on forums, does not appear in the academic literature, 
but the term bricoleur does, notably in the witings of Levi-Strauss and of Ciborra. 
The software and hardware elements of the UnIQue PIMS can be viewed both as the 
result of bricolage but also as the result of experiential design. In particular, I was 
attracted to InfoQube for a number of reasons among which were its relatively open 
architecture – thus, for example, the ability to integrate data from an external 
database using SQL and to enhance its functionality using a scripting language 
(VBScript). 
5.6 UnIQue architecture 
 
Figure 47 UnIQue architecture 
[This diagram is not in fact a Conceprocity map – there is no support for software 
architecture diagrams in Conceprocity.] 
1. The UnIQue PIMS is based on affordances offered by the InfoQube software 
package. It is shown as a rectangle linked to a database which is internal to 
InfoQube (but is in fact a Microsoft Access database internal to and managed by 
InfoQube). 
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2. Among the data stored in UnIQue are dynamic links to files, labelled here as 
nuggets/resources. The effect of this is that it is possible to manage – to link, 
classify, categorise… external files which implement nuggets.  
3. Shown as entirely separate is the Conceprocity concept mapping which is 
managed by Lucidchart. 
4. I maintain bibliographic references using a software service called Zotero. 
5. The element marked SQLite DB internal is the internal database which stores 
bibliographic items within a Zotero reference management system. Within 
UnIQue, I have established links to this Zotero database such that the bibliographic 
references – stored by Zotero – are visible to and can be managed in UnIQue. 
6. Currently shown as separate, but in fact potentially also linked into UnIQue 
(“planned”), is an example situational application: the Acquis academic quality 
information system which I have designed and built using Microsoft Access. 
5.7 Components of my proof-of-concept personal information 
management system – 1 
InfoQube: data in grids (tables; Gantt view, etc.) - Used very extensively in the PhD 
research, e.g. for: 
Lists of nuggets and resources 
Classification (Jacob 2004); this is what (Bunge 1977) calls kind 
Categorisation (tagging) 
Day-to-day and PhD planning 
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Figure 48 The nugget grid in UnIQue 
It should be noted that nuggets can be arranged hierarchically, that is to say a 
nugget can form part of another nugget – a child nugget being nested within a 
parent nugget. Furthermore, a given nugget may have multiple parents – that is to 
say, it may be used and reused in multiple contexts. 
5.8 Class, kind and tag in UnIQue 
Classification and categorisation have latterly been applied both to my journal and 
to my bibliography. The bibliography grid in UnIQue is maintained by means of an 
SQL query on the SQLite database which is internal to the Zotero reference 
management system – thus UnIQue and Zotero are integrated. The values in any 
field can either be constrained to be a single value from a set – classification – or 
multiple values from a set – tagging or categorisation. The fact that any field can 
have a classification or kind is an instance of a property having a property – which 
Bunge would not admit, but which is of great practical value. 
My basis for the choice of InfoQube in my initial evaluation was its support for  
multi-parent hierarchical outlining with columns (fields) and the possibility of 
incorporating own-code (VBScript). 
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An example use of VBScript in horizontal (row) equations is keeping values in step  
between different fields – there is no notion of referential integrity in InfoQube, so I 
have had to do some VBScript (row equations) and SQL programming. 
An example use of VBScript in vertical (column) equations is calculating roll-up 
elapsed time in planning grids. 
5.9 How I have made use of Conceprocity in this study 
A nugget: part of the PhD plan stored in InfoQube  
 
Figure 49 A part of a planning grid in UnIQue, including a Gantt chart 
A planning grid in UnIQue exploits Gantt chart functionality, thus offering affordances both 
to the individual planner and potentially to her « manager ». 
A Conceprocity dictionary which names, classifies and tags principal 
notions 
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Figure 50 Dictionary entries used when constructing a complex Conceprocity model 
 
  





Figure 51Example journal entries 
5.10 Components of my proof-of-concept personal 
information management system – 2 - Bibliography 
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Figure 52 Bibliography grid in InfoQube linking to data in Zotero SQLite database 
Aspects of personal ontology include: 
o Classification by Kind 
o Categorisation by Tag 
o Tagged classification, to give cross-referencing between tags and kinds and 
thus aid structure and searching 
This is based upon the use of a service called Zotero: reference management. 
Whence the References at the end of this thesis. 
Zotero SQLite bibliography is surfaced in an InfoQube grid which can be filtered by kind or 
tag 
5.11 Modelling nuggets in the Conceprocity approach 
A Conceprocity model of a "nugget" (a piece of knowledge, often actionable) may 
include: 
❑ A set of Conceprocity maps – these are visual representations of 
aspects of the model 
❑ A set of entries in the Conceprocity dictionary – this helps to clarify 
the semantics of the model by naming notions and deciding their 
notion type 
❑ A set of supporting “resources”, that is, files which, together with the 
maps and the dictionary, constitute this nugget 
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❑ For example, for a taught class, these might include a PowerPoint 
presentation and supporting articles 
Outlining 
Outlining is needed to level (hierarchicalise) a nugget model. If the number of 
notions in the model is large, it is essential to split the model up into more 
manageable chunks. These chunks may be “obvious”, that is, correspond to 
structural distinctions which are evident. Or they may need to be imposed in a more 
analytical way, distinguishing sub-nuggets of knowledge, possibly actionable.  
There should always be a route map (which is also a root map – incidentally, root 
and route are pronounced the same in British English) which sets out the main 
chunks and how they are related. We call this the Level 1 map. Each major chunk 
can then be represented on a specific Level 2 map.  
There are well established principles to be applied when hierarchicalising 
(levelling) Conceprocity maps. 
In particular, we respect the observation of (Miller 1956) concerning “The magical 
number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity for processing 
information”. Thus, there should be no more than nine main notions on the route 
map (or indeed on each level 2 map – this may sometimes require the creation of 
level 3 maps). The top-level chunks might be identifiable as the themes of the topic 
which is being modelled. 
We exploit the specific multiple inheritance property of InfoQube which permits an 
item to appear in multiple contexts – to possess multiple parents. This usefully 
reduces data redundancy with its potential for error. 
5.12 Components of my proof-of-concept personal 
information management system – 3 
Further elements of the PIMS include: 
o Acquis: Microsoft Access implementation of an academic quality 
information system – a situational application (Cherbakov, Bravery, and 
Pandya 2008). Provides functionality of great use to a programme manager 
and to a leader of large teaching modules. 
o Cloud-based apps: Lucidchart for Conceprocity (etc.), GSuite (Google Apps) 
(shared web spreadsheets). 
o Website: www.MarkRogerGregory.net - WordPress 
o ABBYY PDF Transformer+ (PDF; OCR), Directory Opus and SugarSync. 
o Textual analysis and concept identification: Leximancer (A. E. Smith and 
Humphreys 2006). 
o Microsoft Word: multiple uses – e.g. writing nugget text; PhD journal. 
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o Microsoft Excel: multiple uses – e.g. maintaining banking, accounts and 
healthcare records. 
o Microsoft PowerPoint: multiple uses – e.g. structuring nuggets; presenting 
nuggets. 
5.13 Textual analysis using Leximancer 
My actual use of Leximancer 
I have used Leximancer for the following purposes: 
o An overall analysis of the entire PhD journal (but not of the papers that I 
have written during the PhD) 
o Purpose: to discover the vocabulary that I have used and how that has 
evolved over time 
o An overall analysis of a large small part of the PIM literature corpus – for 
comparison, showing how small is the overlap with my work 
o A focussed analysis of my work at a much finer level of granularity, that of 
individual journal entries 
o The language used in the writing of William Jones, a leading PIM 
researcher 
A Leximancer analysis of my PhD journal 
5.13.1.1 Results without any additional compound terms, August 2015 
I carried out a summary analysis of my complete PhD journal. This was then 
approximately 310,000 words in length. The concept map, with percent visible 
concepts turned up to 100%, looks like this; the blue arrows are my own additions 
to highlight the major themes which emerged. 
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Figure 53 Leximancer analysis of complete PhD journal, August 2015 
5.13.1.2 Results with additional compound terms, December 2015 
I carried out a summary analysis of my complete PhD journal in December 2015. 
The journal was by now 362,000 words in length. The concept map, with percent 
visible concepts turned up to 100%, looks like this; the blue text boxes are my own 
additions to highlight the major themes which emerged. 
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Figure 54 Analysis of entire journal, December 2015 
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Figure 55 Analysis of journal with additional stopwords 
 
It should be noted that Figure 55 was produced using a list of compound terms; this 
list is reproduced as Table 17. I also added additional words to the stopword list; 
this list is reproduced as Table 18. 
 
Table 17 Significant compound terms 
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On the basis of term frequency information produced by Leximancer and analysed 
using Excel, I identified the following compound terms which were used to “seed” 
the analysis presented as Figure 50. 
Significant compound terms 
personal information management 
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A Leximancer analysis of two books by a leading PIM researcher 
 
 
Figure 56 The language used by William Jones, a leading PIM researcher 
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• In a ranked list of the concepts within the books, in comparison with the most 
frequently used word which is information (100%), the singular word system 
achieves a relevance of only 6%, knowledge only 5% and the word learning does not 
appear at all in the list of concepts. 
• The word “systems” is frequently used in the work of William Jones (relevance of 
14%). However, it can be seen from the diagram that the theme of systems is 
physically distant from that of information and closely related to computing-specific 
terms such as the word computing itself, page, web and search. It is as far removed 
as it can be from the concepts of work, time and tasks. Thus, the word system is 
being used primarily in the informal sense frequently used in everyday language, as 
in “we have introduced a new computer system at work”. It is not used in the sense 
of systems thinking or a systems approach or any reference to cybernetics; nor as 
information system. 
Principal emergent themes  
The emergence which I now present is the result of a (further) piece of 
interpretation and is therefore subject to all the usual caveats concerning the 
interpretivist approach (Walsham 2006). 
 
Table 19 Terms which I deliberately imposed on the Leximancer analysis 
Significant compound terms 
personal information management 
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Table 20 Terms which emerge from the Leximancer analysis of the journal 
Emergent terms 
Action design research  
Theory 
Zotero (synonym: bibliography 
management) 
Conceprocity modelling 





Table 21 Terms which emerge from the work of William Jones 
Emergent terms Comment 
Personal information management 
(synonym PIM) 
This strong emergence merely confirms 
the existence and perhaps the 
importance of the topic area. 
Folder structure A strongly emergent theme from the 
existing PIM literature is that of folder 
structure, often associated with the 
observation that practical PIM for many 
current knowledge workers centres on 
imposing some kind of structure on 
their email communications. 
 
Has Leximancer been useful in this research? 
As I demonstrate elsewhere, a full categorical analysis in terms of a personal 
taxonomy is much more revealing than the rather unschooled use I made of 
Leximancer. It had been my intention to carry out a number of Leximancer analyses 
on interesting subsets of the existing PIM literature. However, I did not allow myself 
sufficient time to carry out these analyses before my short-term licence for the 
product expired and thus before I was able to use Leximancer to investigate 
whether in fact semantic morphogenesis was being evidenced by objectively 
measured criteria. 
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5.14 Evaluating Conceprocity 
Evaluating Conceprocity philosophically 
Cf. (Wand and Weber 2002) who insist on: 
▪ Grammar – constructs and rules 
▪ Method – ways of using the grammar 
▪ Script – models produced 
▪ Context – modelling setting 
Under each of these headings, they set out desirable and essential characteristics. 
The Conceprocity language, dictionary and documentation address all of these. 
Conceprocity is ontologically informed - but neutral on scientific versus social 
ontology.  
The use of Conceprocity is inevitably epistemologically; but can also be, 
ontologically: relativist. 
You could use Conceprocity to model Tolkien’s fictional Middle Earth! 
The approach known as Bunge-Wand-Weber BWW is based on the scientific realist 
ontology of Mario Bunge, notably as expounded in (Bunge 1977, 1979). 
However, various evaluations of existing conceptual modelling approaches 
demonstrate that none completely conform to that ontology and most implement 
only small parts of it. 
Evaluation against BWW ontological principles 
Table 26. 
Evaluating Conceprocity against alternative knowledge mapping 
approaches 
The first pragmatist to take the name, Charles Peirce, created what he called 
existential graphs and what (John F. Sowa 1992a) has more recently renamed 
conceptual graphs. A conceptual graph (CG) is a graph representation for logic based 
on the semantic networks of artificial intelligence and on existential graphs. 
Conceptual graphs are admirably precise - they can be directly transposed into the 
RDF semantic Web knowledge representation because both have formal semantics. I 
prefer concept maps because it is possible to start from the informal stance adopted 
by people who are not specialists in logic or computer science and then gradually, 
often by means of dialogue or even by dialogic mentoring, to refine what is 
understood into ever more precise knowledge maps. These too can be formalised 
and directly transposed into RDF and OWL if that is appropriate. It is not 
appropriate when the primary purpose of concept maps is to attempt to give greater 
precision to the sometimes essentially imprecise or ambiguous notions partially and 
incompletely understood by individual knowledge workers. We are modelling to 
understand, to learn and perhaps to act. Thus, pragmatically I have preferred 
See  
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Conceprocity concept and process maps to more formal knowledge representation 
techniques. 
I am aware that the notion of concepts presented in this thesis is very impoverished 
when compared with the analytical philosopher’s point of view. See for example 
(Hjørland 2009) and (Peacocke 1996). 
5.15 Significance of Conceprocity to this PhD 
Uses to date 
The original starting point was my need to make sense of scientific papers by means 
of concept mapping. Subsequently, I made use of G-MOT then of Conceprocity in the 
following areas: 
• Modelling working models, PWS and PIMS  
• Analysing requirements and synthesising design approaches 
• Modelling « light » processes as nuggets 
• Student use in learning and evaluation. This was on a small scale across 
three modules and about 110 students in 2013/4. 
• Student use for information systems analysis – usage modelling, entity-
relationship modelling, and event process data – with a small group of 
students at Coventry University Scarborough Campus. This is effectively 
mentored action learning because the group size is very small (three 
students). 
Further potential uses 
Conceprocity has grown out of two convictions. One is that visual knowledge 
mapping can be extremely helpful in clarifying understanding of certain kinds of 
knowledge. The second is that modelling continues to have relevance in terms of 
helping to express requirements for information systems. This second application 
area is one in which, for a variety of reasons, the information systems discipline 
seems to have abdicated the responsibility which it once accepted to the users of 
information systems, leaving to computer scientists and to developers the need to 
understand those requirements for themselves. 




IN THE WORKING MODEL 
This chapter discusses morphogenesis and then illustrates semantic and semiotic 
morphogenesis in the individual knowledge worker. 
6.1 How I have been learning in this PhD study 
On the basis of the PhD research journal produced auto ethnographically (Schultze 
2000), I have identified a number of stages of development in my use of language 
which I suggest are evidence of semantic morphogenesis. The journal records events 
which show how the Working Model has evolved in accordance with external 
feedback and external inputs, particularly other published works which I reference 
and which influence my thinking and action. 
6.2 Morphogenesis 
Semantic and semiotic morphogenesis 
The notion of semantic morphogenesis was first suggested by one of my 
supervisors, Renaud Macgilchrist in the paper (Macgilchrist 2004). 
I and Renaud have been working together on revising this paper which we shall 
submit for publication in the near future, with the revised title: Conjectures on the 
morphogenesis of meaning and its part in learning (Macgilchrist and Gregory 2019). 
My contribution has been primarily in providing support from the philosophical 
literature. However, I extend Macgilchrist's thinking towards what I term semiotic 
morphogenesis. 
I contend that semantic and semiotic morphogenesis has been demonstrated in 
specific , individually small but cumulatively large paradigm shifts occurring in the 
learning reported by this PhD. 
According to (Macgilchrist 2004), semantics is encapsulated within paradigms. 
Words outside those paradigms have no meaning. We know this from our 
experience as teachers. Teachers who use words outside the paradigm of the 
students with whom they are interacting, fail completely to communicate. 
Conversely, meaning is bootstrapped from existing understanding of meanings 
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within the context of a repertoire of paradigms whether that is specific to the 
individual learner or more generally to societal knowledge. In accordance with the 
law of primacy, semantic paradigms prefigure meaning – you can only understand in 
terms of your existing repertoire – which you then expand. Consequently, learning – 
once again, either individual or societal – is evolutionary. This is why we now go on 
to suggest a fundamental morphogenesis of learning and of ontology / 
semantics.  
Morphogenesis as a biological mechanism 
The etymology of the word morphogenesis is clear enough: μορφή, shape and 
γένεση, genesis or beginning.  
One of the earlier ideas and mathematical descriptions concerning how physical 
processes and constraints affect biological growth is due to Alan Turing. Turing 
predicted the existence and interaction of morphogens, which are the substances 
governing the pattern of tissue development in the process of biological 
morphogenesis. A morphogen is a signalling molecule which produces specific 
cellular responses depending on its local concentration.  
One of Alan Turing's published papers (Turing 1952) is an extended abductive 
conjecture concerning how biological morphogenesis might actually work. In the 
few remaining years of his life, Turing continued to investigate the mechanisms of 
morphogenesis, generating solutions to reaction-diffusion systems by means of 
simulation modelling of his non-linear differential equations using the then-new 
digital computer. In particular, he studied phylogenesis and phyllotaxis. 
Phylogenesis is the evolutionary development and diversification of a species or 
group of organisms, or of a particular feature of an organism. Phyllotaxis is the 
arrangement of plant organs, as for example in the whorl structure of ferns. Turing’s 
simulations typically involved working with two morphogens and three cells. Thus, 
different growth-influencing morphogens – chemical signals – one which activates 
growth and another which deactivates or inhibits it – interact; and these set up 
patterns of development and growth.  
(Rueda-Contreras and Aragón 2014) discuss the Turing instability of his 
morphogenetic equations of phyllotaxis. (Swinton 2004) discusses what he calls 
“Turing’s last, lost work”. This, a paper which he never submitted for publication 
during his lifetime, has been reconstructed as (Turing 1992). Swinton suggests that 
one of a number of problems that Turing was trying to solve was the appearance of 
Fibonacci numbers in the structures of plants. He describes the Fibonacci 
phyllotaxis problem and speculates about the extent to which Turing had succeeded 
in understanding it at the time of his death. Swinton reuses analogical reasoning 
that Turing himself used in a somewhat different context: Turing himself employed 
model-based reasoning using a model of cannibals and missionaries. A circular 
island is supposed to be populated by cannibals and missionaries. The missionaries 
are all celibate and thus depend on recruitment from the external world to maintain 
their population. Cannibals also die, but can also reproduce, so that their population 
naturally increases. However, when two missionaries meet a cannibal, the cannibal 
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converts and becomes a missionary. This tension between production and 
transformation means that a balance is reached when both populations are mixed 
together. If however the island becomes a thin circular atoll so that individuals react 
(reproduce or convert) only with their immediate neighbours; and if the 
missionaries have bicycles by means of which they can interact more quickly with 
more cannibals, a near zone of excess cannibals and a far zone of excess 
missionaries develops in accordance with the dynamics of the situation. The 
missionary’s bicycle is analogous to the inhibitor morphogen having a higher 
coefficient of diffusivity. We shall return to the importance of analogy and of model-
based reasoning when we discuss how hypotheses arise below. 
Applications of the morphogenesis mechanism 
The word morphogenesis is now frequently used in contexts remote from its 
biological origin. Thus, the critical realist sociologist Margaret Archer defends a 
clear distinction between the agency and the structure central to the structuration 
theory put forward by Anthony Giddens (Giddens 1986). (M. S. Archer 1995) argues 
against what she sees as a generic defect in certain social theory which conflates 
phenomena which should be separately analysed. She argues for analytical dualism, 
clearly distinguishing the effects of coterminous but distinct phenomena. In 
particular, she holds that emergent relationships between phenomena must be 
analysed and not simply reported as co-constitution. In any given dualism, it is 
possible and necessary to investigate how each factor shapes interactions with 
others over time in what she calls a morphogenetic sequence. Specifically, she 
argues against what she sees as the conflation of agency and structure especially by 
Giddens himself. Agency, in that it involves the action of people, is arguably 
causative of structure. Social structure is equally clearly dependent on agency: 
without people, there could be no structures. But Archer argues that they act on 
different timescales so that sometimes structure constrains agency and agents. The 
agents interact creating consequences which lead to structural change. This evolved 
structure is then the context for further agency. Archer sees this as being a 
morphogenetic process. It remains possible and necessary in her view to give 
empirical accounts of how the two different phenomena interlink over time rather 
than hiding behind an interdependence or conflation of the terms. 
(Mutch 2010) relates Archer's morphogenetic approach to the use of information 
and communication technology in organisations. Three gains are seen to accrue 
from this approach: greater clarity about the material properties of technology, links 
to broader structural conditions arising from the conceptualisation of the 
relationship between agency and structure, and the potential to explore the 
importance of reflexivity in contemporary organisations as they make extensive use 
of information and communication technology. Just as Margaret Archer argues that 
the elements of dualism must be analytically separated, so Alistair Mutch discusses 
data analytics in the context of data warehousing and the interdependent but 
different contributions that they can make to organisational strategies. The impact 
on wider aspects of the cultural and structural context is presented by means of a 
morphogenetic approach. 
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(Mingers, Mutch, and Willcocks 2013) further discuss the work of Margaret Archer 
and her contribution to the structure-agency debate. They note how Archer suggests 
that Giddens’ formulation of structures as “memory traces” conflates agency and 
structure. Therefore they suggest a refreshment of the socio-technical tradition in 
Information Systems that examines the interplay between the social and the 
technical-material over time. But they note also her concern for the formulation of 
agency and its indebtedness to reflexivity, the internal conversation by which 
humans monitor their central concerns.  
Morphogenetic growth processes in our understanding of the meaning of 
language in the light of abductive and analogical reasoning 
We use the word morphogenesis in an analogical fashion, but here in the context of 
the development both in the individual and in society of the fundamental concept of 
meaning. We draw parallels between what we view as the mechanisms of semantic 
morphogenesis and mechanisms found in biological systems. Our thinking is further 
informed by cybernetics and by the catastrophe theory of René Thom (Thom [1972] 
1989). 
Semiotics, semantics and the emergence of meaning 
Modern semiotics follows two distinct tendencies which derive from two different 
conceptions of semiotics, sometimes referred to as the Saussurian dyadic and the 
Peirceian triadic. We closely follow this distinction as it is discussed by (Mingers and 
Willcocks 2014). We have at least two reasons for doing this. One is that with them 
we prefer a critical realist, Habermasian-influenced philosophy to the post-
structuralist thinking that leads from de Saussure’s semiotics to Derrida and to 
Giddens. We follow Mingers and Willcocks also in preferring Peirce’s triadic analysis 
of semiotic signs to the dyadic signifier (sign) and signified (meaning) reading of 
Saussurian semiotics. When discussing signs, notably in (Peirce and Welby [1903–
1911] 1977); (Peirce 1902), Peirce distinguishes between object (the thing or concept 
itself), representamen (the icon or symbol or index), and – crucially – the 
interpretant: the immediate meaning of the sign and its effects as meaning on an 
interpreter. For Peirce, the sign is all of object, representamen and interpretant. And 
he holds that one of the effects of the interpretant is to give rise to new signs in the 
interpreter: thus for him the process of semiosis is continuous. That in turn yields 
the dynamic character which we will now present as fundamental to our idea of 
semantic morphogenesis, the morphogenesis of meaning.   
Our concern is to recognise that deep knowledge and well-structured knowledge, 
such as are implicit and necessary for, for example, a semantic web structure: need 
to be contrasted with current entropy/disorder. We therefore see semantics as 
being encapsulated in what we call paradigms leading to a true repertoire of 
semantic significance. Indeed, we live through paradigms and we normally retain 
previous ones – our semantic legacy. Conversely, our own personal increased 
understanding – and that of collective social knowledge – both require that 
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paradigms evolve and that subsequently knowledge (personal and socially-
legitimised) itself does so. 
It is in this context that we discuss what we identify as being the 
semantic/epistemic “fabric”. Words form a semantic fabric. The semantic fields of 
meaning of words overlap, that is words have overlapping semantic fields. However, 
the semantic fabric is much more than that: it is an emergence from those 
overlapping semantic fields. The cloth that is the semantic fabric changes, it ripples: 
the result is an emergent behaviour. Indeed, this emergent behaviour is so complex 
that it can only validly be described in terms of chaos or complexity theory. 
To recap: semantics is encapsulated within paradigms. Words outside those 
paradigms have no meaning.  
This is why we have identified a fundamental morphogenesis of learning and of 
ontology/semantics.  
In any conversation, we must establish the level of the language-repertoire that 
people have before we can begin to interact with them, and specifically to teach 
them. However, Epistemics give the capacity of further discovery, innovation and of 
the imagination. 
We laugh at a joke because we go beyond the paradigms within which it is 
expressed to reveal what is either absurdity or paradox. In this way, laughter is a 
meta-epistemic (or perhaps better here, a meta-heuristic); as we detect an 
inconsistency in our belief system, we laugh at our previous naiveté. We can only 
enjoy the joke if we have broken through to the next paradigm. Jokes can cause 
offence (negative) or relief or amusement (release). 
 Extending the genetic analogy  
Variety, understood in the sense expressed in the work of Ross Ashby (Ashby 1956, 
1958, 1962), does not pre-exist; it is generated. Some biological variety is useful; 
some is dangerous to the ongoing survival of an organism. Thus, DNA tends to 
inhibit dangerous mutation – but at the price of being less likely to generate useful 
mutation. Similarly, in the context of semantics, we see the emergence of a set of 
coherent beliefs expressed using words that have meaning in a semantic fabric. As a 
child learns, she sees or senses the absurdity of earlier concepts – this is the genesis 
of useful variety. But the explosion of variety is not of necessity a good thing. The 
addressable space of a given fragment of semantic fabric has got to be restricted for 
a number of reasons. In any given universe of discourse, we can describe objects as a 
power set of their possible properties. If we are discussing comic characters, we can 
characterise Superman as being all of blue, yellow, can fly. But what we mean by the 
property can-fly is deliberately restricted by the paradigm within which it is 
discussed. In the comic strip, we fully understand that Superman can fly. We also 
fully understand that if we seek to fly in the same way as did Superman, we will 
quickly understand the fundamental distinction between him and us – that is, we 
cannot fly. We have learnt from the fundamental absurdity of the attempt by Icarus 
to fly. 
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The semantic fabric associated with such a discussion is not necessarily a partition 
even of the total power set. We do not necessarily have to have a complete 
characteristic function which describes the behaviour of the whole. There are a 
number of reasons why we would not want one. One is that our notions of property, 
category and the like are necessarily imprecise: they are fuzzy. Another is that the 
very fact of the incompleteness of our system is key because it leaves the system 
open and incomplete and dynamic. The messiness of our belief maintenance 
systems, and the coterminous language systems in which our beliefs are expressed: 
drive their morphogenesis.  
Instabilities will arise at micro and macro levels. Continuing our genetic analogy, 
changes in chromosomes such as that which gave rise to the evolution of the orang-
utan are the result of a major shuffle. This particular reshuffle worked, but most will 
not. On a more micro scale, changes in alleles may be beneficial – but again, most 
will not be. Therefore the existence of a sort of genetic parser can be posited leading 
to more or less viable systems. Making a deliberate analogy with object-oriented 
programming, we know that multiple inheritance – though very powerful – leads to 
conflict and is therefore often dangerous. Even potentially beneficial variety, if 
excessive, can overwhelm an organism. Making an analogy to computer 
programming, it was necessary to introduce the cut construct into the Prolog 
programming language (Clocksin and Mellish 1981) in order to restrict the 
exploration space transited by the inference engine. 
There is a close parallel and indeed coterminous nature between belief maintenance 
systems and language systems. Our language system restricts what we can believe. 
Within our language system and our truth maintenance system, words act as 
pointers. The shared use of the word is a Wittgensteinian social contract between 
language users. The development of that social contract can be illustrated by means 
of a conversation that takes place between a child and an adult when a child points, 
and says a word. We correct the word if necessary and we seek more fully to 
describe the thing that the child is pointing at. The same child – parent relationship 
exists as language develops in society itself. We need to make the distinction 
between sense and reference which was originally pointed out by (Frege [1892] 
1948). The word-as-pointer resonates in the belief system of a recipient. Here a sign 
is a pointer to a (non-local) system and its attached complexity. Meaning in such a 
context is an emergence: that is to say, it is a property of a complex auto-adaptive 
system. This parallels the way in which (Maturana and Varela 1980) introduce and 
expand upon the concept of autopoiesis.  
Semiotic morphogenesis illustrated: 2011 
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Figure 57 Early concept map – LICEF G-MOT representation 
 
Semiotic morphogenesis illustrated: 2016 
 
Figure 58 Conceprocity map - semiotic clarity 
We would argue that this is richer, more visual, more expressive, easier to read 
(though not perhaps to learn?) 
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6.3 A summary of the development of my thinking – evidence 
for semantic morphogenesis 
In this section, I seek to identify major changes in my thinking across the years of 
my PhD study. These changes are shown by changes of vocabulary, evidence for 
semantic morphogenesis. 
How my research thinking has developed - 0 – An emphasis on tools and 
techniques (2008 to 2011) 
Initially, my interest was in PIM tools and in their support for conceptual data 
structures. 
I examined technologies such as personal cloud-based relational database, 
functional spreadsheets and the like. I looked into end-user programming. I chose 
specific tools, notably InfoQube and Zotero. 
I carried out experiments in PIM audit with groups of students; unfortunately, the 
results were poor because of inadequate preparation on my part. I built situational 
applications (the small group perspective). But this was always unlikely to be an 
inadequate  approach in isolation – it is wrong to adopt “solutions” to problems 
which have not been properly analysed. 
An important aside: situational applications (1) – dynamic websites 
In parallel with undertaking this PhD, and sometimes overlapping with it: I have 
"perforce" built situational applications. I also pursued a long excursion into 
building web-based content management systems CMS, initially using Drupal 
(2011/2) and subsequently WordPress (2011 to date) – 
www.markrogergregory.net  
The felt and (partially) met need of this work was enabling action learning and 
research, both by students and by research volunteers. 
An important aside: situational applications (2) – Acquis (2013/4) 
I developed Acquis (ACademic QUality Information System): a complex and 
evolving structured database application supporting my work as a teacher and 
programme manager and providing focused feedback to students. Acquis consists of 
over 100 tables, 85 queries, 200 forms and 24 reports. However, I confess that I 
concentrated on the entity-relationship-attribute aspects of the necessary analysis 
and skimped on functional analysis. My self-critique has however been a strong 
influence on the design of Conceprocity – we still need information systems 
requirements analysis tools accessible to “users”. This realisation has led to the 
subsequent extension of Conceprocity to usage modelling, entity-relationship dtaa 
analysis and event process data diagrams. 
  236 / 343 
 
How my research thinking has developed - 1 – From tools to systems 
thinking & philosophy – 2012 onwards 
Building out from my initial interest in PIM tools, I gradually I realised that what 
was important was the notion of a cybernetic PIM system in which the emergent 
behaviour is primarily derived from the user herself – adaptive systemic behaviour. 
This led to questions about the nature of a system: compare the scientific realism 
of (Bunge 1979) and the phenomenology of (Checkland 2000); by means of: 
▪ Ontology – what we know and 
▪ Epistemology – how we know what we know 
How my research thinking has developed – 2 - From data to knowledge and 
back again (2011; 2015) 
The initial research object was me as an information worker and my use of 
computer-based tools to manage – what? personal knowledge… 
Q: But how can such knowledge be represented as computer-manipulable data? The 
data, though “small”, is complex… 
A1: Perhaps first order (predicate) logic, « semantic web » technologies for data 
structures and specifically-written computer programs. But these are not accessible 
by « end users ». 
Q: How can you possibly manage knowledge on a computer? 
A2: You can't. But you can store the data and the conceptual data structures that 
surround that data and begin to explicate its semantics 
So: sense - meaning must be made of the data; this can inform action 
(abbreviation: inform-ation?) – cf. (Mingers 1995, 1997, 1999, 2004). 
How my research thinking has developed – 3 - conceptual modelling (2013 
onwards) 
I initially sought semi-automatic identification of concepts by means of textual 
analysis – Leximancer. However,this only “works” well when the concepts are pre-
seeded – as summarised in Table 17 and Table 18. 
This somewhat disappointing experience confirmed me in my conviction that we 
need something like Conceprocity: concept-process reciprocity – a visual knowledge 
modelling language. But it also inspired me to seek a sound ontological basis for 
conceptual modelling, which I have found in a combination of scientific realism: 
Bunge-Wand-Weber (Wand and Weber 1990); (Rosemann and Green 2002) and of 
social ontology: Bunge-Searle (March and Allen 2014). 
How my research thinking has developed – 4 – Individual learning and 
action as morphogenesis (2014) 
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Macgilchrist presents learning and the creation of knowledge as semantic 
morphogenesis (Macgilchrist 2004). 
I have observed stages of learning and individual transformation in my own 
doctoral research which do indeed suggest morphogenesis at the level of the 
individual agent. 
This developing knowledge is enacted in research speech acts (Searle 2006) in 
accordance with the  theory of communicative action (Habermas 1984, 1987). 
Habermas appeals to reason and rationality where rationality is a disposition 
expressed in behaviour for which good reasons can be given. Communicative 
rationality aims to achieve, sustain and review consensus – a consensus that rests 
on intersubjective recognition of criticisable validity claims. Translated to the social 
sphere, this becomes his theory of communicative action. It depends on two 
assumptions, that language is (1) social and (2) rational. 
My “speech” acts – more accurately, the document acts suggested by (B. Smith 2014) 
- include: 
▪ The elaboration of my PIMS and of Conceprocity: design research 
and adaptation, evidencing semiotic morphogenesis. 
▪ Conference papers and planned journal articles. 
▪ The writing of a reflective and, in significant part, conceptual and 
philosophically-informed thesis. 
How my research thinking has developed – 5 – Action Design Research 
My development of two prototype applications can be set within the broad 
spectrum of action research approaches identified by (Baskerville and Wood-Harper 
1998). 
My work and developing understanding is situated at the intersection of action 
science and action learning. 
Major elements of my work can be positioned as design science research (Hevner et 
al. 2004); (Gregor and Hevner 2013); (Iivari 2015); or as Action Design Research 
(Sein et al. 2011); cf. (Baskerville and Wood-Harper 1998) and (Papas, O’Keefe, and 
Seltsikas 2012). 
This has resulted in Conceprocity 1.0 (May 2013); Conceprocity 3.0 (late 2015); 
Conceprocity 3.2 (late 2016). The development of Conceprocity has been pulled by 
new areas of application (originally knowledge mapping; recently IS requirements 
analysis) and pushed by a growing understanding of the theoretical foundations of 
conceptual modelling and of related philosophical issues.  
We can view my my construction and use of a proof of concept personal information 
management system, UnIQue, 2015, as an application of Action Design Research 
(Sein et al. 2011). 
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How my research thinking has developed – 6 – boundary considerations 
and PIMS principles 
I have concerned myself with at least two interdependent but distinct systems. 
One is the (soft) work system or human activity system which I constitute as I work 
(alone and in collaboration with others); this is what I normally refer to as my PWS, 
my personal work system. I now regard the gradual development of a moderately 
coherent philosophical stance (primarily post-2013) as a major component of this 
PWS. 
The other is the (hard) information system that supports and serves that work 
system. 
Emerging from working with both are certain principles which I suggest may have 
wider application than my own personal accounts – as I share my action learning. 
The principles are rarely original, but their juxtaposition is innovative and their 
application is intended to be practical. Among these is those expressed by (Schön 
1983, 40):  
“Professionals… are coming to recognise that although problem setting is a 
necessary condition for technical problem solving, it is not itself a technical problem. 
When we set the problem, we select what we will treat as the “things” of the 
problem, we set the boundaries of our attention to it, and we impose upon it a 
coherence which allows us to say what is wrong and in what directions the situation 
needs to be changed.  
“Problem setting is a process in which, interactively, we  
name the things to which we will attend [cf. the Conceprocity DICTIONARY] 
and  
frame the context in which we will attend to them.” [cf. a Conceprocity MAP]. 
My experiences and why I have written very little about them in this thesis 
Here, by way of illustration, are journal entries made over two consecutive days.. 












I am forced to think, I suspect abductively, in order to solve an information 
management problem in InfoQube. This is the problem. I am seeking to facilitate a 
process which I call hierarchical classification. For an academic discussion of this 
issue, please see:  (Silla Jr and Freitas 2011). As one example of the significance of 
this issue, consider the requirement to file a document in a hierarchical classification 
system such as a Windows folder hierarchy. But the specific example with which I 
concern myself at this particular juncture is that of positioning things in a personal 
taxonomic classification system so as to permit: 
1. use of that personal taxonomic classification system as the basis of a file 
naming system; this is intended to facilitate relatively unambiguous filing of 
an item so that it can be discovered again later 









2. processing of all the items in a subtree discovered by means of user-specified 
criteria – for example, do everything that must be done today by means of 
consulting a list of items marked as today within a hierarchy of days 
The process of classification involves assigning an item to one and only one location 
in a tree (a directed acyclic graph, DAG). InfoQube implements trees in the form of 
item hierarchy. 
So what then is the problem? In order to classify hierarchically, you first choose the 
level I classifier; then choose from the limited subset of level II classifiers employed 
by the first; then choose the third classifier, again on the basis of the limited subset 
implied by the second classifier. This has the advantage that the number of choices to 
be made at each level in the hierarchy is restricted, ideally to about seven and in 
practice up to about 10. 
There are a couple of problems with this situation. The first is that I’m not actually 
sure how I can subset choices at a given level in the hierarchy on the basis of the 
choice already made at a higher level. The second is that such a structured process 
can receive almost no visual cue beyond the choices available at the current level in 
the hierarchy. If conversely I took the same approach to classification that I will have 
to take to categorisation, that is to say, I copy or clone the item into the classifying 
hierarchy: then I would have the benefit of the visual cues. There would also be 
consistency of approach between classification and categorisation. The disadvantage 
is that the item would be classified in accordance with a visual positioning but that 
the classification would not normally be directly stored in the classified item. 
The choice between these two approaches will be made on the entirely pragmatic 

















What is the relationship between design and abduction? This is one of my waking 
thoughts. A quick search on Google Scholar suggests that a Japanese researcher 
called Takeda has done a lot of thinking in this area: (Takeda et al. 2003). 
Following up on the background to this, we note: (Niiniluoto 1999b). We have 
already come across this gentleman: (Niiniluoto 2002), a book which on further 
review I very much want to read. It will strongly complement my reading in Mario 
Bunge. 
In (Niiniluoto 1999b), the Finnish philosopher describes the history of abduction 
and earlier accounts of heuristic reasoning. Working forwards from Charles Sanders 
Peirce, the author defends inference to the best explanation (one of the 
characterisations of abduction) and its use in the defence of scientific realism. He 
suggests the need to distinguish between weaker and stronger forms of abduction 
and discusses Peircean and Bayesian probabilistic reconstructions of these types of 
inference. 
Why does this matter in the context of my research? My fundamental thesis is that 
each of us has a personal working model which is defended by morphostasis and 
developed by morphogenesis. Thinking conceptually: we develop a 
verisimilitudinous account (dictionary: something that has the appearance of being 
true or real) which we support by means of collected personal data and explicit 
knowledge. I think that this model may be the attractor in a morphogenetic account 
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On 26/03/2016, there were 2195 journal entries extending to 392673 words. 646 
of these journal entries were directly relevant to my thesis. Clearly a direct 
summary of this ethnographic material would risk dominating the content of the 
thesis. Instead, various graphical, categorical and classificatory summaries have 
been attempted. 
6.4 Learning: semantic and semiotic morphogenesis in 
summary 
Some principles of PIM which I would suggest are worth promulgating 
This section sets out the kind of knowledge in the form of working rules which 
professionals and artisans use as a matter of course, often without actually making 
them very explicit. This is close to the tacit knowledge of (Polanyi 1962); (Nonaka 
1994) and the personal knowledge of (Polanyi 1958); see also (M. K. Smith 2003). 
This may partly be because sometimes they are difficult to justify! I introduce the 
notion of warrantability. This is inspired by (Boyles 2006) discussion of Dewey’s 
conception of warranted assertibility. Although warranted assertibility is not 
precisely the same as my notion of warrantability, it does give weight to my 
proposition which is indeed a pragmatic, perhaps even instrumentalist, concept.  
of constraints and affordances. This may be an example of inference to the most 
lovable explanation! See (Lipton 2004), who distinguishes between the likeliest and 
the loveliest explanation. See (Campos 2011) for a discussion of how inference to the 
best explanation relates to Peircean abduction. Note also that my work recognises 
the huge significance of diagrammatic reasoning. 
My old friend Philip Dobson and his colleagues present a series of case studies in 
which practising researchers reflect on how their original hypotheses arose and 
concur that a more explicitly adaptive approach would have been more economical 
had they but applied it: (Dobson et al. 2012). Another old friend, Michael Hoffman, 
argues in (Hoffmann 2010)… He cites (Cheng and Simon 1995) and (Nersessian 
2008, 161); from the latter: 
“ Nancy Nersessian answered this question recently in a concise statement that 
summarizes both the literature on the cognitive functions of diagrams understood in 
the traditional sense of external, graphical representations and her own extensive 
case studies: [A] wide range of empirical data support the view that in making 
explicit, highlighting, or supplying structural and behavioral information, 
diagrammatic representations provide constraints and affordances for inferences in 
reasoning processes.” 
From this whole line of thinking we can conclude that my approach, which has been 
to design a personal information management system which supports a personal 
working model: at least has support in the literature. 
I think that is quite enough metaphysical speculation for one morning… I have in 
mind to be slightly wicked, and to return to the practical question of how to link 
InfoQube and Zotero. As to buying books, that has to wait until I have more money. 
  241 / 343 
 
The warrantability of principles is not necessarily particularly high. However I set 
out this particular list because it’s important to recognise that they do strongly 
influence the way one actually works. We are once again up against the difference 
between espoused theory and theory in use. These principles are stored in the 
UnIQue InfoQube grid called DictNotion. Figure 59 illustrates some such principles 
and the associated warrantability which I suggest. 
 
Figure 59 Principles stored in the grid DictNotion 
• Before making anything, model it first. Before doing any non-trivial task, 
plan it first. 
• Individual actions or activities are often repeated in the same or a similar 
form. Some have sufficient complexity of form to merit planning. Of these, 
some are relatively straightforward and can be written up as a short Word 
document or fragment. Thus, I use a Word template which notably supports 
a hierarchical outline. This approach is adequate for small processes but is 
not so for larger ones. 
• Choose, learn and use technology appropriate to the task. Prefer technology 
which makes it easy to share and integrate data between tools. 
• Data should wherever possible be stored once only. Copies should not be 
made. Instead links to the original should always be preferred. Where 
appropriate and possible, share those links with others. 
• When managing personal data, it is necessary to store all significant data in a 
way which makes its semantics (its meaning) as clear as possible.  
• One such way which is very common (but not universal) is to store the data 
in tables. These would ideally be managed by an end-user-accessible online 
relational database but may in practice be managed by a conventional 
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database which is not web-accessible or as spreadsheets. The definition of 
the table embodies in part or in whole its semantics. 
• The definition of a table and its relationships with other tables is called a 
schema. Schemas associate meaning with data, defining the semantics of the 
data. A schema is more-or-less the same thing as a data dictionary. The 
semantics associated with a personal data item may not always be stored 
with the item itself, but it is essential to be able to associate the metadata 
with the data. 
• One table will almost invariably be present in every PIMS. It is a control 
table. The control table may (and normally will) contain only one record. In 
a spreadsheet, it can consist of named ranges and is typically named 
Lookups. It instantiates certain business rules, such as the percentage score 
associated with a letter grade. 
• Spreadsheets need structuring and design in very much the same way as do 
databases. That is to say, one should clearly distinguish tables of more-or-
less normalised data from unnormalised (but useful) derived, informative, 
presentable views of the same data. Views are the result of set manipulation. 
• Views within a spreadsheet can sometimes be derived using SQL. This is 
true in Google Docs but not in Excel. 
• A PWS needs always to incorporate certain very significant files. The PIMS 
should include a single central list of such files and hyperlinks to get there. 
• Fragmentation of personal information is a necessary evil. It is necessary 
because no one PIM tool can meet all the needs of a PIM user. It is an enemy 
because it makes it difficult to know where “master” data is stored. 
• All scientists and knowledge workers need to maintain notebooks and / or a 
personal journal of the kind that this document is an example. Something of 
this sort is essential to effective reflection / reflexivity. 
• There are certain conceptual data structures which are either fundamental 
or very desirable in much personal information management. Among these 
are: 
 
•  Tables 
•  Hierarchic outlines 
•  Hyperlinks 
• Information concerns things. Things in a database should have names just as 
the things to which they refer have names. The use of those names, in terms 
of sense and reference, terms introduced by Frege (Frege [1892] 1948, 
1997): should be stored in a database to be termed a Lexicon or Vocab. The 
name of a thing is often itself crucial to the meaning and thus the usefulness 
of a thing. (Essentialism.) 
• Things can be found again either by searching or by categorisation and 
classification. There is a fundamental trade-off in information retrieval 
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between recall and precision. See for example (Manning, Raghavan, and 
Schutze 2008). Precision is greatly aided by a formal classification scheme. 
Recall may be aided by necessary-overlapping categories. 
• Before knowledge workers can get something done, they need to collect 
together the necessary information and make it readily available – it needs 
to be “at hand”. They also need to filter out, deliberately to exclude, data 
which is not relevant to the task in hand. This is specifically true of paper 
documents relevant to a task. They may include books, journal articles and 
paper folders. 
• A good tool for managing such “work in hand” enables the data to be 
collected together. This involves collecting links to the data. A very good tool 
for such a purpose is a hierarchical outliner with links to the data items. 
• The benefits of investing in a particular piece of personal information 
management should greatly exceed the costs; and should normally do so 
within a very short timeframe. What is meant by very short will vary with 
context. The justification for this principle is that it is tempting to expend – 
and therefore to waste – enormous amounts of time for relatively small 
benefit. This should wherever possible be avoided. 
• Any given information item, as viewed by users, possesses properties. 
Properties are values of attributes. To the user, a property may appear to be 
tightly bound to its owning information item or may properly be regarded as 
jointly the concern of two information items, these often having different 
types. Information items may need to be categorised or they may need to be 
classified. A classification is a property which mandatorily takes a value 
from the set of values in a second information item. A categorisation (more 
commonly this is referred to as a tag) is usually just the attribute value 
associated with a particular property; it is not constrained to be unique, and 
thus an information item might have multiple tags. 
Constraints and barriers 
• Constraints and barriers may have some external cause or justification; 
however, they are also often what is referred to in common parlance as 
“psychological”. The list which follows is maintained in the same InfoQube 
grid. 
• It’s interesting how constraints / barriers come in even on this apparently 
small and straightforward task. As soon as I start to work on it or think 
about it, all the usual self-imposed constraints and barriers come crashing 
in: 
•  
•  The desire to be doing anything else! The search – always successful – for 
distraction 
•  Losing the thread, almost literally being unable to think about the matter 
in hand: “my mind has gone blank” 
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•  The pressing need to do something else; there is always something even 
more urgent 
•  Blocking actions – you don’t start task B because you must do A even more 
urgently; but somehow task A takes longer than it ought to do (as a result of, 
for example, perfectionism, etc.) 
• While needing to do one thing, you do another. At 
http://sridattalabs.com/2012/02/06/rabbit-holes-being-smart-hurts-
prod/ the blogger Sridatta Thatipamala describes the problem of rabbit 
holes, why they damage productivity, and why they can nevertheless be 
valuable. 
• I believe myself to be inartistic and therefore I am. Damaging lack of self-
belief damages creativity and perhaps productivity – although the damage to 
creativity is probably more significant. 
• Prejudices or false beliefs are really stupid. Example: Twitter is a waste of 
time. Example: blogs are narcissistic and a waste of time. Example: 
quantitative techniques are restrictive and boring. 
• The tools on which I base my PIMS are not entirely reliable. Since they quite 
often fail, I need to spend significant amounts of time protecting myself 
against the danger of data corruption and significant amounts of time 
recovering from actual data corruption.  
• I have a strong tendency to prefer large actions with a big, obvious outcome 
to small, often essential actions. I am also still too wedded to doing 
everything myself – I’m not good at delegating or at buying in help. 
• I am really reluctant to face up to the real issues. I am feeling my way 
towards an understanding of larger issues. One is my unwillingness really to 
prioritise the externally important and / or that which is (often legitimately) 
required of me, either by managers or others whom I serve (e.g. students). I 
prefer to do what pleases me. 
• When I’m doing something a bit technical – e.g. using a spreadsheet to 
reformat data into useful information – and when I get to a difficult bit, I 
often turn aside to read Google News or otherwise waste time. I can 
sometimes take five or ten minutes out in this way several or even many 
times in the course of executing a large task. 
• I recognise the existence of task interdependencies which block progress. 
They might be referred to as logjams or even in some cases the “deadly 
embraces” set out in operating systems design discussions. In operating 
systems, in the scheduling of nominally-independent tasks which need to 
share resources, use is made of mechanisms such as semaphores, locks, 
mutexes and the like to prevent the occurrence of circular deadlock (so-
called “deadly embrace”). [For a discussion, see 
http://blog.feabhas.com/tag/deadly-embrace/ accessed 27/02/2016. The 
discussion terminates by identifying the need for what Tony Hoare (Hoare 
1974) identified as the monitor, that is, an object which encapsulates a 
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mutex and which cannot be bypassed.] Circular dependence frequently 
occurs in getting work done. It should where possible be avoided by 
atomising large tasks and just getting on with them before a large task is 
allowed to arise. However, in extreme cases, it is necessary to break the 
logjam by terminating a task before it is properly completed. 
• But a final reflection is a clear echo of the starting point for this research. 
The tools available by means of which to carry out effective personal 
information management are currently far too clunky, extremely badly 
integrated if at all, depressingly slow and frequently “buggy” when used in 
conjunction one with another. To judge from the number of forums that 
concern commonly used personal information management tools such as 
Microsoft Excel, and the anger frequently expressed within those forums: I 
am not alone in bemoaning the current state-of-the-art. It is not that the 
tools do not work; it is that they do not work well enough together to fit into 
a reasonable workflow which does not impose too high a cognitive load 
upon the end-user. The individual frustrations may be small; it is the 
cumulative effect which becomes offputting and even mildly depressing. 
Perhaps one third of all my journal entries relate to technical problems or to 
frustrations relating to the use of PIM tools. For example, I can no longer 
search my PhD journal quickly because it has become so large. As a direct 
consequence I have not been able to carry out the more detailed analyses 
that I had wished to do and really to profit from the content of that journal.  
• To take a specific example of the kind of workflow difficulty which I am 
talking about. Zotero is undoubtedly an excellent reference management 
system. Nominally, it integrates quite well with Microsoft Word. But you 
cannot click on a reference held in Microsoft Word and go directly from that 
back into the Zotero database. That link has not been implemented. The user 
is forced to work in both tools in order to get her work done.  
Review and recap on the notion of a personal working model 
I conjecture the following meta-model: 
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Figure 60 Personal working model and system 
6.4.1.1 Re-modelling the personal working model 
As a brief illustration of some of the findings of the work, we ask as our topic 
question ‘how might we model the personal working model of a 
teacher/researcher?’ We see in Table 23 a list of some of the notions originally 
identified at the start of this thesis. This initial vocabulary has been stored as nugget 
dictionary entries in the DictNotion grid of the current UnIQue IQBase. In Figure 61 
we present a top-level Conceprocity model of how those notions might be 
interrelated in a putative model of a personal working model. The corresponding 
warrantable findings are (i) that there exists a PIMS specific to each knowledge 
worker who (ii) understands and regulates her work in accordance with some, 
frequently inexplicit, personal working model.  
We note here that model-based reasoning has great practical value. There are 
various interpretations of this phrase, e.g. (Nersessian 1999), but here we make the 
observation that during the construction of a model from a starting list of notions it 
frequently becomes evident that other notions and/or relationships are required. 
Thus, for example consideration of a logical operator may well point to the need for 
additional notions and relationships. Again, where it’s impossible to use a structural 
relationship, a procedure may abductively be surmised then identified. 
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Table 23 Notions in the Working Model: a hierarchical outline 
Item NotionType Warrantability 
1. Working model Principle 5=: Finding 
1.1. Personal knowledge Package 7: Institutional 
1.1.1. Personal ontology Principle 7: Institutional 
1.1.1.1. Taxonomy Concept 8: Scientific 
1.1.1.1.1. Classifying by kind Procedure 8: Scientific 
1.1.1.1.2. Scientific ontology Concept 8: Scientific 
1.1.1.1.3. Social ontology Concept 7: Institutional 
1.1.1.1.4. Build "initial" taxonomy Procedure 3: Observation 
1.1.1.1.5. Develop taxonomy as 
activity and understanding 
changes 
Procedure 4: Emergence 
1.1.1.2. Categorising by tag: build and 
maintain the tag set 
Procedure 4: Emergence 
1.1.1.2.1. Tags Concept 4: Emergence 
1.1.2. Philosophy / philosophical stance Principle 7: Institutional 
1.1.2.1. Critical realism Principle 7: Institutional 
1.1.2.2. Warrantability  Principle 5=: Finding 
1.1.2.3. Design the Conceprocity concept 
process reciprocity modelling 
language 
Procedure 6: Design 
1.1.2.3.1. Build Conceprocity map of 
my personal working model 
Procedure 6: Design 
1.1.2.3.2. Conceptual knowledge 
modelling and model-based 
reasoning  
Principle 6: Design 
1.1.2.4. Theory-building Procedure 5=: Finding 
1.1.2.5. Creating, maintaining and 
publishing nuggets and in particular 
nugget signature models  
Procedure 6: Design 
1.1.2.6. Recognition and delineation of 
principles 
Procedure 5=: Principle 
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1.1.3. Learning Procedure 3: Observation 
1.1.3.1. Learning: existing knowledge Procedure 3: Observation 
1.1.3.2. Implicit learning: learning know-
how – internalising 
Procedure 3: Observation 
1.1.3.3. Action learning Procedure 3: Observation 
1.1.4. Maintain homeostasis (controlled 
survival through stability): regulate in 
accordance with the good regulator 
theorem of Conant and Ashby and the 
personal working model 
Procedure 5=: Principle 
1.1.4.1. Regulation Concept 8: Scientific 
1.1.4.2. Model Concept 6: Design 
1.1.4.3. BVSR: blind variation, selective 
retention 
Principle 5=: Principle 
1.1.5. Reflect in and after action: structured 
self reflection 
Procedure 4: Emergence 
1.1.6. Actors Actor 5=: Finding 
1.1.6.1. Mark - researcher Individual 3: Observation 
1.1.6.2. Mark - user Individual 3: Observation 
1.1.6.3. Student Actor 3: Observation 
1.1.6.4. Knowledge worker Actor 2: Conjecture / 
abduction 
1.1.7. Enquiring: creating knowledge Procedure 4: Emergence 
1.1.7.1. Autoethnography Principle 3: Observation 
1.1.7.2. Design science research Principle 7: Institutional 
1.1.7.3. Identify concepts and themes 
from text 
Procedure 4: Emergence 
1.1.7.3.1. Leximancer Principle 8: Scientific 
1.1.7.3.2. Emergent themes and 
concepts 
Concept 4: Emergence 
1.1.7.3.3. Theorise Procedure 7: Institutional 
1.1.7.3.3.1. Espoused theories Principle 3: Observation 
1.1.7.3.3.2. Theories-in-use Principle 3: Observation 
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1.1.7.4. Assemble by means of bricolage Procedure 4: Emergence 
1.1.7.5. Explicitly design and construct – 
experiential design 
Procedure 6: Design 
1.1.7.6. Multiple method research Principle 7: Institutional 
1.1.7.7. Theory-in-use Principle 5=: Finding 
1.1.7.8. Bricolage Concept 5=: Principle 
1.1.7.9. Experiential design Concept 5=: Principle 
1.1.7.10. Designed artefact Concept 6: Design 
1.2. Doing and informing Package 7: Institutional 
1.2.1. PWS personal work system Concept 3: Observation 
1.2.1.1. Mark's PWS Instance 3: Observation 
1.2.1.1.1. Research journal Instance 3: Observation 
1.2.1.1.2. Build and maintain 
Conceprocity models 
Procedure 6: Design 
1.2.1.1.2.1. Maintain dictionary Procedure 6: Design 
1.2.1.1.2.2. Maintain maps Procedure 6: Design 
1.2.2. PIMS personal information management 
system 
Concept 5=: Finding 
1.2.2.1. Use PIMS Procedure 5=: Finding 
1.2.2.2. Principles of effective PIM Principle    
1.2.2.3. UnIQue PIMS Instance 7: Institutional 
1.2.2.3.1. Grids Concept 6: Design 
1.2.2.3.2. Build PIMS Procedure 6: Design 
1.2.2.3.2.1. Affordances Concept 7: Institutional 
1.2.2.3.2.1.1. PIM technology and 
tools 
Principle 7: Institutional 
1.2.2.3.2.1.1.1. Zotero Principle 8: Scientific 
1.2.2.3.2.1.1.2. Lucidchart Principle 8: Scientific 
1.2.2.3.2.1.1.3. InfoQube Principle 8: Scientific 
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2. Future research programme Instance 6: Design 
2.1. Action design research Instance 6: Design 









Figure 61 A personal working model – early 2016 
Post-PhD mentored action research is discovering that the construction and 
comparison in Conceprocity of distinct but overlapping IS requirements models 
(usage, event process data and entity relationship unified by a shared dictionary) 
permits the early identification of inconsistencies and omissions. 
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Learning: semantic and semiotic morphogenesis in summary 
Evidence for semantic morphogenesis is provided by significant changes of language 
which indicate a paradigm shift. These are demonstrated in the preceding section 
headers in this chapter; I have attempted where possible to indicate the 
approximate date associated with that language. 
Semiotic morphogenesis is evident from significant changes in visual expression; 
these also indicate a paradigm shift – as do changes both in models and the process 
of modelling.  
Figure 61 is a remodelling of the top level working model. Note that I have as yet not 
sought to change the underlying models of the personal work system nor of the 
personal information management system. However, my understanding of the more 
conceptual elements of the working model has considerably evolved. This is 
evidenced in the very different picture that emerges – compare this early 2016 
model with that for 2014, which can be found at: Figure 6. In part, the difference in 
expression is the result of an evolution of the modelling language. But much more 
significant has been the introduction of a dictionary. (Vervaeke and Green 1997) 
suggest that the propositional content of a model cannot depend only on its visual or 
diagrammatic form – it must also have a descriptive element. Careful observation 
will indicate that the diagram has in fact diverged from the dictionary elements used 
in its construction; this is an aspect of model-based reasoning during the 
construction of the diagram. The next step should be to revise the dictionary in 
accordance with the understanding that has been created as the visual map has been 
created – they are in effect co-dependent. 
6.4.1.2 Learning as systemic understanding – re-viewing Checkland’s FMA and 
LUMAS models 
In section 0.2, I considered and rejected LUMAS as an alternative framing device for 
this theisis in favour of FMA. In section 0 I noted however the value of LUMAS in 
learning from enquiry. I have been challenged to consider what I would change if I 
were to repeat this research or do more along the same lines. On reflection, I would 
certainly at least extend FMA to include explicit consideration of learning on the 
forward and especially the feedback paths. By feedback path, I mean the 
practopoetic traverse which gains variety by interaction with the environment – in 
this case, the community of learners and scholars. But LUMAS already implicitly 
considers that with the path from learnng L to methodology M – where L, in my 
terms outer-loop learning, modifies and enriches M, the methodology. If I am 
justified in this speculation, then effective learning well reported might indeed 
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 CONTRIBUTIONS 
AND FURTHER WORK 
Contributions are itemised and are evaluated in diverse ways. A future programme 
of work is outlined. Some provisional conclusions are drawn, but this work Must Go 
On… 
7.1 So what? Evaluating products, process and intellectual 
contributions 
How does any of this make any useful difference to the world at large? 
What are the existing contributions of this research? 
How will I go on to develop them so as to make more of a useful difference? 
Evaluation of the changes in the vocabulary that I as a researcher was using in my 
research journal.  
What needs to be evaluated: 
▪ Framework 
▪ Methodology 
▪ Contributions, both process and products 
How evaluation has been carried out 
▪ Ongoing evaluation following (Sein et al. 2011): design 
principles 
▪ Evaluation following (Baskerville, Kaul, and Storey 2015) 
7.2 Existing and developing contributions from my Ph.D. 
research to date - 1 
o Visual knowledge mapping as part of personal work system. 
o Strong ontological basis (Bunge-Wand-Weber BWW (Bunge 1977, 1979); 
(Wand and Weber 1990);(Rosemann and Green 2002); (Wand, Storey, and 
Weber 1999), (Wand and Weber 2002); typed notions (Booch, Rumbaugh, 
and Jacobson 2005); (Paquette 2010); social ontology (Searle 
2006);(March and Allen 2014)). 
o Conceprocity’s principal dialects. 
o CIAOPEA: for students. 
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o Empirical investigation in S1 2013/4 as M2 students had to model the 
concepts and relationships present in an academic paper concerning e-
commerce – loose guidance. 
o S2: tighter guidance to M1 students as they evaluated their own 
experiments in personal information management and as they sought to 
model the structure of journal articles in e-commerce. 
o TROPICPEA: for and with practitioners; empirical work with research 
volunteers as I and they model their personal work systems. 
7.3 Conceprocity usage profiles 
 
Table 24 Conceprocity usage profiles 







Concepts Images Actors Operators Procedures Events Associations 
. Makes use of a deliberately restricted range of Conceprocity 
notions. In particular, the only relationship type supported is 
Association. In order to give more expressiveness, this profile 






Very general with the full range of Conceprocity objects, Typed-
Relationships Operators Principles Images Concepts Procedures 
Events Actors . In this profile, relationships should not normally be 
named. Instead, the nature of the two notions linked by a typed 
relationship should normally provide full context sufficient to make 
the meaning of the relationship clear. Where this is not the case, 
Conceprocity permits commentary / notes. 
Typical uses include: self-observation, research design, 
representing knowledge as-is and as-ought, demonstrating 
understanding, documenting a body of knowledge and design of 
teaching, learning and evaluation. In the context of teaching, it is 
sensible to use such knowledge maps as the “advance organiser” or 
signposting originally suggested by (Ausubel 1963). This usage 






Usage models are slightly-extended use case diagrams. Use case 
diagrams were first proposed by Jacobson and are documented in 
(Booch, Rumbaugh, and Jacobson 2005). We suggest that no 
distinction needs or ought to be made between a use case and a 
procedure. Therefore the symbol used to represent a procedure is 
also used to represent a use case. However in Conceprocity we 
address what we perceive to be a weakness in use case analysis as 
presented by (Booch, Rumbaugh, and Jacobson 2005). That 
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weakness is that interactions – which occur at the interface 
between an actor and a use case – should be explicitly represented. 
We have therefore introduced a specific symbol for interaction 
which we have called a form. In cases where a use case diagram 
represents a computer-based system which is or will be 
implemented, this interaction will take concrete form as a web 
page, perhaps as a web form; or as some other element, such as a 
form, report, query or view in a desktop database. UML stereotypes 
<<extends>> and <<includes>> are implemented simply as labels 







Conceprocity event process chain diagrams are generally similar to 
ARIS EPC diagrams but they are optionally extended by 
incorporating a specific Data swimlane. The data swimlane is 
populated by concepts, which may subsequently be implemented as 
data tables, data views, specific file-types or by webpages. The 
value of the data swimlane is that interactions between it and other 
(non-data) swimlanes enable the modelling of the data flows 
(dataflows) that would otherwise require specific dataflow 
diagrams (DFDs). We suggest that no distinction needs or ought to 
be made between a function in the usual event-process chain 
described by (Scheer, Thomas, and Adam 2005), implemented for 
example in ARIS; and a procedure in Conceprocity. Therefore the 
symbol used to represent a procedure is also used to represent a 
function in an event-process chain. Conceprocity already has a 
specific symbol for an event. The symbols for inclusive OR, 
exclusive XOR and AND are deliberately not the same as those used 





Conceprocity Entity / Relationship diagrams follow the 
conventions established by (Chen 1976) and subsequent work. 
However, ordinality, cardinality and multiplicity are shown in the 
Conceprocity / UML style because this is more expressive (although 









 Conceprocity is not currently intended for the representation of full 
ontologies; it can however be used effectively to represent 
taxonomies. 
   
7.4 Evidence for the usefulness of Conceprocity  
To what extent and in what contexts is Conceprocity really useful? 
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Research into the Working Model of knowledge workers 
 The personal working model of the author 
I present two top level models, separated in time by two years, as: 
Figure 6 A model of a Personal Working Model (2014). 
Figure 61 A personal working model – early 2016. 
They are significantly different in their form and in their content. I would like to 
suggest that the more sophisticated notions present in the later model reflect a 
greater understanding of the underlying philosophical issues discussed in this 
thesis. It is interesting that the visible changes are in the top level model, which is 
the more conceptual and less concrete, less rooted part of the model – the PIMS and 
PWS have much more obvious manifestations. 
 The personal working model of other knowledge workers 
Although empirical work in this area has begun, it will not be reported upon in this 
thesis.  
Modelling the content of academic articles  
 By final year master’s students 
In the first semester of the academic year 2013/4, a small element of the overall 
assessment of a module entitled IS505E Principles of E-Commerce PEC required 
each student to select a different academic article concerning e-business and/or 
information systems. A short teaching session in one class introduced students to 
the basic usage profile of Conceprocity, at that time entitled CAPRI. In a later 
session, students were then introduced to the more advanced usage profile, at the 
time called CAPRICE. The work undertaken by the students was a part only of their 
assessment for a module. I did not therefore expect them to put a huge amount of 
effort into these models. Overall, the quality of conceptual understanding was 
surprisingly good and the degree of respect for the conventions of the modelling 
language rather poor. However, this was very much a first experiment with a very 
early version of Conceprocity. 
Consequent improvements to Conceprocity 
In part as a response to student experience, it was decided to completely revamp 
the usage profiles in Conceprocity. Capri has been replaced by CIAOPEA. Caprice has 
been replaced by TROPICPEA.  
Information systems requirement analysis 
I managed the core Information Systems course in a French business school for 
twelve years. Teaching for almost all that time used an evolving combination of use 
case diagrams, data flow diagrams and entity relationship modelling. This built upon 
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a first-year course in which students became moderately competent in the use of 
Microsoft Access, a rapid application development environment incorporating a 
small-scale relational database. In the most recent two years, dataflow diagrams 
were replaced by event process chains. One of my motivations in creating 
Conceprocity was to prototype an approach to information systems requirements 
analysis, still based on these historically interesting analysis tools but possessed of a 
notational consistency sadly lacking when bringing together existing methods. 
7.5 A critical evaluation of Conceprocity and some 
suggestions for future work 
The tentative nature of these initial conclusions: further research proposed 
Conceprocity is a semi-formal visual knowledge representation language which 
enables and encourages the modeller to be more precise in defining, bounding and 
relating conceptual and procedural knowledge. It is in effect a means to constrain 
and enhance natural language expression and thereby to increase the precision of 
the meaning which the modeller needs to express. To the extent to which two 
modellers can agree upon a Conceprocity model, it is also a means to establish and 
to verify communication of ideas and concepts. 
Certainly, Conceprocity is not without its weaknesses. It is arguably an error to 
permit so much generality of expression in a single modelling approach. The 
counter-argument is that usage profiles permit a more restricted representation and 
are therefore less likely to give rise to cognitive overload in users and readers. I 
would also point out that in knowledge representation schemes such as UML, it is 
necessary to learn a wide range of different – sometimes annoyingly so – 
representations. This problem is even starker in the area of conventional structured 
analysis (Yourdon and Constantine 1976), where a simple notion such as process is 
represented in different, overlapping and confusing ways – contrast data flow 
diagrams, event process chains and use case diagrams. 
More fundamental difficulties and objections 
We have largely accepted as a given the notions put forward by (Paquette 2010) 
which are themselves based partly on the UML thinking of (Booch, Rumbaugh, and 
Jacobson 2005). Paquette’s thinking also derives in large part from cognitive 
science; this influence pervades his book and in particular informs chapter 6 on 
taxonomies of problems and generic skills. 
Earlier we suggested that existing visual representation formalisms have emerged 
largely from the computer science and software engineering communities. It is 
instructive to reconsider the origins of formalisms such as Entity Relationship 
models, modern structured systems analysis, conceptual graphs ((John F. Sowa 
1992a) following Charles Peirce), the object modelling technique and the successor 
Unified Modelling Language UML. These are all representation approaches which 
have been built primarily for the analysis and architectural design of complex 
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software systems. In Conceprocity as it currently stands we have designed and 
presented a visual representation system which, following (Paquette, 2010, p.xiv), 
we wish to be usable by educational specialists and learners who are not computer 
scientists. It is at the same time general and powerful enough to represent the 
structure of knowledge and learning/working scenarios. 
Paquette goes on to say:  
“We present three major steps starting with (1) informal visual 
modelling for the educated layperson, to help represent interesting 
knowledge. We then (2) move onto semi-formal modelling to help 
define target competencies and activity scenarios for knowledge and 
competency acquisition by learners and workers. Finally (3) we 
present the more formal visual models (Ontologies) that can be used 
by software agents to ensure execution of knowledge-based 
processes on the semantic web.” [(Paquette, 2010, p.xiv) slightly 
amended for clarity.]  
Thus, G-MOT supports three dialects, one for general use, one for instruction design 
and one for ontology building. Similarly Conceprocity distinguishes usage profiles 
within a single visual representation language. 
Recall that notion is the name given in Conceprocity to the modelling meta-concepts 
of concepts, procedures, actors, principles, events and relationships. A possible 
alternative word for notions is meta-concepts, that is, concepts about concepts. We 
now wish further to address the issue of whether Conceprocity has chosen the right 
notions. In section 0 we discussed why Conceprocity distinguishes concepts, 
procedures and principles. Here we consider the nature of concept mapping itself 
and the relationships permitted in Conceprocity.  
 What is concept mapping anyway? 
Much of the literature surrounding concept mapping comes from the field of 
enquiry known as knowledge organisation which is largely situated within the 
discipline known as library and information science. (Hjørland 2009) holds that 
information science and knowledge organization cannot avoid relating to theories of 
concepts. Knowledge organizing systems (e.g., classification systems, thesauri, and 
ontologies) should be understood as systems organizing concepts and their 
semantic relations. Different theories of concepts have different implications for 
how to construe, evaluate, and use such systems. Based on what he calls “a post-
Kuhnian view” of paradigms, Hjørland argues that the best understanding and 
classification of theories of concepts is to view and classify them in accordance with 
epistemological theories (he emphasises empiricism, rationalism, historicism, and 
pragmatism). Different views of concepts are associated with different worldviews 
and epistemologies which tend to compete with each other. The historicist and 
pragmatist understandings of concepts are in his view the most fruitful views; he 
outlines the importance of historicist and pragmatic theories of concepts for 
information science. For him, the concept is a socially negotiated construct that 
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should be identified by studying discourses (Hjørland 2009). This view of concept 
theory has been labelled socio-constructivist. 
(Friedman and Thellefsen 2011) discuss knowledge organisation systems and the 
emergence of concept theory and semiotics in that connection. For them knowledge 
organisation as a domain has as its focus the order of concepts, both from a 
theoretical perspective and from an applied perspective. It is therefore important to 
understand the meaning of a concept found in text and in visual maps. Whatever the 
epistemological stance one adopts, it is evident that the meaning of a concept is that 
which was intended by the originator of that concept in accordance with her own 
particular epistemological stance. 
Thus, when (Friedman and Smiraglia 2013) attempt a synthesis of the existing 
theory concerning concepts and concept mapping they do so within the tradition of 
library and information science and in particular they identify “knowledge 
organisation systems”, based on earlier work reported as (Friedman and Thellefsen 
2011). 
 Relationships in Conceprocity 
Some concepts refer to data. The E/R Entity Relationship model of (Chen 1976) has 
informed in particular Conceprocity’s thinking about associations, cardinality, 
ordinality and multiplicities. 
The ideas of aggregation, generalisation and specialisation were introduced by (J. M. 
Smith and Smith 1977) and later informed the design of UML and G-MOT. However, 
it is difficult to discern a single source of inspiration for the conceptualisations 
underlying UML. Specifically, UML does not possess a meta-model; nor does G-MOT.  
Composition and part-whole relationships are the subject of mereology (which is 
separate from the concept of topology). (Guarino 1995) give a fuller introduction.  
Towards an ontological evaluation of Conceprocity 
(Wand 1996) holds that despite the availability of a large number of systems 
analysis methods and techniques there does not exist a general underlying 
foundation for this knowledge domain. The stance which Wand adopts is that an 
information system is a representation of another “real-world” system. This 
ontological stance borrows from the philosophy of Mario Bunge, and in particular 
his ontological formalism as presented in volumes 3 and 4 of his “Treatise on basic 
philosophy” (Bunge 1977, 1979). Wand sees an information system as a 
representation that enables us to obtain knowledge about a certain domain without 
having to observe it. Thus, where the represented domain might be termed the real-
world system, an information system is an artificial representation of that real-
world system, as perceived by somebody, built to enable information processing 
functions. (Wand 1996) therefore challenged me to re-engineer Conceprocity 
starting from a clear ontological stance, which I have sought to achieve. However, 
the stance I have eventually adopted differs somewhat from that which Yair Wand, 
Ron Weber and their various co-authors and collaborators assume in their work. See  
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Table 26 following. 
(Wand and Weber 2002) set out a framework for research on conceptual modelling 
in connection with information systems which has four main components; see Table 
25: 
Table 25 Conceptual Modelling Framework Elements (based on (Wand and Weber 
2002)) 





Provides a set of constructs 
and rules that show how to 
combine the constructs to 
model real-while domains. 
Largely complete. We need to give 
further consideration in particular 
to properties, since the current 
representation (sub-concepts) 
consumes too much space on the 
page. Note that we have yet to 
define the meta-model suggested 
by (Rosemann and Green 2002) for 
Conceprocity; we defend this 
lacuna by emphasising the 
emergent and pragmatic origins of 
Conceprocity. We note also the 
importance of (initially) loosely 
coupling and controlling systems, 
then of subsequently tightening 
them: cf. (Orton and Weick 1990). 
In version 3.0, properties can either 
be modelled as (sub-) concepts or 





Provides procedures by 
which a grammar can be 
used. Such a method needs 
to prescribe how to make 
observations of a domain 
into a model of the domain. 
The method is documented in the 
form of a PowerPoint presentation. 
See also ‘Appendix 1 How to create 
and maintain Conceprocity models’ 
in this document and the linked 




A script is the product of 
the conceptual modelling 
process. 
A Lucidchart template exists and 
this forms the basis of each script. 
The scripts themselves are stored 
in the user's Google Drive. 
Context The context is the setting in 
which conceptual 
modelling occurs and in 
which scripts are 
subsequently used. 
The initial context of use has been 
identified and some scripts have 
already been produced. 
Conceprocity does not itself 
possess easy means to produce 
and maintain a dictionary of the 
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objects it contains, nor any metrics. 
Instead, the dictionary is stored 
elsewhere, for example in Excel, 
Access or – as in this study – 
InfoQube.  
 Specific ontological issues 
• Construct Incompleteness exists in a modelling grammar unless there is at least one modelling 
grammatical construct for each ontological construct. 
• Construct Overload exists if one grammatical construct represents more than one 
ontological construct. 
• Construct Redundancy exists if more than one grammatical construct represents the 
same ontological construct. 
• Construct Excess exists in a modeling grammar when a grammatical construct is present 
that does not map into any ontological construct. 
Table 26 An evaluation of Conceprocity against BWW criteria. Derived from: (Green 
and Rosemann 2000) 
Ontological Construct Specific ontological issues Evaluation 
THING  
Conceprocity conforms well. In particular, it 
distinguishes instances from classes, which is 
unusual in modelling languages. 
PROPERTY:  
Arguably, there is construct excess here. It is possible to 
represent properties both as sub- concepts and in 
separate data tables. This is pragmatically very 







BINDING MUTUAL  
useful. 
ATTRIBUTES  As above. 
CLASS  Conforms. 
KIND  Conforms. 
STATE 
This is a system property, 




This is a system property, 





 Minimally implemented via principles. 
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LAWFUL STATE SPACE  Minimally implemented via principles.  
EVENT  
Implemented by means of the event notion; but we 
should be cautious because event may have 
multiple meanings. 
PROCESS 
Process is discussed by 
Bunge, but not treated 
as a specific 
ontological construct. 
Implemented by means of the procedure notion; but 




 This is a system property, not a model property. 
TRANSFORMATION  
Implemented by means of principle notion; but principle 






Implemented by means of principle notion; but principle 
is arguably afflicted by construct overload. 
LAWFUL EVENT SPACE  This is a system property, not a model property. 
HISTORY  Implement using event instances. 
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ACTS ON  Implemented. 
COUPLING: 
BINDING MUTUAL  
PROPERTY 
 Implemented. 
SYSTEM  Implemented by means of swim lane. 




SYSTEM STRUCTURE  Implemented. 




LEVEL STRUCTURE  Implemented. 
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EXTERNAL EVENT  Implemented. 
STABLE STATE*  This is a system property, not a model property. 
UNSTABLE STATE  This is a system property, not a model property. 
INTERNAL EVENT  See event. 
WELL-DEFINED EVENT  This is a system property, not a model property. 
POORLY-DEFINED 
EVENT 
 This is a system property, not a model property. 
 




Specific ontological issues Notes 
Concept  No distinction is drawn between 
conceptual notions and concrete 
In Conceprocity 3.2, name syntax is extended to 
permit sub-typing, as in queryOutput : 
databaseQuery 
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Images and rich pictures   
Operator  The set of operators is currently fixed; it might be 
sensible to make this user-extensible. 
However, semantic relationships (CPR 3.2) 
have introduced language extensibility 
 
Procedure Arguable construct overload. 
Procedure is used for process, 
function, use case 
A design preference. 
Event Slightly more focused in 
Conceprocity than it is in the 
Bunge ontology 
 
Actor Absent from the Bunge 
ontology, which is where the 
deficiency lies 
 
Principle Corresponds to a number of 
notions in the Bunge ontology,  
such as state law and lawful 
state space.  
We have chosen to follow Paquette’s notion here. 
Class and instance Useful clarification  
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Form Is specific to human-computer 
interaction 
 
View Arguably, construct excess. 
Could simply be a subtype of 
concept. 
Can so be treated in CPR 3.2 
Entity Arguably, construct excess. 
Could simply be a subtype of 
concept. 
This is the 3.2 implementation 
Aggregation   
Composition   
Specialisation   
Typed relationships   
Precedence relationship Arguable construct overload. 
There is no visual distinction 
between precedence 
relationship, prompts 
relationship and input product 
relationship. 
The current compromise is justifiable because it is 
easier to teach and to explain. 
Prompts relationship Arguable construct overload. 
There is no visual distinction 
 




relationship and input product 
relationship. 
Input-product relationship Arguable construct overload. 
There is no visual distinction 
between precedence 
relationship, prompts 
relationship and input product 
relationship. 
Instantiates relationship  A useful clarification. 
Regulates relationship  An essential clarification. 
Grammar   Insufficiently policed in the existing 
implementation. 
Hierarchical levels It could be argued that there is 
construct excess in having both 
hierarchical levels and swim 
lanes. However, they are both 
pragmatically useful. 
 
Swim lanes  Construct excess – actor could be used for this 
purpose. Retained for commonality with SAP 
event process chains. 
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Set operations  Supported by semantic relationships in CPR 3.2. 
Concept to concept  
relationships 
 E.g. analogy, metaphor. Supported by semantic 
relationships in CPR 3.2. 
Collective intentionality   
Institution An important innovation. Most 
conceptual mapping approaches 
simply do not recognise the 
separate existence of social 
ontology, which is peculiar 
given that most information 
systems concern the products of 
human intentionality rather than 
natural-world entities. 
 
Constitutive rule  
Deontic power  
Action  
Semantic relationship  E.g. analogy, metaphor… 
7.6 Existing and developing contributions from my Ph.D. 
research to date - 2 
o Personal working model 
▪ Predicted via (Conant and Ashby 1970) 
▪ Seeking to get individuals to make this explicit. 
o The identification of Nuggets as outputs from and intermediate products of 
the personal work system 
o The beginnings of an understanding of personal information management 
systems 
▪ Bootstrapped by the use and investigation of my own personal 
information management system 
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▪ Under-researched by academia 
▪ Potentially massively significant to the ICT and consumer 
electronics industries 
▪ Thus demanding further academic research. 
o Whence a proof-of-concept personal information management system 
PIMS (Baskerville 2011b) “UnIQue” – tool and method 
▪ Relevance: multiple, e.g. classification (kind) and categorisation 
(tagging) as examples of personal data organization (Jacob 2004) 
both of nuggets and of a bibliography. 
o Initial diffusion of results 
▪ Twelve conference papers  
▪ Website: www.markrogergregory.net, designed to draw in 
volunteers. 
7.7 Design science evaluation: multiple genres of enquiry 
As discussed in Section 0, (Baskerville, Kaul, and Storey 2015) identify four different genre 
of enquiry and show that a single design study may traverse some or all of these genres. 
Thus, for example the design of Conceprocity has nomothetic elements; its application may 
have nomothetic and will always have ideographic aspects. They therefore set out 
corresponding sets of criteria for knowledge justification and evaluation for each genre of 
enquiry. In appendix B, they set out general quality criteria. They suggest the necessity for 
prolonged engagement, persistent observation, data triangulation, methodological 
triangulation, inventiveness, innovativeness, originality, the establishment of principles 
such as dialogical reasoning and the examination and acceptance or rejection of multiple 
interpretations. I would contend that these criteria have been respected either in the 
design of Conceprocity or in the design of UnIQue or in both. Conversely, there are other 
general qualities which this study has not so far respected: these include confirmability, 
dependability, transferability, generalisability, investigator triangulation, objectivity and 
internal and external validity. The knowledge contributions made by this study can 
sometimes be characterised as nascent design theory; operational principles or 
architecture including constructs, models, methods, design principles and technological 
rules – in accordance with (Gregor and Hevner 2013) level 2 knowledge contributions. 
More often, the contributions can only be characterised as situated artefacts; instantiated 
software products or implemented processes – these correspond only to level 1 in the 
knowledge contribution levels identified by Gregor and Hevner. Therefore, I have been 
purposefully vague in the exact level which I associate with design artefacts in my table of 
warrantability. Certainly, there is no question of making level 3 claims for a well-
developed design theory which includes both mid-range and grand design theories. 
7.8 An evaluation of my use of the FMA meta-framework 
See section 6.4.1.2. 
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7.9 Summary list of contributions from my Ph.D. and how 
they have been evaluated 
  
Table 28 Summary list of contributions and notes on their evaluation 
o Contribution o Evaluation 
o A language and method for 
explicating and modelling aspects of 
personal knowledge in a visual form: 
Conceprocity. 
o See section 7.4 above. 
o A thorough literature review, 
indicating the existing absence and 
current need for a philosophically-
informed systems perspective on 
personal information management 
PIM. 
o As the discussion in section 4.4 
makes clear, only two authors 
appear previously to have written 
about personal information 
management systems per se and 
neither of these contributions are 
informed by a strong discussion of 
the nature of systems and in 
particular of emergence. My 
analysis in section 0 of the work of 
William Jones, who is both a prolific 
author in his own right and whose 
works include collections of papers 
from participants in PIM 
workshops, shows that the word 
system is used only in the informal 
sense that any computer on a desk 
constitutes a system. 
o A justification for an insistence on 
modelling – Modelling cannot be just 
an optional extra in situations where 
regulation is required. 
o As Figure 1.8 and the discussion in 
section 1.8 together show, data in a 
personal information management 
system models aspects of reality 
and thereby influences behaviour; 
furthermore, the process of creating 
and/or interpreting a conceptual 
model may change the 
understanding and the actions of a 
knowledge worker. 
o A demonstration by example of the 
role that an explicit philosophical 
stance can take in the working model 
of a knowledge worker and of the 
value that can then have in 
o The process of undertaking this PhD 
and the learning associated with it 
have changed who I am, how I think 
and how I act. 
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influencing the direction of the work 
done. 
o PIMS modelling and implementation 
must be based on an identified 
personal ontological stance which is 
exemplified in the research. 
o The various classification and 
categorisation aspects of the 
UnIQue personal information 
management system have been put 
in place because of the fundamental 
necessity to classify and categorise 
data. The fundamentally realist 
perspective adopted is also 
reflected in the form and content of 
the various Conceprocity models 
produced – and of Conceprocity 
itself, with its insistence on typed 
objects and relationships. 
o Conceptualisation and illustration of 
the individual working models of 
certain individuals, starting with me: 
structured self observation. 
o I have, by means of observation and 
of modelling, been able to illustrate 
a specific case of an individual 
working model. 
o Use of an evolving PIMS and creation 
of Conceprocity: design science 
(Hevner et al. 2004); (Carlsson 2010) 
or action design research (Sein et al. 
2011). 
o  
o Analysis of unschooled and schooled 
Conceprocity mapping by students: 
how useful? - action learning. 
o Now started in teaching in 
Scarborough; second cycle in 2017. 
o Evidence for semiotic and semantic 
morphogenesis in at least one 
individual case; this emergence 
needs further empirical 
investigation. 
o Semiotic morphogenesis is 
evidenced in the development of 
diagrammatic conventions in old 
and new diagrams in this thesis. 
o One of the first applications (as 
opposed to theoretical discussions) 
of a critical realist approach in the 
context of design science research. 
o  
o The thesis subject matter has 
imposed an investigative, self-
referential research approach which 
is iconoclastic and richly informative. 
The morphogenetic development of 
the personal work system and model 
demonstrate the benefits of an open, 
learning approach to learning-while-
o  
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doing which may well have 
applicability in post-experience 
learning by knowledge workers in 
other domains. 
7.10 To what extent have I achieved what I set out to do? 
When I set out to research personal information management systems, I did so with 
an explicit statement that I was exploring rather than seeking explanation. I have 
taken what may appear to be two long and perhaps meandering detours: the first 
into philosophical concerns and the second into conceptual knowledge modelling. 
That I have done this is justifiable for the following reasons: 
1. I needed to unlearn and relearn an incomplete epistemology and a largely 
inexplicit ontology. I have been happy to discover critical realism with its 
emphasis on ontological realism and appropriate epistemological relativism 
and its emphasis  
2. I knew from the start that I would need to create representational and 
actionable models. The need for representational models led me to develop 
the Conceprocity visual modelling language and toolkit. The need for 
actionable models led me to develop UnIQue with its emphasis on explicit 
support for classification and categorisation. I did this because one 
implication of the Conant and Ashby good regulator theorem is that the 
regulatory model should be as near as possible isomorphic with the system 
being regulated. This has the startling and unsettling implication that off-
the-shelf, standardised, overly packaged “solutions” are likely to prove 
inadequate in their regulation of complex situations. Although not reported 
in this thesis, my second design motivation in the creation of Conceprocity 
has been the desire to support usage profiles which will help train and 
support information systems professionals as they analyse system 
requirements. 
3. I am painfully aware that my iconoclastic approach to research risks being 
seen as too left-field to make it easy to promulgate the results of this 
research so far. I am equally aware that the largely exploratory nature of the 
research undertaken so far imposes a significant additional period of work 
on my part before I gain clearer understanding of some of the issues which I 
have raised. But I have enjoyed the process so far… 
7.11 What next? My post-PhD research programme 
This near-future research programme will also consist of multiple elements. 
Investigating the working model, personal work system and personal 
information management system 
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One part of the research will investigate how to identify and make more explicit the 
PIMS and personal working model of knowledge workers who agree to act as 
research volunteers. They will participate in mentored action research into the 
personal working model, personal work systems and supporting personal 
information management systems of the individual knowledge worker as she 
functions in the enterprise and in society.  
Collaborative conceptual modelling for information systems requirements 
analysis 
A second element of the research extends the scope of application of Conceprocity 
into the area of information systems requirements analysis and design. Already 
underway, it involves the active collaboration of students and professional 
knowledge workers.  
Conceprocity is structured as a series of usage profiles. These include the CIAOPEA 
simple knowledge mapping profile and the TROPICPEA comprehensive knowledge 
mapping profile. This is because during the doctoral research, Conceprocity was 
used primarily as a knowledge modelling approach. However, it has also been 
designed for a second area of application, that of information systems requirements 
analysis. (Pohl 2010) holds that conceptual modelling is an essential complement to 
requirements analysis based on natural language. I have as a teacher sought over 
many years to introduce information systems and business students to aspects of 
conceptual modelling which ought to assist in a reasonably rigorous elicitation and 
analysis of user requirements for computerised information systems. In my 
experience and that of others, both the conventional structured approach – usually 
based on data flow diagrams and/or entity relationship attribute modelling – and 
approaches based on UML techniques, particularly use case models: tend in practice 
not to be successful. Students find the techniques difficult to learn and effectively 
impossible to apply; certainly, the analysis undertaken is not reflected in the design 
of the artefacts they attempt subsequently to implement.  
My conjecture is that a contributory factor to the difficulties which students 
encounter is the confusion engendered by encountering multiple, overlapping and 
inconsistent knowledge representation schemas.  
I have designed Conceprocity to use the same symbols across a range of different 
usage profiles. Each usage profile corresponds to a particular kind of model which it 
may be appropriate to use in some context or other. Where, as in information 
systems requirements, use is made of multiple models, I have endeavoured to 
ensure that the same symbol is used for comparable and compatible notion types in 
each of the models. 
Table 29 lists the current Conceprocity usage profiles. The column entitled 
“Purpose” indicates which model types are best served by the corresponding usage 
profile. 
Table 29 Conceprocity usage profiles 











Concepts Images Actors Operators Procedures Events 
Associations. CIAOPEA makes use of a deliberately restricted 
range of Conceprocity notions. In particular, the only 
relationship type supported is Association. In order to give 
more expressiveness, this profile permits Association 
relationships to be named and encourages it. This usage 
profile is designed for simple concept mapping, where it is 
desirable to mask the complexity of different relationship 
types. It is equally suitable for use in usage modelling (aka 






Very general with the full range of Conceprocity objects, 
Typed-Relationships Operators Principles Images Concepts 
Procedures Events Actors . In this profile, relationships 
should not normally be named. Instead, the nature of the two 
notions linked by a typed relationship should normally 
provide full context sufficient to make the meaning of the 
relationship clear. Where this is not the case, Conceprocity 
permits commentary / notes. Typical uses include: self-
observation, research design, representing knowledge as-is 
and as-ought, demonstrating understanding, documenting a 
body of knowledge and design of teaching, learning and 
evaluation. In the context of teaching, it is sensible to use such 
knowledge maps as the “advance organiser” or signposting 
originally suggested by (Ausubel 1963). This usage profile is 






Usage models are slightly-extended use case diagrams. Use 
case diagrams were first proposed by Jacobson and are 
documented in (Booch, Rumbaugh, and Jacobson 2005). We 
suggest that no distinction needs or ought to be made 
between a use case and a procedure. Therefore, the symbol 
used to represent a procedure is also used to represent a use 
case. We go on in Conceprocity to address what we perceive 
to be a weakness in use case analysis as presented by (Booch, 
Rumbaugh, and Jacobson 2005). That weakness is that 
interactions – which occur at the interface between an actor 
and a use case – should be explicitly represented. We have 
therefore introduced a specific symbol for interaction which 
we have called a form. In cases where a use case diagram 
represents a computer-based system which is or will be 
implemented, this interaction will take concrete form as a 
dynamic web page, or as some other element, such as a form, 
report, query or view in a desktop database. UML stereotypes 
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<<extends>> and <<includes>> are implemented simply as 







Conceprocity event process chain diagrams are generally 
similar to ARIS EPC diagrams (Scheer 2000) but they are 
optionally extended by incorporating a specific ICT swimlane. 
The ICT swimlane is populated by concepts, which may 
subsequently be implemented as data tables, data views, 
specific file-types or by webpages; or by the forms identified 
in a usage model. The value of the ICT swimlane is that 
interactions between data and other (non-ICT) swimlanes 
enable the modelling of the data flows (dataflows) that would 
otherwise require specific dataflow diagrams (DFDs).  
We suggest that no distinction needs or ought to be made 
between a function in the usual event-process chain 
described by (Scheer, Thomas, and Adam 2005), 
implemented for example in ARIS (Scheer 2000); and a 
procedure in Conceprocity. Therefore, the symbol used to 
represent a procedure is also used to represent a function in 
an event-process chain. Conceprocity already has a specific 
symbol for an event which was inspired by, and is therefore 
consistent with, an EPC event. The symbols for inclusive OR, 
exclusive XOR and AND are deliberately not the same as those 
used in common event-process chain modelling tools such as 
ARIS. In Conceprocity, a clear visual distinction is made 





Conceprocity Entity / Relationship diagrams broadly follow 
the conventions established by (Chen 1976) and subsequent 
work. Conceprocity permits the use of the crow’s foot 
notation used by Chen. However, ordinality, cardinality and 
multiplicity can also be shown in the Conceprocity style used 
in TRPOICPEA. Itself based directly on UML, the TROPICPEA 
notation is more expressive (although less visual) than Chen’s 
notation. 
I am currently experimenting with the use of Conceprocity-based requirements 
analysis in student teaching and learning. The research approach adopted is that 
identified as mentored action learning (Gregory, Kehal, and Descubes 2012b) in the 
context of design ethnography (Baskerville and Myers 2015). Teaching, particularly 
in small classes, has much in common with mentored action learning. An additional 
element required by mentored action learning (over and above normal teaching 
practice) is structured reflection by the teacher.  
Further exploitation of the existing research data 
I will carry out further analysis of the PhD Journal which I have created over the last 
five years. The purpose of this analysis will be to: 
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1. Continue to verify and to improve the classification and categorisation 
mechanisms put in place in UnIQue. 
2. Better understand and delineate principles of effective personal 
information and work management. 
My eventual intention is to set out the specification for an improved knowledge 
management and personal information management application. 
Moving on towards mentored action learning 
It continues to be my intention to carry out a process of mentored action research 
federated by a shared online learning community. In that community individuals 
will act both as learners and mentors; I refer to both as research volunteers (RVs). 
Initially I shall perhaps be prima inter pares, the principal research mentor. 
In my role as what (Baskerville and Myers 2015) call a design ethnographer, I as 
researcher will collect many more facts, some of which may also be surprising. 
These will suggest hypothetical explanations – some of which may later, and by 
other researchers, be the subject of further empirical investigation by logics of 
enquiry other than abductive. In the processes of carrying out my research and 
aiding the learning of others, other contributions – prototype learning resources in 
the form of working documents which in this current thesis I name nuggets – will be 
generated and, to some extent, refined. My “conclusions” will continue sometimes to 
be tentative, almost always partial, perhaps insufficiently rigorous for some journals 
but of some relevance or usefulness in practice. That latter probability motivates 
me. 
The significance of this ongoing research programme 
Together, mentored action learning in the context of understanding and improving 
personal work and the continuing work on Conceprocity-based requirements 
analysis are indications of how this research programme potentially offers intensely 
practical relevance and application for knowledge workers in service and for 
students learning how better to manage their knowledge, information and time. I am 
planning two online courses in the MOOC tradition which will help respectively 
students and managers in practice to see the benefits of improving their personal 
information management within the context of a better understanding of their 
working model. In the case of executives, I intend to give them practical help – 
mentored action learning – towards a better understanding of who they are and 
how they work best. However, this has to be within the context of mentored action 
learning because as yet I have far too little evidence of the generalisability of my 
currently somewhat tenuous findings. Conceprocity in its current Lucidchart 
implementation is just about ready for prime-time; however, because Lucidchart is a 
chargeable service, I need to consider the possibility of re-implementing the entire 
approach as an open source project. 
7.12 Post-PhD research programme as a Conceprocity map 
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Figure 62 shows the author’s post-PhD mentored action learning research process: 
  
Figure 62 The PhD research process of the author represented as a Conceprocity 
concept <-> process map 
This map is by no means the only possible conceptualisation of post-PhD work. 
Furthermore, it can easily be criticised on multiple grounds. I have not, for example, 
followed my own guidelines on the number of notions to be shown on a single map. 
But the very fact of there being such a model helps to clarify understanding, enables 
dialogue and offers evaluative possibilities.  
7.13 Papers planned following thesis acceptance 
 















management by  
Gregory, Mark Information 
Systems Journal 
Written and presented at 
conference as (Gregory, 
Kehal, and Descubes 2012a). 







– AJG: 3; FNEGE: 
2 
A small amount of additional 
empirical research is 
required. Early 2017. 










Systems –  
AJG: 3; FNEGE: 1 
Written and presented at 
conference. (Gregory and 
Macgilchrist 2014). Awaits 
minor revision. 2017. 
Action learning and 
structured reflection 
in information 








AJG: not ranked; 
FNEGE: 2 
Written and presented at 
conference. (Gregory and 
Descubes 2011c). Awaits 
minor revision. Journal 





Gregory, Mark Information and 
Organization – 
AJG: 3; FNEGE: 2 
or Journal of 
Information 
Science – AJG:2; 
FNEGE: NR or 






AJG: 3; FNEGE: 
NR 
Written; awaits minor 
revision and incorporation of 
additional empirical data 






mapping1.docx for an early 
draft of this paper. 











– AJG: 2; FNEGE: 
NR 
An empirical analysis of 
emergent concepts in the 
literature of Personal 
Information Management 
PIM, demonstrating the 
absence of a systems view in 
the literature and arguing for 







Gregory, Mark Academy of 
Management 
Perspectives -  
AJG: 2; FNEGE: 2 
2017 
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7.14 Emergent principles 
This section summarise principles which I recognised as I kept my research journal. 
I am certain that there are more principles waiting to be discovered when I carry 
out further analysis of that journal. The warrantability of principles of this kind is 
low but to suggest them and perhaps then to test them is better than simply to 
ignore their possibility 
o Philosophy (sometimes) matters. 
▪ Especially if trying to get articles published in top IS journals! 
Building bridges 
from each side of the 








Gregory, Mark Information 
Systems 
Frontiers – AJG: 
3; FNEGE: 4 
2017 
Conjectures on the 
morphogenesis of 








Education – AJG: 
4; FNEGE: 2 
Early 2017. Originally 
written by Renaud; I have 
significantly revised and 
extended this paper, 
particularly in the area of its 
philosophical underpinnings. 
Model-based 
reasoning in the 
service of 
conceptualisation: a 
concept <-> process 
reciprocity approach 
Gregory, Mark Academy of 
Management 
Discoveries – 
not ranked (too 
new?) 
2017 
Teaching as action 
learning: a design 
science perspective 
Gregory, Mark Academy of 
Management 
Learning and 
Education – AJG: 
4; FNEGE: 2 
2018; co-author sought. A 
reflective evaluation of the 
cycles of action learning, 
particularly by the teacher, 
implicit in repeated and 
evolving course delivery 
involving practical 
techniques. Each delivery is 
seen as an experiment from 
which lessons are learnt for 
subsequent cycles. 
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o Only by taking a systems perspective can we recognise the existence of 
personal work and information systems, their overlap and their 
distinctions. 
▪ Even then, we need to take care to align the content and structure 
of our PIMS to the world that we recognise. 
▪ Thus, personal ontological categories can be of the real, purely 
conceptual or indeed fictional. 
▪ A suitably-ambiguous example: storing details about a household – 
the people who live at an address. 
o Similarly, models – which are always conceptual abstractions – can be of 
the real, conceptual or fictional. 
▪ Models are necessary; the IS community with which I identify has a 
duty to help people understand that. 
• The alternative to models is not no models, but bad models 
because they remain inexplicit mental models. 
• Models take different forms but must be “surfaced”; we 
must help to make them more explicit and perhaps to 
improve them 
• Conceptual modelling, for example Conceprocity, can 
greatly help here. 
• Aspects of certain models are active or dynamic, e.g. tables 
of summary data used to support decisions. 
o Control – management – needs and should mandate good modelling 
aiding requisite variety. 
o We should endeavour to build good regulators – a good Working Model – 
and to help others to do so. 
In my discussion of the work of (Gregor and Jones 2007) on the anatomy of a design 
theory, in section 0, I concluded with the speculation that the set of principles I 
would put forward for the specification and/or evolution of a PIMS within a PWS 
could be tested against the design theory components summarised in Table 10. as I 
analyse, design and specify better tools for personal information and knowledge 
management, I shall in parallel apply these design theory components and 
subsequently report my work. 
7.15 Some reflections and two conclusions 
I have so far failed to meet a personal objective, which was to have carried out 
sufficient mentored action research to be in a position to yield results empirically 
informed by the PIMS of people other than myself. 
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I have learnt a great deal from my doctoral studies, but clearly have much still to 
learn. 
In particular, I still look for "solutions" to insufficiently defined or perhaps 
irrelevant problems – cf. Soft Systems Methodology SSM (Checkland and Poulter 
2006). 
1. Each knowledge worker should learn continuously to improve the 
individual enacted knowledge model and system of data organisation 
which informs and is informed by their daily work. 
2. Any knowledge worker can benefit from systemic and systematic personal 
information management by means of: 
▪ Inspired bricolage and principled design. 
▪ Theory-informed clarity of conceptualisation. 
▪ Multiple points of view and tools appropriate to each. 
▪ Reflection and shared learning. 
7.16 A summary 
The effective regulation of the work and life of the individual knowledge worker 
depends upon having a homomorphic model of that life and what she is seeking to 
achieve within it. This observation is not original – it is based on the work of Conant 
and Ashby – but its application to the individual is believed to be novel. Making such 
a homomorphic Personal Working Model explicit is difficult but highly desirable and 
therefore merits hard work. The model is partial and its various expressions require 
elements which are visual, analogical and the understanding of which will 
necessarily involve model-based reasoning. Certain elements of this personal 
working model are best expressed visually; others are best expressed as tables of 
elements which can to some extent be presented hierarchically but are in fact often 
of a network underlying structure. The elements both of the tables and of the visual 
models are an expression of the personal ontology of the individual knowledge 
worker. By ontology, I mean the kinds of things with which she must deal and how 
they relate one to another.    
My initial research epistemology concentrates on my use of a personal information 
management system in order to study, and in particular to model, personal 
information management systems PIMS. My PIMS is the result of an assembly by 
bricolage and experiential design of various elements which enable me to store the 
personal data which informs my working life. 
1. In my investigation of the nature of this model, I have perforce to use 
formalisms. I have chosen pragmatically to concentrate on two semi-formal 
means of expression. Conceprocity – concept <-> process reciprocity – is a 
visual and textual language and toolset of my own devising which is 
intended for capturing, expressing, communicating and co-creating models 
of topic areas of domain knowledge by domain experts or learners.  
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2. I have also made use of a software tool called InfoQube. The fundamental 
information management technique supported by InfoQube is that of a 
hierarchic outline with columns which are database queries. Its most 
prominent advance on earlier outlining tools is that any information item 
can appear in more than one hierarchy simultaneously. Furthermore, the 
item can appear as a row in one or more grids, each column of which 
permits the storage of user-defined values such as text, numbers, lists, 
hyperlinks and pictures. 
Thus, in my own model of my own working life I have chosen to represent the 
semantic structure, the dictionary, of that model by means of InfoQube data grids 
and Conceprocity visual maps. Much of the target data is stored in InfoQube grids.  
I go on to summarise the nature of the ontology. 
There are things. Every thing has a kind. Things (and kinds of things) have 
properties. Things sometimes offer affordances to actors. Some things have a clear 
real-world existence. The ontology of the brute things with which I am concerned 
follows Mario Bunge. The ontology of the institutional things with which I am 
concerned broadly follows John Searle.  
Things are transformed by actions. Repeated actions may be generalised into 
processes. Every instance of a thing and every kind of thing – the latter 
corresponding to a concept – has a name. Collections of things, which I refer to as 
concepts, can be related to other concepts either by structural relationships or by 
actions which transform one concept to another: transformations. In Conceprocity, 
we might represent an action as having input concepts and output concepts.  
Conceprocity is a semiotic system. I and therefore I suspect many others react 
against the exactness and the formalism of the existential graphs of Charles Sanders 
Peirce and the conceptual graphs of John Sowa. That is why I have devised 
Conceprocity. It is a compromise between formality and approachability. It may 
initially appear to be a step too far for certain learners, but a modeller can 
concentrate on visual icons that speak to her – and hopefully to other users of the 
map.  
I hope that I have begun to show how personal information is used by the 
knowledge worker in what we stress to be an open, self-organising system 
demonstrating continuous evolution and learning.  
7.17 A wider public? 
Information systems used to be a practical subject and it should be again. It is the 
individual who has the most to gain from being more effective in her work and 
information management and it is individual information systems which, as Richard 
Baskerville has suggested, hold the greatest promise for new and exciting research 
questions and projects. I also believe that information systems researchers and 
teachers continue to be the best placed people to introduce the potential of ICT – the 
most potent current source of business innovation – and specifically to introduce, 
train and help people to capitalize on the enormous and somewhat lost significance 
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of modelling.I am planning two online courses in the MOOC tradition which will help 
respectively students and managers in practice to see the benefits of improving 
their personal information management within the context of a better 
understanding of their working model. In the case of executives, I intend to give 
them practical help – mentored action learning – towards a better understanding of 
who they are and how they work best. However, this has to be within the context of 
mentored action learning because as yet I have far too little evidence of the 
generalisability of my currently somewhat tenuous findings. Conceprocity in its 
current Lucidchart implementation is just about ready for prime-time; however, 
because Lucidchart is a chargeable service, I need to consider the possibility of re-
implementing the entire approach as an open source project. 
7.18 Some final words 
The thesis which I here present is the culmination of several years of thinking and of 
research. It is of course incomplete and is at best just another brick in the wall. 
However, I feel happy that I have been able to do what I set out to do at this stage in 
the development of my work.  
My professor of geography and urban planning at the University of Reading in the 
early 1970s was Sir Peter Hall, a truly inspiring teacher who died in 2014. Sir Peter 
advised his PhD student Carmen Hass-Klau to rewrite the final chapter of her PhD 
when she had answered to her own satisfaction the question: 
 “‘Why did you want to write this PhD and what do you really want 
to say after three years of work?’. So I did and in later life I quite 
often used this advice with my own PhD students.” 
The Argentinian philosopher Mario Bunge approvingly quotes his own teacher of 
philosophy in the preface to his treatise on philosophy (Bunge 1979): 
“The author dedicates this work to his philosophy teacher Kanenas 
T. Pota in gratitude for his advice: "Do your own thing. Your reward 
will be doing it, your punishment having done it".”   
Elsewhere, Bunge quotes the same teacher: 
“Philosophy without exactness is mushy - but can be nourishing. 
Exactness without depth is sheer gymnastics — and boring.” 
Earlier in the same preface, Bunge states: 
“Now a word of apology for attempting to build a system of basic 
philosophy. As we are supposed to live in the age of analysis, it may 
well be wondered whether there is any room left, except in the 
cemeteries of ideas, for philosophical syntheses. The author's 
opinion is that analysis, though necessary, is insufficient - except of 
course for destruction. The ultimate goal of theoretical research, be it 
in philosophy, science, or mathematics, is the construction of 
systems, i.e. theories. Moreover those theories should be articulated 
into systems rather than being disjoint, let alone mutually at odds. 
Once we have got a system we may proceed to taking it apart. First 
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the tree, then the sawdust. And having attained the sawdust stage we 
should move on to the next, namely the building of further systems. 
And this for three reasons: because the world itself is systemic, 
because no idea can become fully clear unless it is embedded in some 
system or other, and because sawdust philosophy is rather boring.” 
I am glad that, much closer to the end of my working life than to its beginning, I have 
been able to write and to present a PhD thesis which gives a potentially useful 
partial answer to the question posed in its title. I have identified, exemplified and 
begun to model the three fundamental systemic concepts included in that title, those 
of Working Model, personal work system and personal information management 
systems (PIMS). My apology is to those in my entourage who have had to wait so 
long while I have “done my own thing”, or at least (be afraid…) made a start on it. 
   Mark Gregory, Hull, 21/12/2016. 
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1. Appendix 1 How to create and maintain Conceprocity models  
For reasons of space, the full version of this appendix has been moved to my website 
where it can be accessed via the address 
http://markrogergregory.net/2016/03/31/thesis-resources/ 
§0 Illustrating Concepts 
Concepts may be held both visually and linguistically, whence: 
Mind Maps –Tony Buzan (Buzan and Buzan 1996). 
Concept maps – Joseph Novak and collaborators (Novak and Cañas 2008) following 
David Ausubel (Ausubel 1963) and (Ausubel 2000). 
Concept maps with typed concepts and relationships: LICEF (Université de Québec à 
Montréal UQAM) (Paquette 2010); (Basque 2013). 
Concept <-> Process maps: Conceprocity: Mark Gregory (www.markrogergregory.net). 
Using both the visual and the linguistic (written and spoken language) stimulates better 
understanding of a situation and thus better learning. 
§1 Using both the Left and Right Brain 
The concept of right brain and left brain thinking developed from the late 1960s research 
of psycho-biologist Roger W Sperry, who discovered that the human brain has two very 
different ways of thinking (Sperry 1975). 
Right brain is visual and processes information in an intuitive and simultaneous way, 
looking first at the whole picture then the details. 
Left brain is verbal and processes information in an analytical and sequential way, looking 
first at the pieces then putting them together to get the whole. 
§2 Tony Buzan’s Mind Maps 
(Buzan and Buzan 1996) 
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Figure 63 An example mind map 
Tony Buzan’s Mind Maps are highly visual. However, their insistence on a single centre is 
unnecessarily restrictive and their strict hierarchy prevents conceptual cross-linking 
between branches of the tree. 
§3 Conceprocity: An Introduction 
Conceprocity – concept <-> process reciprocity – is a visual and textual language and 
toolset intended for capturing, expressing, communicating and co-creating models of 
topic areas of domain knowledge by domain experts or learners. 
You, as an expert or a learner in your domain,  decide the vocabulary. 
You follow what are initially very simple grammar rules as you build a visual model of 
your understanding of a topic within your domain of interest. 
§4 Conceprocity: for teaching and learning 
I as a teacher wish to: 
Provide learners with signposts to and syntheses of course material – (Ausubel 1963) 
and (Ausubel 2000)’s “advance organisers”. 
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Stimulate and assist student learning as students themselves create their own concept 
maps. 
Evaluate and enhance student learning. 
Both students and I can use Conceprocity maps for these purposes. 
§5 Conceprocity: in research practice 
I as a researcher need to map concepts and their relationships in order to: 
Model personal work systems – the subject of my research; these PWS might belong to 
me or to research volunteers. 
Clarify and record my understanding of complex issues and sometimes of complex 
articles or working documents that I read or write. 
and  
To communicate that understanding to others. 
Conceprocity aims to be a simple, relevant, easily-applicable way to represent, manage 
and facilitate the communication of personal knowledge. 
§6 Conceprocity: as a contribution to research methods 
I as a researcher of personal information management have chosen as one of my 
research methods autoethnography (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009); (S. H. Jones 2005), 
which can be characterised by structured self-observation (Rodriguez and Ryave 2002). 
One way of structuring that self-observation is to create concept maps; precisely in order 
to give structure to my self-observation and to that of other collaborators. 
§7 Simple Conceprocity: CIAOPEA 
Within Conceprocity there is a beginners’ profile “Simple concept mapping for 
beginners”, in which the only available relationship between concepts is association . 
This simple concept mapping for beginners usage profile is called CIAOPEA: Concepts 
Images Associations Operators Procedures Events Actors . 
Strong emphasis on the use of sketches, icons and images to stimulate right brain 
involvement. 
There are other usage profiles which are not mentioned further in the first part of this 
presentation. 
They make use of a further notion – principles; and of typed relationships rather than 
associations 
§8 An example Conceprocity model and how it has been created - 1 
Start with a simple English sentence: “The cat sat on the mat”. 
Give a specific instance: “The cat called Kat sat on the mat in my lounge”. 
A concrete Conceprocity map is as right. 
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Identify concepts (things), any static relationships and any activities. 
Create a specific and a more general model using the meta-concepts (we call them 
Conceprocity notions) of concept, procedure and relationship. 
We firstly consider concrete then abstract representations.  
 
 
§9 An example Conceprocity model and how it has been created - 2 
Observe, maybe discuss and then refine the resulting map. 
Here we choose to remove the concrete and retain the abstract elements in a conceptual 
model of the general situation of creatures acting in a spatial context. 
The model that results depends upon the viewpoint and the purpose of the modeller. 
A cat specialist (and a cat lover!) will take a different view from an expert in cognitive 
science applied to animals. 
But the process of dialogue and of mutual understanding can be aided by visual concept 
mapping and by centring the dialogue around the models. 
(Concrete notions are indicated by a pecked border and a slightly darker colour whereas 
abstract notions have a solid border and a slightly lighter colour.) 
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§10 Simple Conceprocity CIAOPEA: Fundamentals 
Conceprocity distinguishes between types (classes) of objects:- following LICEF’s G-MOT. 
Concepts – (kinds of) things, ideas, etc.; these are usable and (sometimes) decidable 
classes of knowledge or data 
 
Images: images illustrate concepts or any other notion 
 
Associations: concepts are related by relationships or relationship instances (links). In 
CIAOPEA the only available type of relationship is an association; this should normally be 
given a name and perhaps a direction - arrow  
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Operators: logical operators NOT, XOR, OR or AND 
 
Procedures  - the means of enacting knowledge in the form of specific activities, 
repeatable actions and processes – the latter being templates for repeated actions 
 
Events: EITHER occurrences in time that change the state of a class of objects OR named 
states of class of objects 
 
Actors - people, organisations, external systems 
 
§11 Further examples and positioning 




Simple Conceprocity CIAOPEA: Representation 
 
Representing Simple Conceprocity CIAOPEA relationships 
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Different kinds of arrow (arcs) are used:; principally the Regulates relationship, the 
Prompts relationship and the Instantiates relationship: 
 
§12 Images: Conceprocity for the Right Brain 
Conceprocity makes it easy to include visual elements. Beyond Conceprocity’s own 
symbols, we can include images and icons. 
You can either locate these for yourself, or you can use Google Images search, or you can 
make sketches using apps such as ArtRage. Sketches (e.g. fragments of rich pictures) can 
also be drawn freehand on paper and then photographed and uploaded. 
Sketches – less formal diagrams – sometimes have a role, particularly in the early 
development or the informal presentation of a model (especially during whiteboard 
sessions). This is the way in which a concept process model can include and embrace rich 
pictures or elements of a rich picture. Rich pictures were originally introduced by Peter 
Checkland (Checkland 1981); see also (Avison, Golder, and Shah 1992) and (Checkland 
and Tsouvalis 1997). A recent application is reported by (Berg and Pooley 2012). We note 
that the recent widespread use of tablet computers makes it much easier to create such 
sketches and then to incorporate them in Conceprocity models. We note too that sketches 
can be created using pen and paper and then captured digitally as images: the person 
responsible for the sketch takes a photograph of the outcome using her smartphone or 





§13 Modelling businesses using rich pictures 
Use few words. 
Use lots of pictures. 
 
Although a Conceprocity model usually includes rich pictures as an element of a 
Conceprocity map, a rich picture can in fact stand alone as a Conceprocity model. 
§14 Making rich pictures 
Rich pictures (situation summaries) are used to depict complicated situations. 
Encapsulate the real situation through a no-holds-barred, cartoon representation of 
layout, connections, relationships, influences, cause-and-effect etc. - objective notions. 
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Should also try to depict subjective elements such as character and characteristics, points 
of view and prejudices, spirit and human nature – since these often get eliminated far too 
soon in conceptual modelling. 
If possible, involve the actors themselves rather than focusing on your own interpretation 
of the situation. 
Allow competing pictures, and indeed complete models - don’t “reconcile”; but do perhaps 
“accommodate”? 
Prefer sketches to the reuse of images found on the Web – the former involve modellers 
and readers much more. 
§15 Begin to build a model 
o What is the question or topic area that you are addressing? 
o What are the top five or so concepts? 
o Are there any direct relationships (associations) between these concepts? 
▪ E.g.: is-a-kind-of, consists-of… 
o Otherwise: what processes link or transform the concepts? 
o Make lists of likely concepts and procedures. 
o Perhaps keep these lists in a formal Conceprocity dictionary? 
o Sketch out an initial CIAOPEA model – on a large sheet of paper or on a 
whiteboard – preserve this using a smartphone picture. 
o Include rich picture elements as images on the CIAOPEA map. 
§16 How to get started with a CIAOPEA model 
Identify and make lists of concepts and their “obvious” structural links / associations. 
Example: Kat is-instance-of cat; beech is-a-kind-of tree. 
Identify procedures or processes which link concepts and is still validly a part of where 
one needs to be changed or transformed in some way which goes beyond a structural 
association. 
farmer buys bull 
cow gives-birth-to calf 
(But here, better – structural - models are possible, expressed in terms of parent and 
child). 
§17 A student tutorial example: Modelling a marketing campaign 
Your task: to create a simple Conceprocity CIAOPEA model of the general principles of an 
e-marketing campaign. 
Over to you: 
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Twenty minutes as separate teams. 
Present, compare, contrast, reject, synthesise for five minutes. 
Tell / show us your tentative conclusions on the flipboard. 
§18 Full Conceprocity: TROPICPEA 
TROPICPEA: Typed-Relationships Operators Principles Images Concepts Procedures 
Events Actors. 
More emphasis on principles and on events. 
Associations are clarified as fully typed relationships. 
Examples: a wing is-part-of aircraft. 
Follows and extends LICEF G-MOT. 
Intended for use by more experienced modellers or by learners who have access to a 
skilled mentor. 
You are advised to start with CIAOPEA and perhaps progress to TROPICPEA. 
§19 Full Conceprocity TROPICPEA fundamentals 
 
The remainder of this appendix is to be found at: 
https://markrogergregory.net/conceprocity-version-3-0-2016/
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2. Appendix 2 Conceprocity’s special relationships 
Conceprocity 3.0 introduces generalized relationship symbols which can be marked with text and/or icon. There are two generalised relationship symbols, 
one directional, the other not. They look like this: 
 
Figure 64 Undirected and directed generalised relationship symbols 
 
Table 31 Semantic relations  





Examples Commentary Direction Relation name Conceprocity 
Synonymy 
(similar) 
N, V, Aj, Av Pipe, tube A word or phrase with a meaning that is 
the same as, or very similar12 to, another 
word or phrase. 
Non-
directional 
synonym_of ◆ synonym 
  Rise, ascend  Similarity is probably too 
imprecise a term to use in 
the context of conceptual   Sad, unhappy  
12 We are aware that the notion of similarity is difficult because similarity can occur in a number of different and sometimes conflicting ways. "Very similar" 
is an attempt to get round these undoubted difficulties. (Vervaeke and Green 1997, 70) remind us that “similarity is vacuous as an explanatory concept 



























Examples Commentary Direction Relation name Conceprocity 
  Rapidly, 
speedily 
Synonymy is WordNet’s basic relation, 
because WordNet uses sets of synonyms 
(synsets) to represent word senses. 
Synonymy (syn same, onyma name) is a 
etric relation between word forms. 
 modelling. It is necessary 
to ask: similar in what 
terms? Allowed, but must 
be made specific. 
Antonymy 
(opposite) 
Aj, Av, (N, 
V) 
Wet, dry A word which has the opposite meaning to 
another. Antonymy (opposing-name) is 
also a symmetric semantic relation 
between word forms, especially important 




antonym_of ◆ antonym 
  Powerful, 
powerless 
 Antonymy is probably as 
difficult to make precise as 
similarity. Allowed, but 
must be made specific.   Friendly, 
unfriendly 
 








A superordinate grouping word or phrase 
which includes subordinate terms. 
Hypernymy (super-name) and its inverse, 
hyponymy (sub-name)), are transitive 
relations between synsets. Because there 
is usually only one hypernym, this 
Transitive - 
directional 
hypernym_of Concept aggregation 
because any two objects are similar in infinitely many different ways. What causes our general agreement on the relative similarity of objects is more 
strongly a function of the inherent structure of our cognitive mechanisms, which more or less automatically select those dimensions along which objects 
are compared. That is, it is an effect of categorization, not its cause.” 




























Examples Commentary Direction Relation name Conceprocity 
semantic relation organizes the meanings 
of nouns into a hierarchical structure. 
Hyponymy 
(subordinate) 
N Sugar maple, 
maple 
A more specific term; a subordinate 
grouping word or phrase. Hyponymy (sub-
name) and its inverse, hypernymy (super-
name), are transitive relations between 
synsets. Because there is usually only one 
hypernym, this semantic relation 




hyponym_ of Concept aggregation 
  Maple, tree   
  Tree, plant   
Holonymy 
(part) 
N Brim, hat In relation to a given term, a term—word 
or phrase—that denotes a whole whose 
part is denoted by the other term, such as 
"face" in relation to "eye”. Holonymy 
(whole-name) and its inverse, meronymy 




holonym_of Concept composition 
Meronymy 
(part) 
N Brim, hat A term that denotes a part of the whole 
that is denoted by another term. 
Meronymy (part-name) and its inverse, 
holonymy (whole-name), are complex 
semantic relations. WordNet distinguishes 




meronym_ of Concept composition 
  Gin, Martini    
  Ship, Fleet   






Examples Commentary Direction Relation name Conceprocity 
Troponymy 
(manner) 
V March, walk Troponymy (manner-name) is for verbs 
what hyponymy is for nouns, although the 
resulting hierarchies are much shallower. 
Transitive - 
directional 
troponym_ of Procedure composition: 
sub-procedures 
  Whisper, 
speak 
 
Entailment V Drive, ride Entailment relations between verbs are 





entails Event – procedure linked 
by prompts relationship 
  Divorce, 
marry 
Analogy N, V, Aj, Av 
 
The use of a similar example or model to 
explain or to extrapolate from. Analogy 
(from Greek ἀναλογία, analogia, 
"proportion") is a cognitive process of 
transferring information or meaning from 
a particular subject (the analogue or 
source) to another particular subject (the 
target), or a linguistic expression 
corresponding to such a process. In a 
narrower sense, analogy is an inference or 
an argument from one particular to 
another particular, as opposed to 
deduction, induction, and abduction, 
where at least one of the premises or the 
conclusion is general. In Conceprocity, at 
least one side of such an analogy 
Transitive - 
directional 
analogous_ to → analogy 






Examples Commentary Direction Relation name Conceprocity 













their exits and 
their 
entrances…” 
A metaphor is a form of analogy which 
states that A is B or substitutes B for A. It is 
a figure of speech that identifies one thing 
as being the same as some unrelated other 
thing, thus strongly implying the 
similarities between the two. 
Transitive - 
directional 
metaphor_ for → METAPHOR 
Simile 
  
A figure of speech that directly compares 
two things through the explicit use of 
connecting words (such as like, as, so, than, 
or various verbs such as resemble). A 
simile is a form of analogy which states 




simile_for ◆ LIKE 
Homonym N, V, Aj, Av 
 
A word that both sounds and is spelled the 













Examples Commentary Direction Relation name Conceprocity 
Metonym N, V, Aj, Av "Hollywood" 
is used as a 
metonym for 
the U.S. film 
industry 
A word that names an object from a single 
characteristic of it or of a closely related 
object. It is a figure of speech in which a 
thing or concept is called not by its own 
name but rather by the name of something 
associated in meaning with that thing or 
concept. The words "metonymy" and 
"metonym" come from the Greek: 
μετωνυμία, metōnymía, "a change of 
name", from μετά, metá, "after, beyond" 
and -ωνυμία, -ōnymía, a suffix used to 




metonym_for ◆ METONYM 
Ambiguity N, V, Aj, Av 
 
Something liable to more than one 
interpretation, explanation or meaning, if 
that meaning etc. cannot be determined 
from its context. 
Non-
directional 
Ambiguity ◆ RESOLVES 
 
Or: If there is ambiguity, 
then this is the occasion for 
the modeller to make clear 
similarities and 
distinctions. 
Note: N = 
nouns, Aj = 
adjectives, V 






Examples Commentary Direction Relation name Conceprocity 





An ontological relation that is used to 
describe cases where the lower-level 




supervenes_on None. The notion is 
inadmissible (Bunge 
2004b). Model by means of 
feedback via environment. 
Resemblance   “In the tropology of classical rhetoric, the 
place assigned to metaphor among the 
figures of signification is defined 
specifically by the role that the 
relationship of resemblance has in the 
transference from initial idea to new idea. 
Metaphor is the trope of resemblance par 
excellence.” (Ricoeur [1986] 2004, 205). 
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